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Abstract 
The project utilised an ethnographic approach, and the scholarship of Michel Foucault and 
João Biehl, to reconnect the wider social, political and institutional factors that were 
influential in the formation of a particular form of ADHD related health care.  By utilising 
various strands of theoretical and empirical material from both authors, the study aimed to 
reconnect the nexus of elements that conditioned the possibility for the everyday social 
practice of ADHD to be in place within an NHS region in Scotland.   
An overarching aim was to consider ADHD from outside its dominant biomedical 
explanation by examining the wider context and processes that conditioned the possibility 
for the emergence of a local social practice of ADHD inscription and treatment.  The 
investigation made use of the ethnographic approach of Vita: Life in a Zone of Social 
Abandonment as a methodological guide.  Vita reconnects the nexus of elements – the 
‘invisible machinery’ – that allowed for the subject of the project to be represented as 
mentally defective in the present.  This project attempts a similar methodological 
reconnection of the invisible machinery that conditioned the present, but with the social 
practice of ADHD as the focus.   
The analytic approach made use of the concept of ‘problematisation’, which captures a 
two-stage process – the questioning of how and why certain ‘things’ become a problem, 
but also how these ‘things’ are shaped as the objects that they become.  Objects are not 
considered as things that previously did not exist being created by discourse, but as things 
that become what they are because of their interconnected ‘apparatus’ – the totality of 
discursive and non-discursive elements that introduce them into the play of true and false.  
The object of interest for this project was ‘young people’ and how they were problematised 
and shaped as the target of certain knowledges.  It was through this process, the how of 
their construction as a problem, that the project made the connections that provided the 
authority for particular problem explanations to be installed as ‘real’ over other possibilities.  
The fieldwork was conducted in a small geographical region in Scotland and consisted of 
several periods in health and education services.  Along with extended periods in these 
domains, further ethnographic tools utilised included observation of clinical appointments, 
document analysis, interviews and archival research.  Multiple sources of information 
formed the qualitative data for the investigation, including audio recordings/transcription of 
clinical appointments, clinical case notes, health service management team meetings, and 
health and education policies and guidelines.  The different layers of qualitative material – 
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from individual appointment to national policy – allowed for reconnection of the discursive 
field in which the current practice of ADHD emerged.  The material was engaged with 
horizontally and vertically within and across the different layers of material, allowing for the 
examination of the changing discursive background and the problematisation of young 
people within education and health domains.  The analysis revealed discontinuity in how 
the ‘problem’ of young people was constructed across time, what was legitimated as 
solution to these problems, what effects were created, and what followed from these 
effects.   
The study is considered a Foucauldian-inspired ethnographic ‘case study’.  The thesis 
uses the various chapters to construct a genealogical account of the emergence of the 
local social practice of ADHD, one that maps and makes visible the multiplicity of events 
implicated in the construction of young people as particular types of problems and which 
conditioned the possibility for the social practice of ADHD to become the current means by 
which young people become known as problems.  The genealogy is considered a 
theoretical redescription of the rise of ADHD inscription and treatment locally, one that 
aims to trouble accepted explanations by revealing the wider complex network from which 
the social practice emerged.
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Establishing the research frame of reference  
In chapters 1 and 2, I shall establish the frame of reference for this investigation and 
outline the methodological plan that guided the investigation in the field.  Chapter 1 is 
offered in place of the requirement to conduct a ‘literature review’ as part of the University 
of Queensland PhD requirements.  My rationale for not providing a ‘review’ of the ADHD 
literature is because I take the position that reviewing this material would be nothing more 
than a reproduction of the ‘scientific truth value’ of ADHD (Biehl, 2005).  Rather than 
viewing the material as providing access to a ‘real’ account of ADHD, I consider it as 
constructing a rhetorical truth value, based on an enactment of procedures of objectivity, 
that provides ADHD its authority and which allows it to remain a dominant way of 
constructing young people considered problematic.  Instead, what is offered in place of a 
literature review, is a brief account of the positivist literature and then an expansion on the 
rationale for the rejection of this literature on ontological and epistemological grounds.  The 
remainder of the chapter then provides an account of the theory and concepts that 
underpin the approach that has guided this investigation.  This theoretical account is then 
expanded in Chapter 2, which is presented in two parts.  In the first part, I expand the 
theoretical account, providing a detailed theorising of the main analytical concept that 
guides the investigation – the apparatus.  This expansion follows a series of ‘questions’ 
that guided the theorising/expansion of the concept.  The concept is then placed with an 
account of methodological precautions and analytical steps.  In the second part of chapter 
2, I provide a detailed account of the procedures for enactment of the theoretical account 
offered in the first part of the chapter. 
Outlining ADHD: A brief account of the positivist literature 
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) is the most extensively studied area of 
child psychiatry and the most common psychiatric status ascribed to children worldwide 
(Timimi, 2005).  Since first appearing in the DSM-II (APA, 1968) as ‘Hyperkinetic Reaction 
of Childhood’, ADHD has undergone multiple changes in nomenclature and nosology with 
advocates arguing that this reflects the increasingly sophisticated understanding of the 
pathophysiology provided by research from neuroimaging studies (de Mello, Rossi, 
Cardoso, Rivero, De Moura, Nogueira et al., 2013); twin studies (Kuntsi, Pinto, Price, van 
der Meere, Frazier-Wood & Asherson, 2013); adoption studies (Harold, Leve, Barrett, 
Elam, Neiderhiser, Natsuaki et al., 2013); and genetics (Hawi, Matthews, Barry, Kirley, 
Wagner, Wallace et al., 2013).  This evidence is argued to highlight that ADHD is a 
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‘biologically driven, brain-based neuro-developmental disorder’ (Fischman & Madras, 
2005), the ‘most heritable psychiatric disorder’ (Faraone, Perlis, Doyle, Smoller, Goralnick, 
Holmgren & Sklar, 2005), arises from the ‘interplay of environmental risk factors and 
multiple susceptibility genes’ (Faraone, Perlis, Doyle, Smoller, Goralnick, Holmgren & 
Sklar, 2005) and is ‘associated with both structural and functional brain deficits’ (Seidman, 
Valera & Makris, 2005; Fischman & Madras, 2005). 
The above representation of ADHD is not the only one, however.  A brief review of ADHD 
literature highlights that there are as many critics as there are advocates, a whole range of 
competing possible causes of the ‘symptoms’ (Walker, 2004; DuPaul et al., 2001; Powell & 
Inglis-Powell, 1999; Armstrong, 1996; Shanahan, 2004; Smelter et al., 1996; Atkinson & 
Shute, 1999), as well multiple alternative explanatory frameworks that would allow for 
ADHD to be known in a completely different way (Conrad & Schneider, 1980; DeGrandpre, 
1999; Baughman, 2012; Breggin, 2002; Ideus, 1995; Slee, 1995; Prior, 1997; Baldwin, 
2000; Tait, 2006).  Even if a brief review were to be confined to only positivist experimental 
psychiatric and psychological research, there would be as many articles regarding the 
methodological failings of the ‘evidence’ as there are articles claiming to provide ‘evidence’ 
for ADHD.  As means of an example, contrast the questions asked of ADHD neuroimaging 
studies (Fox et al., 1995; Sowell et al., 2003; Castellanos et al., 2002; Walker, 1998); twin 
studies and adoption studies (Joseph, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006); and genetics studies 
(Bakker et al., 2005; Langley et al., 2005; Mill et al., 2005; Ogdie et al., 2003; Van der 
Meulen et al., 2005; Arcos-Burgos et al., 2004; Bakker et al., 2003; Fisher et al., 2002; 
Hebebrand, Dempfle, Saar et al., 2006) with the previously mentioned studies in each of 
these areas regarded as ‘evidence’ for ADHD.. 
Rejection of the positivist literature 
Given that ADHD has attracted trenchant criticism from many professionals within the field 
of child and adolescent mental health, as well as commentators and critics outside that 
field, and that increasingly sophisticated biomedical investigations have failed to produce 
conclusive evidence of genetic, biological or neurological indicators, why does diagnosis 
and treatment with stimulant medications continue apace?  There are many available 
answers to this question, all of which likely account towards the expansion.  For example, 
from an individual financial position, mental health diagnosis generally, and ADHD 
specifically, can increase financial support for young people and parents by £100-£200 per 
month (D'amico, Knapp, Beecham, Sandberg, Taylor, & Sayal, 2014).  This is not to say 
 17 
that those in receipt of welfare benefits are malingering, but that financial support for 
ADHD as disability may make acceptance of the biomedical explanation more likely for 
those in the lower SES bracket, the group that constitutes the bulk of those in receipt of 
the diagnosis (Currie & Stabile, 2006).  This financial support can also be extended into 
the education and health sectors, with additional financial support available to struggling 
schools and health services in order to assist them to meet government targets for waiting 
times and improved outcomes for those considered to have additional educational needs 
(these two issues will be explored later in the thesis).  However, a prominent factor in the 
expansion that must be acknowledged is the role of the pharmaceutical companies and 
their requirement for increased profit as well as the cultural capital gained by clinicians and 
researchers involved in ADHD (this also extended to critical researchers, like myself, who 
benefit from the very notion of ADHD as object of critique) (Fisher, 2008). 
Whilst some of these themes will appear in this thesis, they are not the focus.  Instead, my 
aim is to consider the question above: why does diagnosis and treatment with stimulant 
medications continue apace despite the failure of the evidence?  However, rather than 
entering the debate for and against ADHD that charaterises the mainstream psychological 
and psychiatric literature (of which these competing positions contribute), I will consider 
this phenomenon from a Foucauldian-inspired sociological perspective.  Thus, I do not 
subscribe to modernist assumptions of knowledge as cognitive representation of ‘what is 
the case’ in the ‘real world’ arrived at through positivist-inspired research based on 
rationality and empiricism.  To take this approach would imply that the symptoms of ADHD 
are naturally occurring phenomena embodied in the sufferer and that the diagnosis is 
globally and trans-historically applicable, ‘out there’ independent of its observers and 
awaiting discovery through objective observation and by experts (Pilgrim, 2007).   
Instead, my position throughout the project assumes infinitely many potential ‘reality-
versions’, each of which promotes the interests of some as opposed to other interest 
groups.  Reality-versions are considered to be constituted at intersections of societal 
structures and are socially manufactured through legitimation practices into ‘knowledges’.  
The reality-versions that I am interested in are ‘psy-complex’ reality-versions: “the 
heterogeneous knowledges, forms of authority and practical techniques that constitute 
psychological expertise” (Rose, 1999: vii).  As such, I do not consider psychological and 
psychiatric knowledges, such as ADHD, as a description of ‘real’ phenomena, but as 
constituting them and, in the process of so-doing, individualising, psychologising, 
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essentialising and naturalising as inevitable what are contingent socially constituted and so 
reconstitutable features of particular politico-socio-economic arrangements.   
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, and the various categories and concepts 
associated with these psy-complex reality-versions, are considered socially sanctioned 
ways of understanding the world.  By producing ‘positive knowledges’ and ‘plausible truth 
claims’ through ‘apparent dispassionate expertise’, these psy-complex reality-versions 
have not only made it possible for humans to understand themselves and others in ways 
that we have come to view as ‘psychological’ – personality, intelligence, self-esteem, 
behaviour, etc. – but have also made it difficult for humans to be conceived in ways 
outside of these knowledges.  These knowledges have come to enjoy the privileged 
position of ‘truth’ within our current historical and cultural period and have provided 
everyday social practices that reinforce their status as knowledge as well as reinforce the 
positions of the institutions that enact them. These knowledges, with their implicit norms, 
regulations, controls and various methods for shaping the individual in the image of the 
knowledge, have enwrapped us, influencing our thinking and judging, and how we act and 
interact. 
Our current dominant system of truthing structures truth as scientific knowledge; in this 
sense, ADHD, as an object of psychological and psychiatric knowledge, with its filtering 
through ‘objective’ scientific methods, and with its enunciation of and enunciation by 
multiple connected knowledges and practices – such as medical, psychiatric, 
psychological, educational – and as enacted by various positions of authority – such as 
psychiatrists, psychologists, teachers – has come to enjoy the privileged status of ‘truth’.  
The rules, according to which the true and the false are separated within the regime of 
‘truth’ of ADHD, evident in the debate between the ‘International Consensus Statement on 
ADHD’ (Barkley et al., 2002) and the ‘Critique of the International Consensus Statement 
on ADHD’ (Timimi et al., 2004), focus on the rules and procedures that enact ‘objectivity’ 
and ‘methodological rigour’, with conceptualisations that do not attend to these procedural 
requirements being assigned the status of ‘false’, or at best ‘methodologically flawed’. 
Established as truth within our present culture and historical period, ADHD has become 
embedded within laws, policy, training, ‘interventions’ and everyday language; these 
various elements are assembled together into apparatuses which produce, inscribe, 
examine, debate, analyse, theorise and, with the results, form further elements (Rose, 
1999).  It is within these apparatuses of psychological truth that human subjects are 
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‘assembled’, constituted as objects of psychological knowledge through various 
‘techniques of the self’ – the various “ways of thinking, judging and acting upon 
themselves” (Rose, 1999; p. xvi) articulated by the understandings presented by ‘psy’ 
knowledges that enwrap the everyday life of human beings.  
‘Truthing’ ADHD through psychiatric research 
Since its inception as the DSM (APA, 1957), the number of categories of classification has 
more than tripled, increasing from 112 to 374 in the DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000); with the 
release of the new edition (DSM-V: APA, 2013), further concepts and categories have 
been introduced.  These concepts and categories are further divided into ‘subtypes’ and 
‘symptomology’, allowing for an increasingly nuanced categorisation of human subjects.  
They have also become embedded in various forms into everyday life, through the 
internet, through television, through newspapers and magazines, transforming family 
relations by urging observation (‘watchful waiting’) (NICE, 2008; p. 15) and readiness to 
respond to the ‘signs of ADHD’ by placing the child in front of an ‘expert’.  And with the 
embedding of ADHD in policy and guidance, professional relations have also been 
transformed, with the role of pre-school assistants, class-room assistants, and teachers, 
extended into new areas of social management (Tait, 2001).  The techniques for managing 
difference have also burgeoned with the most common, psychostimulant medication, being 
the most controversial.  However, many further techniques are applied which, although 
less obvious, are no less insidious.  Take any guidance regarding ‘treatment’ of ADHD and 
you will have a stepwise approach to the management of difference refracted through an 
ADHD lens.   
The ‘discovery’ of ADHD is attributed to George Frederick Still. During the Goulstonian 
Lectures to the Royal College of Physicians in 1902, descriptions such as 
‘passionateness’, ‘spitefulness’, ‘cruelty’, ‘jealousy’, ‘lawlessness’, ‘immodesty’, ‘sexual 
immorality’, and ‘viciousness’ (Still, 1902; p. 1009) were presented as signs of a ‘defect of 
moral control’ in children who were deemed too intelligent for the behaviours to be 
associated with ‘disorders of intellect’; the ‘defect of moral control’ was considered a 
“manifestation of some morbid physical condition” (ibid.; p. 1165).  These descriptions 
have been presented by mainstream literature as early ‘proof’ of ADHD before being 
refined by the ‘progress of clinical practice’ and ‘scientific investigation’, both by advocates 
(see: Barkley, 1990; 1991; 1997) as well as critics (see: Armstrong, 1995; Breggin, 1998) 
of ADHD.  However, if one were to foreground the controversies and disputes over truth 
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and the deployment of various elements in order to establish authority and dominance of 
‘hyperkinesis’ as an ‘organic child psychiatric disorder’, it can be argued that the 
emergence of this particular object of psychiatric knowledge was not ‘discovered’, but was 
constituted though an interconnected nexus of discourses, knowledges, practices, and 
procedures.   
As highlighted by Rose (1999), the conditions of possibility for ‘psy’ knowledges, such as 
ADHD, to emerge are “themselves practical and institutional, involving the collection of 
persons together in particular places, their organisation within particular practices and the 
grids of perception and judgement that are thrown over conduct and competencies as a 
consequence [...]; psychological phenomena [...] are thus the outcome of a complex 
process of production, requiring the alignment of entities, forces, gazes and thought” (p. 
xv).  This is apparent in the series of meetings held between 1948 and 1951 and published 
in the Journal of Orthopsychiatry between 1949 and 1952 (see: Healy, 1949).  These 
publications detail a series of discussions between representatives of the institutions of 
psychiatry, paediatrics and criminal justice; the focus in the meetings was the applicability 
of the category of ‘psychopath’, an object of a moral discourse, when applied to children.  
It is argued that these meetings paved the way for judgements of morality to slide into 
obscurity and be replaced solely with a psychiatric judgement; the particular ‘alignment of 
entities, forces, gazes and thought’ within these meetings allowed for ‘psychiatric’ 
judgements to be ‘thrown over the conduct and competencies’ of certain groups of children 
and conditioned the possibility for the emergence of the ‘organicity of hyperkinesis’ 
(Knobel, Wolman & Mason, 1959), the category from which the modern concept of ADHD 
emerged. 
The ‘truthing’ of ‘hyperkinesis’ as ‘biological’ in origin and as an ‘organic child psychiatric 
disorder’ allowed for conduct and competencies that were previously considered a moral 
concern and for emergence of the rhetorical ‘scientific-ness’ of ADHD upon which the 
current battle over truth is fought; once this ‘truth’ was established, brought into existence, 
further explored, dissected, analysed, and classified, a ‘family of descriptions’ that formed 
one version of reality to the exclusion of other versions of reality emerged.  And once this 
‘family of descriptions’ took hold, the production of other ‘families of descriptions’ were 
closed off as forms of research and investigation followed one path at the expense of 
others (Rose, 1999; p. xvi).  The family of descriptors that currently provide the intelligibility 
of ADHD are provided by the biomedical discourse, which upturned the psychodynamic 
discourse that dominated psychiatric knowledge in the DSM in which Hyperkinetic 
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Reaction of Childhood first appeared.  This shift in ‘aetiological focus’ emerged from 
controversies and disputes over the ‘truth’ between a ‘neo-Kraepelinian’ paradigm 
(Klerman, 1978) and a ‘psychodynamic paradigm’ between the second and third editions 
of the DSM; through this confrontation, the concept of ‘reactions’ associated with the 
‘psychodynamic paradigm’ (Millon, 1986) was replaced by descriptors of the expression of 
disorders and claims of being “atheoretical with regard to aetiology” (Klerman, 1978; p. 7).  
It is through this shift that the principles of the descriptive classification system of Emil 
Kraepelin (Kraepelin, 1913) and the notion of biological aetiology was reintroduced to 
psychiatry, which allowed for burgeoning of research in order to establish the biological 
origins of psychiatric disorders; the ‘family of descriptions’ and associated practices that 
have taken hold are connected to the modernist scientific discourse, allowing ADHD to be 
constituted as a ‘biologically driven, brain-based neuro-developmental disorder’. 
The rise of ADHD 
Despite the dubious origins of scientific-ness of ADHD (Foucault, 1980) and being 
considered the most controversial child psychiatric disorder (Wolraich, 1999), the number 
of children receiving the diagnosis, and the resulting treatment with stimulant medication, 
has risen exponentially in recent years (Radcliffe & Timimi, 2005). For example, in the UK, 
a recent report on the safe management of controlled drugs (CQC, 2013) highlighted that 
prescriptions of Methylphenidate increased by 236,937 between 2007 and 2012 in NHS 
settings in England, an increase of 56% on the 2007 figure.  Scotland saw a similar 
increase in the prescription of Methylphenidate.  According to the Information Services 
Division (ISD, 2012) of the NHS National Services Scotland, the number of prescriptions of 
Methylphenidate increased from approximately 43 Defined Daily Doses (DDD: per 1000 of 
the 0–19 population) to approximately 91 Defined Daily Doses (per 1000 of the 0–19 
population) which, based on the Scottish populations of 0–19-year-olds for 2002 
(1,210,000) and 2011 (1,172,000) (GROS, 2013), was an increase of 54,600 prescriptions 
(an increase of 105% on the 2002 figure).  However, these figures only cover the NHS 
prescriptions for Methylphenidate in England and Scotland; they do not include Northern 
Ireland and Wales, prescriptions for ADHD drugs other than Methylphenidate or private 
prescriptions.  A wider view is provided by the International Narcotics Control Board 
(INCB, 2012); in 2011, the UK had a prescription rate of 0.06 per 1000 inhabitants per day 
on all forms of medical amphetamine: at the 2011 census population estimate of 63.2 
million, this suggests approximately 3.79 million people were taking a form of medical 
amphetamine in 2011.  This increasing diagnosis and treatment with stimulant medication 
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has also been mirrored in Australia; the number of boys diagnosed increased from 2,200 
to 20,800 between 1988 and 1998, with the number of girls diagnosed doubling in the 
same period (Davis et al., 2001, cited in Graham, 2008).  Between 2000 and 2011, 
prescriptions of stimulant medication increased by 72.9% (Stephenson, Karanges & 
McGregor, 2013) making Australia the third highest prescriber of stimulant medication 
behind Canada and the USA (Mitchell, 2004, cited in Graham, 2008). 
As highlighted above, ADHD is a global phenomenon; its visibility as explanation for 
children’s behaviour has become more and more prominent, to the exclusion of multiple 
alternative explanations.  It is now common parlance, appearing in newspapers; television 
shows; radio shows; popular magazines; the internet; on leaflets in GP surgeries and 
schools; and even as an ‘app’ available for smart phones and tablets (see: ADHD 
Psychopharmacology by SoftPsych or ADDitude Magazine by New Hope Media).  It also 
appears to be accepted without question by those that are the focus; in my role as a 
clinical psychologist in a Child and Adolescent Mental Health Service (CAMHS), many of 
the families I met had requested appointments to discuss whether their son or daughter 
‘had’ ADHD.  This was not confined to families with young children; families of teenagers 
would request appointments, teenagers themselves would request appointments, 
professionals working with young people would request appointments.  What makes this 
extraordinary is that, whilst ADHD has been available as an explanation in various forms 
since the 1950s, the rise of the current epidemic of ADHD commenced in the mid 1980s, 
with a continued rise from its initial emergence.  This is evident in the diagnosis rates listed 
previously, but also highlighted clearly in Table 1 below. The chart was constructed using 
‘Google Books Ngram Viewer’, which charts frequency of appearance of specified words in 
books printed between 1800 and 2008 (Google, 2016).  Table 2 focused on the period 
between 1980 and 2008. 
Table 1: Frequency of appearance of ‘ADHD’: 1800-2008  
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Table 2: Frequency of appearance of ‘ADHD’: 1980-2008 
 
This begs the question: why then?  What was significant about this period that allowed for 
the explanation offered by psychiatric discourse to become so dominant?  The answer 
provided by proponents of ADHD is that the condition is better recognised due to improved 
training for health and education professionals, improved screening tools, better treatment 
regimens, and the accumulation of knowledge regarding the anatomy and structure of the 
brain (Anastopoulos, Barkley & Shelton, 1994; Mandell, Thompson, Weintraub et al., 2005; 
Lange, Reichl, Lange et al., 2010); the implicit proposition here is that lack of awareness, 
poor training, unprecise screening tools, unwillingness to accept diagnosis due to poor 
treatment options, and lack of knowledge and technology for understanding the origins of 
the condition have led to an underdiagnoses of the disorder until now. 
Date 
Frequency as %
  
Date 
Frequency as %
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Problematising ADHD diagnoses 
The aim of this project is to question the rising diagnosis rates and the explanations 
offered for this rise from a Foucauldian-inspired standpoint.  The rising diagnosis of ADHD 
has not gone unquestioned; a recent critique of the expansion of the disorder cited several 
factors, including a transnational pharmaceutical industry; western psychiatry; increasing 
usage of the DSM diagnostic criteria; ease of access to online screening checklists; and 
advocacy groups.  I do not dispute these factors as contributing to the rising diagnosis 
rates, but my point of focus will be different; instead of considering the vehicles that may 
have allowed for the concept to become more accessible, I aim to consider how the 
everyday social practice of ADHD has contributed to the burgeoning of usage and, thus, 
contributed to the rising rates of diagnoses. 
To do so, the project has utilised the concept of problematisation.  The concept relates to 
Foucault’s focus on what he called ‘the history of thought’, which was described as an 
analysis of the way “institutions, practices, habits and behaviours become a problem for 
people who behave in specific sorts of ways, who have certain types of habits, who 
engage in certain kinds of practices, and who put to work certain types of institutions”.  
Utilising the concept involves analysis of “the way an unproblematic field of experience, or 
set of practices, which were accepted without question, which were familiar and ‘silent’, out 
of discussion, becomes a problem, raises discussion and debate, incites new reactions, 
and induces a crisis in previously silent behaviour, habits, practices, and institutions” 
(Foucault, 2001; p. 74).  Thus, the project aims to examine, and call into the question, the 
gathering together, characterisation, analysis, and management (Foucault, 2001) of young 
people through ADHD.  To do so, my aim is to examine the interconnected nexus of 
discourses, power/knowledges, practices, and procedures through which young people 
are constituted as ‘having’ ADHD. 
Discourse, power and knowledge 
The concept of discourse within Foucault’s writing is particularly elusive and difficult to 
define, mainly due to the different ways in which the concept was used in different stages 
of his writing; for example, sometimes it was considered to represent a ‘general domain of 
all statements’, sometimes it represented an ‘individualisable group of statements’, and 
other times it was considered as a ‘regulated practice that accounts for a number of 
statements’ (Foucault, 1972; p. 8).  For the purposes of this project, discourse is referring 
to the way it is used in the third definition above: that discourses consist of multiple 
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statements that cohere and produce meaning and effects in the ‘real’ world (Carabine, 
2001).  By referring to ‘real’ in inverted commas, I am not suggesting that reality does not 
exist, but that the material things to which the categories and concepts that structure our 
world refer, have their meanings inscribed upon them by these categories and concepts, 
and that these categories and concepts gain their specific meaning from the discourse to 
which they belong.  Thus, discourse is considered as a group of statements that belong to 
a single formation of knowledge (O’Farrell, 2005) and which “systematically form the 
objects of which they speak” (Foucault, 1972; p. 54).  However, discourses should not be 
considered as an expression or representation of reality; not only do they produce the 
objects of which they speak, but they constitute particular realities over other realities 
through defining and establishing what is considered ‘truth’ at particular historical moments 
through a “whole series of particular mechanisms, definable and defined, that seem 
capable of inducing behaviours or discourses” (Foucault, 1996; p. 394).  Thus, the 
inscription of meaning by discourse constitutes reality, fixing particular understandings and 
their associated ways for thinking, talking and acting, thereby legitimating the practices 
and consequences of ordering our world in that particular way (Burr, 1995; Gergen, 1985).   
It is these ‘discourse effects’, the structuring of the commonly accepted understandings of 
our world, and the practices and procedures that have been produced in relation to these 
effects, that are of particular interest to me.  As I mentioned earlier, the discourse of ADHD 
structures commonly accepted understandings about young people, and it has become 
common practice to problematise young people’s behaviour through this particular form of 
knowledge.  As such, various forms of difference are constructed as ‘behavioural 
symptoms’ – for example, being ‘unable to sustain attention or follow through on 
instructions’, being ‘easily distracted’, having an ‘inability to inhibit response’, having an 
‘excessively high level of activity’ – and management of these behavioural symptoms 
through psychological and psychiatric ‘treatments’ has exponentially increased as a 
consequence of these effects.  Discourses are able to achieve these effects, to specify 
‘what is’ and ‘what is not’ in the ‘true’, through being entwined with power/knowledge 
(Carabine, 2001).  Discourses are historically variable ways of specifying ‘truth’, with 
knowledge being produced by effects of power and considered as ‘truth’ (Carabine, 2001); 
thus, power functions through discourse, it is constitutive of and is constituted by 
discourse, thus enabling the fixing of reality through the effects it creates and the ‘truths’ it 
establishes.  This fixing of reality should not be considered complete, however; we can 
question our current reality through discourse as it can be both an instrument and an effect 
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of power, but also a hindrance, a starting point for an opposing strategy, as discourse can 
undermine and expose power, rendering it fragile and making it possible to thwart 
(Foucault, 1998; pp. 100–101).  
The conception of power offered by Foucault is radically different from previous 
understandings of power offered within the social sciences; for him, power should be 
considered as diffuse rather than concentrated, embodied and enacted rather than 
possessed, enabling rather than purely coercive, and as constitutive of subject positions 
rather than deployed by them (Gaventa, 2003).  He also did not see knowledge as 
separate from society or as objective and value free; there is “not knowledge on one side 
and society on the other, or science and the state, but only the fundamental forms of 
knowledge/power” (Foucault, quoted in Sheridan, 1980; p. 283).  Thus, for Foucault, 
knowledge and power are entwined: knowledge cannot be formed “without a system of 
communications, records, accumulation and displacement which is in itself a form of power 
and which is linked, in its existence and functioning, to the other forms of power” (Foucault, 
1997; p. 131).  Conversely, it is not possible for power to be exercised “without the 
extraction, appropriation, distribution or retention of knowledge” (ibid.; p. 131).    
Foucault’s account of discourse and power/knowledge has implications for how we can 
understand ourselves; if the various knowledges that structure the social world cannot be 
considered objective truths, but constituted by discourse and power/knowledge, then the 
ways in which we understand the human subject must be seen as socially constituted and 
historically and culturally contingent.  In this sense, the ‘truth’ of human subjects presented 
by psychological knowledge as possessing fixed, authentic characteristics or essences is 
called into question; people, or rather, the subject positions that people inhabit are 
considered the product of power/knowledge, constituted as an object of psychological 
knowledge through various technologies of power and self (Foucault, 1988).  Technologies 
of power are seen as ‘any assembly of practical rationality governed by a more or less 
conscious goal’ (Rose, 1996; p. 26), ‘an assemblage of knowledge, instruments, persons, 
buildings and spaces which act on human conduct from a distance’ (Arribas-Ayllon & 
Walkerdine, 2008).  Technologies of self are considered as the various techniques and 
strategies that allow individuals to work on themselves – their thoughts, actions, bodies, 
conduct – in order to self-govern in relation to the norms and orders of particular forms of 
knowledge (Foucault, 1988). 
Power, therefore, is considered to function through the subject positions constituted by 
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discourse, as functioning through diverse social practices, and as productive, as 
constitutive of the discourses and knowledges that structure our ways of knowing 
ourselves and others and the subject positions that reinforce these forms of knowledge.  
However, the particular ‘truths’ that structure our social world subjugate alternative 
possible ‘truths’ by limiting alternative ways of thinking, being and talking through rules that 
govern what can be considered as true or false knowledge (Foucault, 1975); thus, power 
should be seen as both a productive and constraining force (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002).  
In coupling both power and knowledge, Foucault (1980) indicates that power and 
knowledge are co-determinant; power is always bound up with knowledge – they 
presuppose one another, co-contributing to the production of the subject positions that 
come to be inscribed upon us and the objects (including alternate subject positions) that 
we can know about (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002).  Thus, power/knowledge provides the 
conditions of possibility for the social world; power produces the subject positions, the 
objects, concepts and categories, creating difference in their individual characteristics and 
relationships by attaching them to specific discourses and knowledges (Jørgensen & 
Phillips, 2002).   
Discipline and governmentality 
Foucault’s two descriptions of power – disciplinary and governmentality – can be 
conceptualised as different historical configurations of power/knowledge (O’Farrell, 2005).  
The historical configuration of disciplinary power can be conceived of as a ‘technology’ that 
gathers information on the body via mechanisms of individualisation and surveillance and 
which uses this knowledge to induce certain forms of conduct, behaviour, performance, 
and capacities.  Through producing certain knowledges of the body, power is able to train 
the body in certain ways, to perform certain functions and actions; this ‘micro-physics of 
power’, as Foucault termed it, “reaches into the very grain of individuals, touches their 
bodies and inserts itself into their attitudes and actions, their discourses, learning 
processes and everyday lives” (1980; p. 39).   
The configuration of power termed governmentality can be considered as the present 
configuration of power (although not superseding disciplinary).  By government, Foucault 
is referring to the techniques and procedures which govern and guide our conduct, “the 
broad sense of techniques and procedures for directing human behaviour” (Foucault, 
1997; p. 82).  In this configuration, power is conceived as operating through specific 
institutions and their practices in order to exert control, but a control that acts upon 
 28 
subjects through various forms of dominant knowledges (Foucault, 2003) and, instead of 
restricting freedoms, it allows for the incorporation of these into the mechanisms which 
guide people’s behaviour in the social body (O’Farrell, 2005).  Further, the enactment of 
power does not occur solely within the confines of schools or hospitals, as with disciplinary 
power (although it continues to be enacted there also), but throughout the social body, 
through the numerous activities and relationships to which we are located: we, individual 
human subjects, form this network when we act in the name of a particular knowledge, 
perform a role for a particular institution, or attempt to act upon the actions of others (or 
ourselves) to influence thinking, judging, or acting. 
Foucault’s concept of discourse and power/knowledge questions our accepted ‘truths’ – 
they must be considered as the product of discourse; as embedded in, and produced by, 
the functioning of systems of power acting through discourse (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002).  
The truths that structure our understanding of the world do not refer to ‘real’ facts about the 
world; they discursively constitute our world, organising knowledge in particular ways, thus 
providing the intelligible background that governs what can be thought, said or done.  
Thus, ADHD and the ADHD young person are, therefore, seen as products, constituted 
though psychological and psychiatric power/knowledge (Foucault, 1980).  The ADHD 
young person is also constituted as ‘real’ in the day-to-day talk and action of a multitude of 
professionals and experts as well as by families and young people themselves when they 
come to know themselves through ADHD knowledge.  If we understand forms of 
knowledge, such as ADHD, as modes of governing the conduct of children and families  
(Foucault, 2003), as part of the ‘myriad methods for shaping human subjects’ behaviour 
and action through the deployment of “programmes, strategies, techniques” that “act upon 
the action of others for certain ends” (Rose, 1999; p. xxi), then ADHD should also be 
understood as the subjugation of young people “in the reality of a social practice through 
mechanisms of power that adhere to a truth” (Foucault, 1997; p. 47).  The particular ‘truth’ 
is the biomedical ‘truth’; the social practices structured and warranted by this, and which 
subjugate young people, are psychiatric and psychological diagnoses and intervention. 
Governmentality and the apparatus of truth 
In ‘two histories of the truth’, Foucault (1994; p. 4) describes two approaches to history: 
one which was concerned with the development and regulation of forms of scientific 
knowledge and one which was concerned with human subjects’ relation to ‘truth’.  In this 
second ‘external’ history, he draws attention to how subjects’ relation to truth is defined by 
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subjectivity, types of knowledge, and fields of objects.  This relation to ‘truth’ is considered 
to be formed by apparatuses of power.  Foucault describes the ‘apparatus’ as “a 
thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural 
forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, 
philosophical, moral, and philanthropic propositions [...], the apparatus itself is the system 
of relations that can be established between these elements” (1980; p. 194).  The concept 
was utilised to demonstrate the problematisation of ‘sexuality’ in the History of Sexuality 
and to demonstrate the problematisation of the ‘delinquent child’ in Discipline and Punish.  
Rose (1999) also made use of the concept in his previously discussed investigation of the 
development of ‘psy’ knowledges to highlight the conditions under which their truths, facts 
and explanations came to be formulated and accepted. 
The concept of the apparatus will also be utilised in this project.  In following Foucault, it is 
my contention that it is within apparatuses of psychological and psychiatric ‘truth’ that the 
ADHD child is ‘assembled’, constituted through discourse, power/knowledge and the 
practices and procedures that have been constituted by this enmeshment of discourse and 
power.  The most complete description of the apparatus has already been partially 
described above; however, the full statement offers further detail with Foucault adding 
what he was trying to identify with the apparatus:  
“[...] the nature of the connection that can exist between these heterogeneous 
elements.  Thus, a particular discourse can figure at one time as a 
programme of an institution, and at another it can function as a means of 
justifying or masking a practice which itself remains silent, or as a secondary 
reinterpretation of this practice, opening out for it a new field of rationality.  In 
short, between these elements, whether discursive or non-discursive, there is 
a sort of interplay of shifts of positions and modifications of function which can 
also vary very widely.  Thirdly, I understand by the term ‘apparatus’ a sort of – 
shall we say – formation which has as its major function at a given historical 
moment that of responding to an urgent need.  The apparatus thus has a 
dominant strategic function.  This may have been, for example, the 
assimilation of a floating population found to be burdensome for an essentially 
mercantilist economy: there was a strategic imperative acting here as the 
matrix for an apparatus which gradually undertook the control or subjection of 
madness, mental illness and neurosis” (Foucault, 1980; pp. 195-196)   
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What is indicated by Foucault is that the apparatus should be considered as a formation of 
both the ‘discursive’ and the ‘non-discursive’; it is outlined as consisting of multiple 
heterogeneous elements, one being discourse, but also non-discursive elements, such as 
architectural forms, regulatory decisions, administrative measures, etc.  If one considers 
discourses as “practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak” 
(Foucault, 1972; p. 54) and as one element of the apparatus along with multiple others, 
discursive and ‘non-discursive’, Foucault appears to be indicating that the apparatus is a 
more comprehensive object of study, one that allows for examination of the ‘materiality’ of 
discourse (Jäger & Maier, 2009).  This is also outlined in both of the texts in which 
Foucault utilises the apparatus as a methodological tool: Discipline and Punish (1977) and 
The History of Sexuality (1998).  In Discipline and Punish, Foucault highlights the shift in 
forms of punishment from torture to imprisonment; his description of the ‘carceral system’ 
highlights the combining “[...] in a single figure discourses and architectures, coercive 
regulations and scientific propositions, real social effects and invincible Utopias, 
programmes for correcting delinquents and mechanisms for that reinforce delinquency” (p. 
271).  In The History of Sexuality, Foucault outlines the movement between two different 
apparatuses (of kinship and of sexuality) which allowed for the emergence of the 
technology of sexuality; these two apparatuses are contrasted term by term, outlining 
‘elements’ in each, as well as their strategic function (pp. 106–107).  In another text, 
further clues as to what can be considered ‘elements’ within an apparatus are offered 
(Foucault, 2000; p. 284): “there is nothing to be gained from describing this autonomous 
layer of discourse unless one can relate it other layers, practices, institutions, social 
relations, political relations, and so on.  It is the relationship that has always interested 
me”, which further reinforces the notion of the apparatus as the material existence of 
discourse (O’Farrell, 2005). 
If Foucault’s point that the apparatus ‘has as its major function at a given historical 
moment that of responding to an urgent need’ is considered alongside the way he utilised 
the concept in Discipline and Punish (1977) and The History of Sexuality (1998), changing 
historical relationships between discourses and apparatuses are highlighted as important 
to consider.  In both of these texts, historically specific apparatuses are shown to emerge 
from previously unrelated apparatuses; this occurred through the production and 
accommodation of various new and unforeseen elements, generated through the strategic 
aim in which they were engaged.  This is most clearly laid out in The History of Sexuality 
with the emergence of the ‘sexuality’ from the elements that formed the ‘alliance’.  Both 
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apparatuses were formations that consisted of the same elements; however, the 
readjustments of these elements allowed for the strategic objective to shift from the 
reproduction of “the interplay of relations” and the maintenance of “the law that governs 
them” [apparatus of alliance] to the “continual extension of areas and forms of control” 
[apparatus of sexuality] (Foucault, 1998; p. 117).  Through the shifting of the elements that 
formed the intelligible background of the apparatus of alliance, sexuality emerged, along 
with a proliferation of associated discourses, institutions, knowledges, practices, norms, 
rules, relations and techniques of power that maintained it as an object of thought.  What 
was also demonstrated was that the shifting elements were not the result of the agentic 
action of individuals or powerful institutions, but the chance production of unforeseen 
effects and the attempts of the apparatus to accommodate these within its various 
interconnected, heterogeneous, elements.  It was through this double process of “strategic 
elaboration” and “functional overdetermination”, according to Foucault (1994; p. 195), that 
the technology of sexuality was produced and then accommodated as a tool for “social 
control and political subjugation” (Foucault, 1998; p. 123). 
The ‘management’ function of the apparatus is also worth considering in more detail due to 
its importance in highlighting the empirical relationship that connects the discursive and 
non-discursive (Jäger & Maier, 2009).  The strategic aim of the apparatus was clearly 
outlined by Foucault when he highlighted the role of the apparatus in the governance of a 
burdensome ‘floating population’, which posed a problem for the particular economic 
arrangements at the time.  As outlined by Foucault, the apparatus was an ensemble of 
elements which mobilised around a particular problem and it was their connection that 
gave form to the apparatus; the elements were connected by the common purpose they 
served, the particular problem or ‘urgent need’ that was driving the strategic imperative 
(Jäger & Maier, 2009).  In effect, the ‘problem’ at the centre of the apparatus binds the 
apparatus together, providing the intelligible background from its connected elements.  It is 
this intelligible background that continues to make visible the ‘problem’ that the apparatus 
relies upon it for visibility by conditioning what is possible to think, say and do in relation to 
the ‘problem’. 
The apparatus as analytical focus 
Although the study does not use the term ‘apparatus’, Vita: Life in a Zone of Social 
Abandonment (Biehl, 2005) adopts a methodological approach that reconnected the 
various large-scale economic, political and medical reforms and changing family relations 
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that allowed for certain ways of being to be represented as mentally defective and socially 
unproductive and for abandonment in a “dump site of human beings” (Biehl, 2005; p. 1) to 
be considered acceptable.  In a ‘progressive unravelling’ of the story of Catarina, the 
investigation charts the many domestic and institutional events through which she was 
rendered mentally defective and socially unproductive.  Once rendered defective and 
unproductive, the shifting, changing forms of judgement that had taken hold in domestic 
households and medical establishments allowed family, neighbours, and medical 
professionals to consider the act of abandonment in ‘zones of social abandonment’ as 
unproblematic and acceptable.  Utilising the concept of a “bureaucratic and domestic 
machinery […] that authorises the real” (ibid.; p. 10), the investigation reconnected the 
complex network of family, medicine, state, and economy in which the abandonment took 
form, highlighting reality as conditioned by multiple economic, political, social events.  It is 
against this shifting background of intelligibility that judgements of normalcy are made.  
And it is against this shifting background that the practices and procedures for the 
management of what falls outside normalcy are constructed.  With these shifts and 
changes, the boundaries of what it is possible to think, say and do are continually 
changing, determining the life possibilities and conditions of representation that are 
available for understanding ourselves and others.  Throughout the story, Catarina’s voice 
can be seen to be annulled at various life stages by the power relations in which she was 
caught; her gradual construction as mentally defective and socially unproductive within the 
foreground of multiple economic, political, social events eventually allowed for the removal 
of alternative understandings and replacement with an explanation that allowed for 
abandonment to be seen as unproblematic and acceptable. 
As I mentioned above, the concept of the apparatus was not utilised in Vita; however, the 
study utilised the concept of ‘invisible machinery’ that ‘authorised the real’.  The concept of 
the ‘invisible machinery’ consisted of various, heterogeneous, interconnected parts and, 
through various shifts and changes, produced unforeseen effects that were then 
appropriated to extend its reach.  Both The History of Sexuality and Vita also suggest that 
forms of governance are shaped by ‘machinery’ or ‘apparatuses’; specifically, the way the 
family and individuals are shaped in accordance with the changing institutional 
knowledges and practices that are interconnected with elements of other apparatuses.  
Vita is also a ‘progressive unravelling’ of the ‘the knotted reality’ of Catarina’s condition.  
By reconstructing this ‘machinery’, Vita highlighted that as the conditions of our lives and 
the parameters of our local worlds change, our “most intimate processes: emotion, 
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cognitive style, memory, our deepest sense of self” are remade (Kleinman & Fitz-Henry, 
2007; p. 55).  Thus, by investigating the concrete constellations in which people’s lives are 
forged and foreclosed, our ‘naturalised’ understanding of what is socially possible and 
desirable can be disturbed and enlarged (Kleinman & Fitz-Henry, 2007; p. 55). 
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Chapter 2: Part 1 
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Methodological plan 
As was highlighted in the previous chapter, ADHD is a global phenomenon; the rates of 
diagnoses and treatment with psychostimulant medication have risen exponentially since 
the 1980s.  One could argue that this rise in visibility of the practice has rendered it difficult 
to conceive of young people outside of its explanation.  But given that the explanation has 
been around in various forms since the 1950s, why did it gain traction at this specific 
historical and cultural moment?  This is the question that that led me to conduct this 
investigation.  There have been previous studies that have asked similar questions, such 
as Conrad and Bergey’s (2014) investigation of the expansion and growth of the disorder.  
In their important study, the differences in expansion and usage of ADHD as disorder was 
examined within the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy and Brazil, allowing the 
identification and description of several vehicles that facilitated a global migration of the 
diagnosis.  The vehicles identified included the transnational pharmaceutical industry; the 
influence of western psychiatry; moving from ICD to DSM diagnostic criteria; the role of the 
Internet including the related advent of easily accessible online screening checklists; and 
advocacy groups.  However, as mentioned earlier, there are potentially multiple 
explanations that intersect to explain the expansion of ADHD, but this investigation 
considered the question from a Foucauldian-inspired standpoint by utilising the 
methodological concept of the ‘apparatus’ outlined in the previous chapter, making the 
investigation ontological and epistemologically distinct from Conrad and Bergey’s (2014) 
investigation.  
The main line of enquiry that formed the basis of this investigation aimed to provide an 
understanding of how the ‘intelligible background’ provided by the apparatus, upon which 
the everyday thought and action that informed the social practice of diagnosis and 
treatment of ADHD had come to be formed.  By utilising the concept of the apparatus, the 
answer to the question was to be found in the connections between the elements of the 
apparatus that provide the field of intelligibility upon which the actions that constitute 
ADHD take place.  Thus, the investigation focused on the everyday thought and action that 
informed the social practice of ADHD by examining the day-to-day functioning of a United 
Kingdom National Health Service (NHS) Child and Adolescent Mental Health Service 
(CAMHS) and the various networks of relations that were involved in the social practice of 
ADHD across this interconnected system.  The aim of focusing on the day-to-day 
functioning of these institutions was not to reveal who or what was involved, but to grasp 
the “conditions that make these acceptable at a given moment” (Foucault, 1991; p. 75).  
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Like Foucault, my hypothesis was that the thought and action that informed the social 
practice of ADHD was not “just governed by institutions, prescribed by ideologies, guided 
by pragmatic circumstances […] but, up to a point, possess their own specific regularities, 
logic, strategy, self-evidence, and reason” (ibid.; p. 75).  By approaching the investigation 
this way, by asking how it became possible for the ideas and actions of ADHD, and the 
authorities that perform them, to be in place in the present moment, the investigation was 
interested in the various events and transformations that conditioned the possibility for the 
current social practice, that constitutes the ADHD young person, to exist.  By considering 
the various events and transformations that allowed the emergence of these social 
practices, I am also questioning the role of local ‘micro-practices’ in the emergence and 
exponential rise of ADHD knowledge and practice more generally.  By micro-practices, I 
am referring to the repetition, on a regular basis, of the myriad interactions that are 
required to ‘enact’ particular forms of social relations in which certain realties are 
maintained (Bacchi & Goodwin, 2016).   
In this chapter, I attempt to sketch out the methodological plan, but as there is no 
delineated Foucauldian approach to research, with Foucault himself against prescription 
(Foucault, 1994), I shall not attempt to provide a ‘step-by-step’ guide for conducting 
Foucauldian-inspired ethnographic fieldwork.  Instead, the remainder of the chapter will be 
structured around the ‘questions’ I asked myself when elaborating the concept of the 
apparatus into the methodological plan that guided my investigation in the field.   
What is an ‘apparatus’? 
The most widely circulated statement regarding the apparatus can be found in 
Power/Knowledge (Foucault, 1980); here, the apparatus is defined as a heterogeneous 
collection consisting of various elements, including discourses, along with “the said as 
much as the unsaid” (p. 194).  As highlighted by Peltonen (2004), the multiple elements, 
both discursive and non-discursive, indicate the apparatus as a comprehensive object of 
study.  Although included as an element, the apparatus moves beyond discourse to 
include “other layers”, such as “practices, institutions, social relations, political relations, 
and so on” (Foucault, 1998; pp. 284–5).  This is also articulated by Rabinow and Rose 
(2003); the authors endorse the apparatus as “one of the most powerful conceptual tools 
introduced by Foucault” (p. 9) as it allowed researchers to move beyond the “confines of 
social theory concepts, such as institutions, classes, cultures and ideas, ideologies, beliefs 
and prejudices”.  However, the very term ‘apparatus’ needs to be considered further due to 
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occluding much of the distinct conceptual linages from the original French ‘dispositif’ 
(Bussolini, 2010). 
This is highlighted clearly at the start of the series of lectures on Psychiatric Power (2008); 
the translator notes state that “there does not seem to be a satisfactory English equivalent 
for the particular way in which Foucault uses this term to designate a configuration or 
arrangement of elements and forces, practices and discourses, power and knowledge, that 
is both strategic and technical” (ibid.; p. xxiii).  The comprehensiveness of the concept is 
articulated in the original French term: ‘le dispositif’ is used to describe an arrangement 
that has been set up for a specific purpose and which has been designed to have some 
form of immediate effect (Raffnsøe, Gudmand-Høyer & Thaning, 2014).  Agamben (2009) 
offers further examples, highlighting ‘dispositif’ as referring to the part of a legal judgment 
that contains the decision, or the enacting clause of the law; the way parts of a ‘machine’ 
are arranged or, more specifically, the ‘diagram’ of the arrangement of the components of 
the machinery (Raffnsøe et al., 2014); and, in a military context, the set of means arranged 
according to a plan (Agamben, 2009).  This military definition is expanded by Raffnsøe et 
al. (2014) who add that the term designates the carrying out of the military plan in time and 
space, with the particular means available, and with characteristics of the opponent in 
mind.  In addition to these translations, the etymology provided by Raffnsøe et al. (2014) is 
particularly informative: in both French and English, the term derives from the Latin 
‘dispositivus’, which refers to a certain ‘something’ that has certain ‘attributes’.  Both the 
adjective and its substantive form are considered to be derivatives of the Latin verb 
‘dispōnăre’, which ‘set in order’, ‘arrange’, ‘dispose’, or ‘form’; the authors indicate that, 
conceptually, this indicates that some kind of ‘activity’ must be added to the ‘something’ 
and to the ‘attributes’ of the dispositive. 
By considering all of the definitions, the concept can be expanded: it is both a strategic 
and technical, multi-layered, multi-component machine or collective, constructed with a 
specific problem in mind, which functions temporally and spatially to achieve resolution to 
the problem with which it has been constructed to resolve.  This complex and layered 
object of study is clearly articulated by Foucault (1980) in Power/Knowledge: he defines 
the apparatus as a “thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble of discourses, institutions, 
architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific 
statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions – in short, the said as 
much as the unsaid” (p. 194); but, rather than focusing on these individual elements, we 
are urged to consider the “system of relations between these elements” and the “nature of 
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the connection that can exist between them” (p. 194). 
How does an ‘apparatus’ function? 
After expanding the term, the next step was to consider how an apparatus might function; I 
found the ‘strategic function’ and ‘urgent need’ particularly important for developing this 
element.  As outlined above, the apparatus responds to an urgent need; in Foucault’s 
(1980) example, this was “the assimilation of a floating population found to be burdensome 
for an essentially mercantilist economy” (p. 194).  He goes on to state that “there was a 
strategic imperative acting here as the matrix for an apparatus which gradually undertook 
the control or subjection of madness, mental illness and neurosis” (ibid.; p. 194).  I take the 
final part of the statement to highlight an important feature of the apparatus: that it 
transforms ‘problems’ – in Foucault’s account, the ‘burdensome floating population’ is 
transformed into ‘madness, mental illness and neurosis’ – and through the transformation 
of the problem, the apparatus is transformed.  The process of transformation is outlined 
clearly in The History of Sexuality where the ‘apparatus of alliance’ becomes the 
‘apparatus of sexuality’ due to ‘unforeseen effects’ that were the outcome of the 
functioning of the apparatus of alliance achieving its strategic aim.  It is through the double 
process of “strategic elaboration” and “functional overdetermination” (1998; p. 195), the 
chance production unforeseen effects and the accommodation of these within the 
interconnected elements, that new elements and problems emerge, shifting the focus and 
strategic aim of the apparatus. 
Having elaborated the importance of the ‘strategic aim’ in developing this element of the 
apparatus, I then considered the role of the human subject in achieving the strategic aim.  
For me, the human subject is in a state of constant flux, continually subjectified and 
objectified by multiple discourses, continually formed and reformed by networks of 
competing discourses and power relations (Henriques, Holloway, Urwin, Venn & 
Walkerdine, 1984).  I consider the subject as a vehicle for power, with power circulating 
through the network of relations constructed and installed by the various discourses that 
form part of the apparatus (Foucault, 1980); thus, the statements that can be made within 
the social reality of ADHD are determined by the rules of the discourses that function as 
part of the apparatus.  But as outlined above, discourse is just one of an ensemble of 
heterogeneous elements that interact with each other as part of the apparatus; thus, I 
consider the statements and actions that are possible within the apparatus to be 
determined by the rules of discourse, but also by the wider collection of interconnected 
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elements and their interaction with discourse.  As I outlined above, the apparatus 
continually creates and accommodates ‘unforeseen effects’ which, for me, permeate 
throughout the network of connections, continually influencing what can be said and done; 
each statement can, thus, create unforeseen effects that affect change in connected 
elements, thus allowing for the arrangement of elements to be forever displaced (Raffnsøe 
et al., 2014).   
I take this continual displacement through the complex network of interactions and 
influences as allowing for the changing nature of the apparatus.  I also consider this to 
have implications for the human subjects that inhabit the subject positions embedded 
within the apparatus: statements made and actions performed can have unforeseen 
effects, thus altering the grid of intelligibility upon which thought and action can take place.  
It is this continual process that conditions the possibility of what can be: the strategic aim 
that binds the heterogeneous ensemble of elements organises, temporally and spatially, 
the pursuit of the strategic aim, but it does not predetermine the results; it disposes in 
certain ways, but cannot actualise outcomes due to the multiplicity of possibilities that can 
be elaborated between the elements.  For me, this highlights social reality as unfixed and 
that the current network of connections that form social reality does not necessitate future 
social reality.  In effect, we are always at a frontier of uncharted social reality and by 
examining the direction we have come from, it is possible to chart a different direction for 
how we can proceed. 
How to analyse the apparatus?  How to analyse ‘social reality’? 
Having outlined the apparatus and considered what it does, the question of how to analyse 
the apparatus must be approached.  As mentioned above, there is not a delineated 
Foucauldian approach to research that can be followed step-by-step; the particular 
approach taken must be informed by the problem being considered and the theoretical 
underpinning that guides the questioning.  The problem I want to consider is what made it 
possible for the social practice that constructs young people as having ADHD to have 
emerged within the multiplicity of connecting elements of the apparatus.  I want to 
reconnect the complex network of power relations, knowledges, discourses, institutions, 
laws, policies, economic and political events that interacted to allow for the 
problematisation of young people by psychiatric and psychological knowledges and, thus, 
allow for the emergence of the forms of governance enacted through ADHD knowledge, to 
emerge as the solution.  As previously outlined, the interconnectedness of the elements of 
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the apparatus condition the possibility for unforeseen effects and their incorporation as 
new elements; it is this continual displacement that is of interest: it is against this shifting 
background that the boundaries of what it is possible to think, say, and do continually 
change, thus determining the life chances of the various human subjects that are caught in 
the network of relations.  This interconnectedness is also of interest as it is this that I 
consider as shaping the focus and function of the apparatus: it is not the agentic action of 
individuals or powerful institutions that shape life possibilities, but the chance production of 
unforeseen effects and the attempts of the apparatus to accommodate these effects.  For 
me, this underlines the importance of the ensemble of elements and how they have 
mutually influenced each other, rather than the statements of individual ‘legitimate 
knowers’ or actions of powerful institutions: they “know what they do; they frequently know 
why they do what they do; but what they don’t know is what what they do does” (Foucault, 
1982; cited in Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982; p. 187).  Thus, ‘what they do’ is important, as is 
‘what they do does’, but it is also important to consider the various elements and events 
that have allowed for ‘what they do’ to be able to ‘do what it does’ at the specific historical 
juncture at which it ‘does what it does’: specifically, I see this as indicating that the 
fieldwork should consider the conditions that have allowed for the ‘events’ that are 
implicated in the emergence of the social practice of ADHD to be acceptable at the specific 
moment of their appearance and to understand the interconnected elements that 
conditioned their possibility (Foucault, 1991).   
By events, I am referring to the pluralization of ‘causes’ that are implicated in the 
emergence of specific realities.  Like Foucault (1991), and as outlined by Bacchi and 
Goodwin (2016), I consider events to be both at the level of statement made but also at 
the level of discourse (Foucault, 1991).  The aim of highlighting the interconnectedness of 
a multiplicity of events is to highlight the ‘practices’ the gave rise to them, the “places 
where what is said and done, rules imposed and reasons given, the planned and taken for 
granted meet and interconnect” (Foucault, 1991; p. 75).  I am using practices in this 
statement in a different way than when used to refer to social practices, although ultimately 
both are connected.  In referring to social practices, I am referring to the enactment of the 
procedures that constitute a specific social activity; in the case of this project, the 
procedures of diagnosis and treatment of ADHD.  In using practices as the locations where 
what is said and done, rules imposed and reasons given, the planned and taken for 
granted meet and interconnect, I am referring to the specifics of ‘what was said’, ‘what was 
done’, ‘who was able to say and do those things’ and ‘what was the wider background in 
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which this occurred’.  More specifically, practices in the wider sense refers to the external 
relations of intelligibility upon which events rely for legitimacy, the connections that make it 
possible for specific subjects to say and do specific things and for those things to be in the 
true at that point in time.  In this sense, the enactment of the procedures that constitute a 
specific social activity are contingent upon the wider practices from which they have 
emerged: the very basis of that what constructs the social activity is contingent upon 
multiple connections, encounters, supports, and blockages within the wider apparatus for 
their very existence (Foucault, 1991).  In this sense, an analytic aim is the reconstruction 
of the network of connected events, and conditions that gave rise to these, from which the 
elements that formed and legitimise the social practice of ADHD have emerged. 
To aid this analytical aim, I consider the concept of ‘problematisation’ as particularly 
important. A number of authors have explicated the concept (Bacchi, 2012; Rabinow & 
Rose, 2003; Deacon, 2000), with each of these accounts drawn upon in developing the 
overview specific to this investigation.  For Bacchi (2012), the concept of problematisation 
captures a two-stage process, which seeks to question how and why certain ‘things’, such 
as behaviours, groups, phenomena, become a problem, but also how these ‘things’ are 
shaped as objects of thought.  In the explication, Bacchi (2012) refers to Foucault’s work 
on sexuality, highlighting that he was interested in how different eras problematised 
sexuality, thus making it a particular object for thought in different sites.  Thus, in applying 
this step to the current investigation, I am interested in how young people are constructed 
as problems and the sites in which this occurs, including the school setting, the health 
setting, various policies, guidelines and the practices aimed at young people; the aim here 
is to understand the ways in which young people are constructed, but also the discourse 
and forms of knowledge that are deployed in the construction of the particular version of 
young people that is made visible.   
By following this approach, my aim was to ‘think problematically’ (Bacchi, 2012) about our 
contemporary social activities, such as the procedures that form the social practice of 
ADHD, and call them into question by connecting their emergence to earlier 
problematisations.  To do this, Bacchi encourages us to locate ‘problematising moments’, 
the times and places where shifts in social reality take place: by locating these moments, 
we are locating ‘crisis moments’ (Foucault, 1985), moments in which ‘givens’ become 
‘questions’, where something that was “previously silent” (Foucault, 2001; p. 74) becomes 
a problem, thus providing a point of access in the process of emergence of the ‘things’ that 
now appear self-evident.  However, as both Bacchi (2012) and Deacon (2000) highlight, 
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these self-evident givens do not become problems due to shifting historical circumstances 
or because of new objects that didn’t previously exist being created by discourse, but 
because of the ‘totality of discursive and non-discursive elements introducing something 
into the play of true and false’, thus constituting it as a particular object of thought 
(Deacon, 2000; p. 131).  The totality of the discursive and non-discursive, the apparatus, 
thus means that we cannot see as inevitable that which emerges from these elements as 
there are a multiplicity of pressures and influences that impact on these outcomes (Bacchi, 
2012; p. 2).  By locating these problematising moments, we are able to see that what is 
considered self-evident is in fact the result of the interaction of multiplicity of events at 
various historical junctures, none of which were necessary or had anything definitive about 
them (Mort & Peters, 2005; p. 19); they are the result of ‘politics’, the multiplicity of 
strategic connections involved in the construction of the crisis moments at these historical 
junctures (Bacchi, 2012). 
Although the location of problematising moments are an important step, further analytical 
steps are required.  As discussed above, these crisis moments highlight our self-evident 
truths as contingent upon shifts and transformations within the networks of connections 
between the elements of the apparatus; but what allows for one version of truth to be 
established over another?  To consider this point, I drew upon Bacchi and Bonham’s 
(2014) elaboration of the concept of practices discussed earlier.  The authors utilise the 
concept to describe the operation of knowledge structures, as opposed to linguistic 
practice, to bridge the symbolic-material distinction that they argue has become lost in 
much of the work that utilises Foucault’s concept of discourse (Bacchi & Bonham, 2014; p. 
173).  Foucault uses the concept of discursive practices to describe the groups of relations 
– the “body of anonymous, historical rules” – involved in knowledge formation (Foucault, 
1972; p. 117); however, these ‘rules’ are not principles that organise and structure 
knowledge per se (Cousins & Hussain, 1984), but are formulated as a “complex group of 
relations that function as a rule” (Foucault, 1972; p. 74; Bacchi & Bonham, 2014).  
Foucault (1972; p. 48) offers this distinction with regards to the formation of objects of 
knowledge when he directs us to “locate the relations that characterise a discursive 
practice”, in effect, the relations that provide visibility and authority.  It is through the 
connection of these relations that knowledge formations are installed and others closed 
down, creating the intelligible background that allows for certain things said to be 
considered as ‘truth’.  From this, it is possible to consider discursive practices as referring 
to what is said, but also to the rules, or connections of relations, that allow for what is said 
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to be considered as ‘truth’ (Bacchi & Bonham, 2014).  As outlined above, the particular 
object of interest in the investigation are ‘young people’, thus the focus will be on how they 
are problematised by these connections and shaped as the target of the specific 
interventions that these legitimate.  It is through this process of problematisation, the how 
of their construction as a problem, that we are able to access the rules that provide the 
authority for one particular version of reality to be installed as ‘real’ over all the other 
multiple possible reality-versions. 
A useful starting point for considering the how of the construction as a problem is 
Foucault’s archaeological method (Foucault, 1972).  Foucault’s research approaches are 
considered to fall into two phases – archaeology and genealogy – with his writings prior to 
Discipline and Punish (Foucault, 1977) considered to be his archaeological texts (Nicholls, 
2008).  In practice, the two approaches overlap, with Foucault continuing to use tools from 
archaeology in his later works (O’Farrell, 2005).  In the archaeological phase, Foucault 
focused on the system of procedures for the production, regulation and diffusion of 
statements; the rules that determined which statements are true and which are false in 
particular historical epochs (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002).  Following Foucault’s suggestion 
that his books be used as “little tool boxes” where “this sentence or that idea” be used to 
“short-circuit, discredit or smash systems of power” (Foucault, 1975; p. 115), rather than 
providing a detailed overview of the entirety of the procedures outlined in the text, which is 
considered beyond the scope of the project, I will focus on the concepts that were utilised 
for the investigation: ‘the statement’, ‘enunciative modality’ and the ‘rules of formation of 
discursive objects’.  I will also draw upon dimensions of analysis outlined by Rose (1999; 
p. xi-xii).  However, as above, this is not offered as a ‘formal analytical grid’; instead, it is 
provided as an example of some of the critical questions we have at our disposal for 
questioning the how of construction.   
The first of these analytical components is the “statement”, which is considered the “atom 
of discourse” (Foucault, 1972; p. 80).  For Foucault, statements are not considered to be 
spoken or written words (although they can be), but as monuments or events, and as 
having a materiality (Foucault, 1972).  By describing statements in this way, Foucault 
highlights that, out of all the grammatically correct possible statements that could have 
been, the statement that was made stands out from all other possible statements by virtue 
of its materiality: it is the statement that was made, it was the statement that entered 
discourse.  The special significance of the statement is emphasised if we consider that the 
production of discourse is “controlled, selected, organised and redistributed according to a 
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number of procedures whose role it is to avert its powers and its dangers, to master the 
unpredictable event [unpredictable statement]” (Foucault, 1981; p. 52).  This special 
significance of statements makes them useful for exploring the ways in which they are 
made visible in the first place: the network of relations that confer authority on them 
(Nicholls, 2008), thus allowing them to take their position within the field of statements that 
form the objects, subjects, concepts and strategies that constitute bodies of knowledge.  
However, it must be noted that statements are not solely words spoken or written; they are 
artefacts that are formed through, and which form objects, subjects and places (Bacchi & 
Bonham, 2014).  Thus, statements can be words spoken, words written, diagrams, tools, 
prescription pads, buildings, building plans, anything that plays a role in installing networks 
of relations that allow for the constitution of the ADHD young person. 
The second analytical component is the “enunciative function” (Foucault, 1972; p. 209), 
which refers to the field in which the statement is located and the relations that are ‘called 
up’ when true statements are uttered.  The enunciative function highlights the “active 
nature of the statement: its activation of other statements and its location within specific 
sets of relations” (Bacchi & Bonham, 2014; p. 184); it is these sets of relations that function 
together to form the domain of objects, subjects, concepts and strategies that constitute 
the bodies of knowledge accepted as ‘truth’.  It is through the enunciative function, the 
calling up of other ‘true’ statements, that authority is conferred upon what is said, allowing 
these statements to be considered true, and prescribing particular ‘enunciating’ subject 
positions with important constitutive effects (Bacchi & Bonham, 2014).  However, human 
subjects are not free to say anything they want, when they want and where they like 
(Foucault, 1981); only certain speakers, saying certain things, from certain places are able 
to utter ‘truth’ statements (Foucault, 1972: pp. 50–52).  Both of these dimensions to the 
enunciative modality carry an important analytical weight: both reveal the various elements 
that confer authority on true statements, such as qualification or professional standing of 
the ‘legitimate knowers’ – the what that confers authority on the speaker of true statements 
– but also the institutional sites from where these ‘true’ statements emerge, which can be 
considered as further dimension of conferral of legitimacy and authority. 
The third analytical component are the “rules of formation of discursive objects” (Foucault, 
1972; pp. 41–42), which are concerned with the way discourse and bodies of knowledge 
are formed by particular statements and not others, thus making particular thoughts, 
actions and behaviours possible and others not (Nicholls, 2008).  The three rules that 
underpin the formation of objects are “the surfaces of emergence”, “the authorities of 
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delimitation” and “the grids of specification” (Foucault, 1972; pp. 41–42) which, when taken 
together, allow for examination of the means by which certain statements come to 
construct the objects of particular bodies of knowledge.  The first of these rules are the 
surfaces of emergence, which refer to the social and cultural domains in which the objects 
appear (Sidhu, 2003); the statements a particular object comes to bear are dependent 
upon the surface on which it appears, thus influencing how the object is constructed.  
Foucault (1972) highlights that the same object will appear differently across different 
bodies of knowledge; for example, the young person will differ across psychiatric, 
psychological and educational discourse, and differ again when appearing as an object of 
political and economic concern.  Each of these domains have their own particular 
conceptual codes, thus determining the particular statements that will come to inscribe 
themselves upon their object, allowing for consideration of the way the same object, in the 
case of this project, young people, comes to be constructed and what this allows in terms 
of action to them and by them.  
The second rule is the authorities of delimitation, which is concerned with the authorities 
that are able to speak of particular objects as objects of certain knowledges.  These 
authorities are recognised through their ‘credentials’, as having been legitimised by 
discourse to define and delimit objects of particular bodies of knowledge; in the case of 
myself as a clinical psychologist, I have satisfied the particular requirements of the 
institution of clinical psychology through training and regulation by the institutional 
governing body, thus enabling ‘me’ as clinical psychologist to speak legitimately and 
authoritatively about the objects of its knowledge.  However, I say ‘me’ in inverted commas 
as I am the human subject, the particular individual, that has filled the “vacant place” 
(Foucault, 1972; p. 95) of clinical psychologist.  I am not the author of the clinical 
psychologist statements that I utter; I merely occupy a place within the discourse of clinical 
psychology, which allows for the statements to be considered legitimate and authoritative.   
The final rule, the grids of specification, refers to the ways in which particular objects are 
“divided, contrasted, related, regrouped, classified, derived from one another as objects” 
(Foucault, 1972; p. 42) of particular bodies of knowledge.  Foucault (1972) provides the 
example of the way psychiatric discourse differentiated its objects from other bodies of 
knowledge through reference to systems, such as the ‘soul’, the ‘body’, the ‘life and history 
of the individual’, and ‘neuropsychological correlations’.  Some of these systems are very 
much still in place – the life and history of the individual and neuropsychological 
correlations – however, the young person is also classified, measured and divided against 
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other grids of specification; for example, psychology: executive functioning deficits; 
educational: learning deficits; economics: unit of economic burden; political: welfare and 
health care system drain. 
Foucault urges caution with the rules of formation of discursive objects as the application 
of these rules provide an ‘inadequate description’: using psychiatric discourse as an 
example, families or schools, with their system of thresholds for acceptable behaviour, do 
not merely classify the young person as having difficulties and then present to the 
psychiatrist for diagnosis of ADHD.  The formation of objects is more complex than the 
straightforward example above; rules of formation can interact in different ways, as well as 
the rules of formation of different interacting systems of formation crossing over the same 
object (i.e. in the case of ADHD, both psychiatric and psychological systems commonly 
interact), allowing for objects to be constructed in different ways, thus expanding the 
possibilities of what can be said and done with regards to the objects that are formed. 
The final analytic components are borrowed from Rose’s (1999) outline of the six 
dimensions through which analysis of the construction of objects can be considered.  Rose 
highlights that the dimensions do not derive a formal methodology, but are offered as a 
means to question the process of construction that takes place for objects to emerge as 
objects ‘in the true’; they are means of questioning the “connections and relations among 
diverse elements that have brought our contemporary ways of thinking, judging and acting 
into being” (p. xii).  I will not provide a detailed account of each of the six dimensions, but 
will elaborate the two dimensions that I considered important for this investigation: 
technologies (of power and self) and subjectivities.  The first of these technologies, 
technologies of power, are seen as “any assembly of practical rationality governed by a 
more or less conscious goal” and “an assemblage of knowledge, instruments, persons, 
buildings and spaces which act on human conduct from a distance” (Rose, 1996; p. 26).  
The second, technologies of self, are considered as the various techniques and strategies 
that allow individuals to work on themselves – their thoughts, actions, bodies, conduct – in 
order to self-govern in relation to the norms and orders of particular forms of knowledge 
(Foucault, 1988).  As outlined earlier, the subject is considered a product of 
power/knowledge, constituted as an object of psychological knowledge through various 
technologies of power and self (Foucault, 1988); if we consider the Foucauldian concept of 
power as “a mode of action upon the actions of others for certain ends” (1994; p. 341) – an 
action upon the action of others in which others’ conduct is influenced by these actions – 
then technologies of power and self are the various means by which power can constitute 
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a subject of discourse, either by allowing power to work on the individual through the 
various relations of power in which the individual is caught, or by the application of power 
to oneself.   
Subjectivities, the forms of personhood made available by power/knowledge, are the 
“outcome of a complex process of production, requiring the alignment of entities, forces, 
gazes and thought” (Rose, 1999; p. xv), which involve the “collection of persons together 
in particular places, their organisation within particular practices and grids of perception, 
and judgement that are thrown over conduct and competencies as a consequence” (ibid.; 
p. xv).  We, individual human subjects, form the ‘grids of perception’, the descriptions that 
are thrown over conduct and competencies, when we act in the name of a particular 
knowledge, perform a role for a particular institution, or attempt to act upon the actions of 
others (or ourselves) to influence thinking, judging, or acting. 
Methods for the application of theory 
The above description can be considered an outline of the analytic of power used for this 
investigation; specifically, an analytic procedure for questioning how power created effects 
and outcomes that have allowed for the social practice of ADHD to be in place in the 
present moment.  By developing an approach to the analysis of power specifically for this 
investigation, I am following Foucault’s approach of viewing power as situated; his 
approach to power was not intended to outline a theory of power as a “context-free, 
ahistorical, objective description” (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982; p. 184).  An analytic of power 
is offered as an opposite to a theory of power – it is offered as a “grid of analysis” (ibid.; 
p.184).  In essence, the outline provided was the means employed for considering the 
cultural practice of ADHD diagnosis and treatment – this follows Foucault’s later work 
focusing on “rituals of power, centering on certain cultural practices which combine 
knowledge and power” (ibid.; p.184) to produce the practices in which the present 
moment’s knowledges and actions that constitute ADHD have emerged.  Foucault offers a 
number of methodological precautions for conducting such an analysis (Foucault, 1980; 
pp. 78–108), which I have taken into account when developing the methods for the 
investigation; I will outline these briefly before outlining the procedure for the investigation.   
First, investigations should focus on the ‘extremities of power’, rather than the centralised 
legitimate forms of power; they should focus on the ultimate destinations, the regional and 
local forms and institutions, where it “invests itself in institutions, becomes embodied in 
techniques, and equips itself with instruments” (ibid.; p.96).  Second, investigations should 
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focus on the points where power is in direct contact with its object, its field of application – 
“where it installs itself and produces its real effects” (ibid.; p.97); thus, investigations 
should aim to investigate how subjects are “gradually, progressively, really and materially 
constituted through a multiplicity of organisms, forces, energies, desires” (ibid.; p.97).  
Third and fourth, the investigation must be conducted as an ascending analysis, from the 
“infinitesimal mechanisms” to “see how these mechanisms of power have been – and 
continue to be – invested, colonised, utilised, involuted, transformed, displaced, extended” 
(ibid., pp. 98–99).  A fifth precaution relates to the object of study: investigations should be 
concerned with the production of methods – tools, procedures, etc. – for the formation of 
knowledge, as power, “exercised through these subtle mechanisms, cannot but evolve, 
organise and put into circulation a knowledge or rather apparatuses of knowledge” (ibid.; 
p.102).  A sixth precaution that has guided the procedures for investigation was informed 
by Raffnsøe et al. (2014): for them, the crucial concern for investigations should be less to 
“elucidate theoretically the ontology of a single and independent dispositive [apparatus]”, 
but to “analyse empirically the way in which several interdependent dispositives 
[apparatus] revolve around and exercise an influence upon certain social experiences and 
problematics” (p. 21).  For them, and for Foucault, “abstruse discussions of conceptual and 
ontological matters” are only worthwhile if they were able to “serve as torch lights” in 
“historically situated as well as diagnostically orientated, empirical and analytical 
explorations” (p. 21). 
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Foucauldian-inspired ethnographic ‘case study’ 
The investigation was conducted within the NHS trust that provides healthcare for 
residents of three large regions in the central Scotland area.  The regions have an 
approximate population of 300,000, and approximately 70,000 of the population is 
comprised of children and young people up to the age of 18.  The area is comprised of 
both urban and rural areas with the majority of the population residing in one of the three 
communities.  The region is served by three local government councils, with each 
providing a number of social and educational services for children: across the three council 
areas, there are a total of 109 primary schools and 16 secondary schools, three 
educational psychology services, and three children and families social work services. 
The project was granted ethical clearance by the South East Scotland Research Ethics 
Committee, in conjunction with the University of Edinburgh, and the University of 
Queensland’s Medical Research Ethics Committee.  Ethical clearance by both bodies 
granted permission for a number of research procedures to take place, including clinical 
case note analysis, analysis of relevant ADHD material not otherwise specified (internal 
documentation, guidelines, procedural requirements, etc.), observation of ADHD clinical 
appointments, extended periods of time in the service, and professional interviews.  The 
project was also granted permission by one of the local council Education Departments, 
allowing the investigation access to all educational establishments within the region and 
for interviews to be conducted with educational professionals. 
The approach to the investigation is considered a Foucauldian-inspired ethnographic ‘case 
study’.  As outlined previously, the investigation aimed to understand how the social 
practice of ADHD diagnosis and treatment came to be possible within a geographical 
region in Scotland.  The starting point of the investigation was observation and audio 
recording of ADHD clinical appointments and simultaneous analysis of clinical case notes 
and CAMHS management team meeting minutes.  The starting point of observation of 
clinical appointments allowed me to witness first-hand the procedure of ADHD diagnosis 
and treatment.  By considering the procedure that structured the appointment as a solution 
to problems that have come to be constructed by psychiatric knowledge, I was able to 
locate the subject positions legitimated to inscribe ADHD on the behaviour of young 
people, the means of judgement that aided the process, and the forms of knowledge and 
discourse deployed in the process.  The clinical appointments that I observed were not 
pre-selected, but were the appointments conducted in the periods of time that I was 
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present in the CAMHS service.  As such, the appointments reflect the ‘problems’ that are 
considered to be ADHD and the procedural approach deployed in their management.  In 
terms of the procedure for observing the appointments, all participants were consulted 
about participation in the project by the CAMHS professional conducting the appointment 
before the appointment took place.  If consent was offered, I joined the clinician in 
collecting the young person and their family from the waiting area, walking with the group 
through the secure entry, down a hallway to an interview room.  As per the ethical 
clearance requirements for the investigation, I was not to able to speak with the young 
person or family or ask questions of the appointment procedure during the session.  
During the sessions, I was required to sit quietly and observe the appointments without 
taking notes or engaging with the process.  As such, the recorded appointments can be 
considered as naturalistic a representation of the ADHD diagnostic process as was 
possible to achieve in a research setting.  All recorded appointments were transcribed 
professionally and, as the investigation was interested in the procedure of the clinical 
appointment, only verbal communication was transcribed.  Each recorded appointment 
was retained and used in conjunction with the transcribed version when analysing the 
appointments.  In total, I was able to observe ten clinical appointments, with six young 
people providing consent to record their appointments.  The clinical appointments lasted 
approximately one hour each, providing six hours of recorded material. 
The starting point of observation of clinical appointments also allowed for discussion of the 
project and for consent to be granted to access the clinical notes; only participants who 
had allowed observation of clinical appointments were consulted regarding access to their 
clinical notes.  Although only six young people consented to recording of appointments, all 
10 participants provided consent to access their clinical case notes.  The combined case 
notes provided approximately 2000 pages worth of textual material, with the smallest set of 
case notes consisting of 24 pages and the largest consisting of 344 pages.  Each set of 
case notes was constituted by three main forms of material: ‘official’ communications, such 
as letters to and from referring professionals, letters to and from the wider network of 
professionals involved in the diagnostic process and various reports from multiple 
professional groups; handwritten clinical notes documenting the content of individual 
clinical sessions, telephone calls, and informal communications; and the ‘tools’ used in the 
diagnostic process, including questionnaires and psychometric assessments.   
The case notes were not processed for the investigation; all case notes were constructed 
by the same three sections, with each section ordered from oldest communication to most 
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recent.  The order of the case notes allowed for a reconstruction of each young person’s 
diagnostic journey, from point of referral to the appointment I witnessed.  As with the 
observation of the clinical appointments, the case notes provided access to the subject 
positions able to inscribe ADHD on the behaviour of young people, the means of 
judgement that aided the process, the forms of knowledge and discourse deployed in the 
process, but also to the wider network of professionals and institutions involved in the 
problematisation of young people and the various ways in which the problem was 
constructed.  Additionally, the case notes can be considered as a historical record of the 
practices and procedures of constitution of the ADHD child within the local health service 
region.  The longest time period covered by the case notes was 12 years and the shortest 
8 months, with case notes reflecting the clinical activity between 2002-2008 (6 case files) 
and 2011-2012 (2 case files) and 2014-2015 (2 case files).  In this sense, the case notes 
are a historical record of the shifts of power/knowledge that allowed for the ‘fixing’ of 
ADHD on the young person; they can be considered as a historical record of the 
extremities of ‘power’, highlighting the point where power was in direct contact with its 
object: the young person. 
Another source of data for the investigation was ‘minutes’ from various team meetings that 
had taken place in the service over several years.  I had not considered this source of 
material prior to commencing the investigation and only became aware of its existence 
through asking questions about a change in the diagnostic procedure discovered in the 
analysis of the case notes.  The ‘minutes’ provided summaries of 342 team meetings that 
had taken place in the service between 2004 and 2015.  The number of meetings that 
occurred each year varied, with the lowest being 12 meetings (2014) and the highest 56 
meetings (2006).  The majority of the meetings occurred on a monthly basis across all 
years (i.e., the Strategic Management Group meeting) with some meetings conducted less 
frequently (i.e., the Administrative Team meeting appeared to be every 6 months).  The 
majority of the minutes were 3 to 4-page summaries of the topics that had been discussed 
in each meeting and the main responses made with regards to each of the discussion 
points.  However, some minutes were more detailed, with the longest document consisting 
of 37 pages and providing the background to a meeting where the service structure and 
specification was designed.  Other larger summaries included minutes from annual review 
days; these meetings occurred annually, were attended by the full-service staff cohort, and 
would typically last a full day: the average length of minutes from the annual review days 
was 12 pages.  The combined minutes provided approximately 900 pages worth of textual 
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material.   
The minutes were not organised sequentially: all documents were electronic word 
documents and were stored in a single folder on the administrative team computer in no 
particular order.  On inspection of the material, it was possible to identify the team meeting 
represented by the minutes and the date it took place, allowing for ordering by team and 
date.  Once ordered by team and date, I was able to hierarchically order the minutes in 
accordance with the structure of the service, allowing for consideration of the flow of 
knowledge from the Strategic Management Group meeting through to individual treatment 
team meetings (ADHD, eating disorder, etc.) or professional group meeting (psychology, 
psychiatry, nursing, etc.).  Once ordered, it was also possible to identify meetings that had 
emerged in relation to specific problems and the outcome of these meetings; for example, 
at various time points, minutes from ‘steering groups’ appeared, tasked with implementing 
a specific change in practice or developing a new team, with the new team minutes 
replacing the steering group minutes once implemented.   
The analysis of the meeting minutes revealed the various ‘problems’ the service had to 
generate solutions to and the impact of these on the day-to-day functioning of the service.  
This was particularly useful in that I was able to identify and analyse the specific policies 
that impacted on the service, but also beyond the service relating to the network of 
connected institutions, allowing for consideration of the role of problems and solutions 
across the network in shaping thought of action within and across sites.  The highlighted 
policies were useful in themselves in that these can be considered the ‘practical texts’ that 
offer rules, opinion and advice on how professionals are to ‘behave’ in relation to the 
specific problems constructed by the policies (Foucault, 1991; Bacchi & Goodwin, 2016), 
thus acting as a framework of everyday conduct for those that it targets, both professional 
and non-professional alike (Foucault, 1986). However, an additional benefit of identifying 
the specific policies that posed problems and required solutions within CAMHS and the 
wider institutional network, was that I was able to ‘layer’ the policies across the discussions 
that took place in various meetings and then again over individual case notes, allowing for 
analysis of the ways in which day-to-day thought and action within the service was shaped 
by and responded to these policies, but also analysis of the emergence of the policies and 
their constructed problems in relation to wider historical practices, events and relations 
(Bacchi & Goodwin, 2016).  The following figures highlight the teams and meetings the 
minutes represented and the structure of the service, allowing cross-referencing meeting 
membership with service structure.  This was considered important as some team 
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members attended several meetings across the service structure and beyond the service.  
The meetings beyond the service are not represented in the diagrams as minutes of these 
meetings were not considered, only references to various outside meetings. 
 
Figure 1: Local NHS and CAMHS management structure 
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Figure 2: CAMHS team meetings with membership 
The investigation also made use of interviews with various professionals involved in the 
wider network identified in the case notes and the sites identified in the minutes.  The 
interviews were not set out in advance; the project was conducted in three six-week 
periods between 2015–2016, with extended periods of time spent in the CAMHS service.  
The CAMHS professionals were made aware of the project by the head of the service in 
advance of my presence in the service.  The interviews conducted as part of the 
investigation were follow-up interviews with professionals with whom I had conversed 
informally during the periods of time spent in the service.  They were based on the content 
of discussions revealing information regarding the emergence of the current social practice 
of ADHD, or questions that arose from observing the clinical appointments, or questions 
that arose from analysis of documents.   
The procedure for interviewing educational professionals followed a different approach due 
to not spending extended periods of time in the establishments.  As with the CAMHS 
professionals, educational professionals in the region were aware of the research through 
the heads of their establishment; before being able to discuss participation, consent to 
discuss the project with educational professionals was required from the heads of the 
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educational establishment.  The establishments and educational professionals that took 
part in the investigation, again, were not predetermined, but were established through the 
questions that arose from the other sources of the investigation.  In this sense, the 
approach to participation selection for professional interviews can be considered to have 
followed a ‘snowball’ approach to selection; the approach is commonly utilised in social 
science research to access hard-to-reach or hidden populations (Faugier & Sargeant, 
1997).  The general approach is for one participant to provide the details of and organise 
contact with a second participant, who in turn does the same for a third participant, and so 
on (Vogt, 1999); however, a difference with the approach I have utilised is that it was not 
the participants’ connection to a particular group per se that was of interest, nor was I 
interested in what the participants felt or believed about ADHD, but what was said by the 
participants, the statements they were able to make as part of that group, with the aim of 
understanding what made the what that was said legitimate, authoritative, and accepted as 
‘within the true’ (Bacchi & Bonham, 2014).   
The interviews did not follow a pre-set structure or order of questions.  All interviews 
focused on the same areas: to identify the subject positions able to speak and act in 
relation to ADHD, what was said and done by them and what constituted these spoken 
and enacted manifestations of discourse and knowledge; i.e. what guided their social 
activity in relation to ADHD diagnosis and treatment?  The aim here, as with the case 
notes, was to investigate the ‘extremities of power’, the point where power was in direct 
contact with the young person within educational sites, and to understand what was being 
deployed in these interactions and the connections that allowed the forms of knowledges 
and materialisations of knowledge in action to be in the true and deployable in the present 
moment, i.e. the heterogeneous elements that conditioned their possibility.  When 
possible, the interviews also allowed for questions regarding the connection of educational 
and health institutions, policies and their role in the social activity of ADHD, and 
discontinuities in knowledge and practice in both the education and health of children and 
young people.  The professional groups interviewed as part of the project included: 
• Consultant Child and Adolescent Psychiatrist 
• Child and Adolescent Mental Health Practitioner 
• Child and Adolescent Mental Health Nurse 
• Consultant Child and Adolescent Psychologist 
• Speech and Language Therapist 
• Teacher 
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• Head Teacher 
• Child and Family Support Worker  
All interviews were transcribed professionally with only verbal communication being 
transcribed.  The rationale for focusing solely on verbal communication (as opposed to 
non-verbal) was that I was interested in the procedure of ADHD diagnosis and treatment, 
rather than the individuals involved per se – i.e., not what interviewees said, but what 
interviewees said, the things said (Bacchi & Bonham, 2014; p. 178) and the connections 
that made the things said, say-able.  There is an important epistemological and 
methodological stance within this rationale: as outlined in the previous chapter, the 
ontological position that informs this project considers human interaction and negotiation 
as the basis of reality.  As such, this position must inform the understanding of the 
interview as a method and, thus, the knowledge produced by this method.  The position I 
have taken with regards to the ‘data in the form of talk’ that comprises the ‘interview’ is in 
line with what Kvale (1996) calls the ‘inter-view’; i.e., a complex social and organisational 
phenomenon rather than just a research method, with knowledge (data) co-created 
between researcher and researched, rather than transmitted by the method (Qu & Dumay, 
2011).  In considering my conversations with professionals in the field as ‘inter-views’, my 
approach to interviews eschews the position that respondents are epistemologically 
passive and mere vessels of answers (Qu & Dumay, 2011).  Rather, as outlined by Qu & 
Dumay (2011), the interviews carried out as part of this project need to be considered 
within the social historical context in which they were carried out, instead of being seen as 
a tool for collecting data in isolation.   
In this sense, the reality produced in the interviews conducted as part of the project must 
not be considered as existing independently of the interview situation, but as ‘situated 
accounts’ (Silverman, 1983).  The ‘data as talk’ thus must be considered against the 
complexity of the interview process itself, with interviews seen as neutral conduits, or even 
sources of bias, but as the productive site of reportable knowledge itself (Holstein & 
Gubrium, 1995).  As such, it is incumbent upon the researcher to consider the power 
differential inherent within the research process and between the researcher and the 
researched.  My approach to this was to follow the advice of previous critical researchers 
in putting in place various strategies for reducing this differential: these included reminding 
participants that they could refuse to answer a question/s or withdraw their participation at 
any time, allowing as much flexibility as possible with regards to where and when to 
conduct the interview, allowing participants to view and edit their interview transcripts 
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before analysis, and giving participants an opportunity to read and comment on analysis 
before sharing through publication or presentation (Reinharz, 1992; Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 
2007; Qu & Dumay, 2011).  However, given the Foucauldian stance underpinning this 
project, and the notion of power that underpins this approach, the influence of discursive 
elements that are difficult to minimise must be taken into account when conducting the 
interview as well reading the transcript data: these include the cultural standing of my 
position as researcher conducting research (and as clinical psychologist), the professional 
positions of the ‘researched’, perceived differences in earnings between the positions, 
perceived differences in knowledge ‘held’, etc.  This list is not exhaustive (there may 
several I am not aware of myself) are not offered to highlight sources of introduced ‘bias’ in 
a modernist research sense, but to make visible the multitude of factors that could be at 
work in the situated accounts co-constructed between me as researcher and the 
participants as researched. 
A final tool utilised was a library and archive investigation of the historical political and 
economic background of the locality and the sites that formed the core of the research 
focus.  The procedure that underpinned this element of investigation was adapted from 
traditional literature review search strategies, making use of the ‘boolean’ technique of 
combining keywords and operators to search archived documents and other textual 
material. The ‘keywords’ in this approach, however, were based on ‘statements’ located 
through fieldwork, either in conversations with professionals or located in policy.  The 
databases searched included historical, political and economic academic journals, historic 
governmental policy archives, such as the national archives, newspaper archives, and 
Labour and Conservative political party archives, such as ‘The Margaret Thatcher 
Foundation’ and ‘The Political Parties and Parliamentary Archives Group’.   
Doing ‘critical’ ethnography 
The ethnographic approach that guided the investigation drew upon the work of a number 
of theorists, including Biehl (2005), Madison (2012) and Thomas (1993).  The 
ethnographic approach outlined by Madison (2012) is somewhat a rejection of a concrete 
method in favour of the ‘doing of critical ethnography’.  In the doing of critical ethnography, 
critical theory, when used as a mode of interpretation, is considered the method (Madison, 
2012; p. 16); the critical ethnographer relies on theory to interpret a social action. Thomas 
(1993) further emphasises the requirement for the ‘doing’ of critical ethnography by 
highlighting that critical ethnography can be seen as “the exploration of a common, 
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meaningful cultural world” from which we “begin to create an understanding of the culture”, 
making use of “clues, traces, gestures, and scraps of sense” prior to the development of 
stable interpretations.  The collection of these “synecdoches, or parts of the whole” can 
then be used to develop an understanding of the whole (p. 15).   
Similarly, the study that influenced this project, Vita (Biehl, 2005), employed conventional 
ethnographic tools for different tasks at different points as the study unfolded.  As for 
critical theory being the method, Biehl stated that he “reads and borrows from the 
language of many books to understand the world he is investigating” and takes these 
understandings into the field “where their propositions might not always work that well but 
are nonetheless helpful in generating figures of thought” (Biehl, 2005; p. 14).  Vita also 
emphasised critical analytic tasks that cross-over with the approach adopted for this 
investigation; specifically, “make visible the intermingling of colloquial practices and 
relations, institutional histories, and discursive structures” (ibid.; p.23), “trace the complex 
network” in which ‘pathology’ takes form, and explore the ways communities, families, 
personal lives and inner worlds are “remade under the impress of economic pressures” 
(ibid.; p.23) by scrutinising the “bureaucratic and domestic machinery of inscriptions and 
invisibility that authorises the real” (ibid.; p.10). 
By employing ethnography as a “way of looking” (Wolcott, 1999; p. 41), as the doing of the 
critical theory outlined in first part of this chapter, my approach aimed to reconnect the 
various elements of the ‘apparatus’ of ADHD, the heterogeneous elements that 
conditioned the possibility for the emergence of the everyday practice of ADHD, using the 
ethnographic tools of observation, document analysis and interview in an iterative and 
retroductive manner (Danermark, Ekström, Jakobsen & Karlsson, 1997).  By approaching 
the investigation in this way, the aim was not to investigate ADHD as a ‘real’ condition, but 
to investigate the conditions fundamental to its existence and usage within the social 
practice of diagnosis and treatment of locality in which the investigation was conducted 
(Meyer & Lunnay, 2013).  In this sense, the project can be considered theory-driven 
research (Montgomery, Wernerfelt, & Balakrishnan, 1989), with the account of the 
apparatus the a priori knowledge that guided the investigation.  It was this a priori 
knowledge that acted as the means of discovering and questioning the ‘conditions’ (Meyer 
& Lunnay, 2013), the circumstances without which something cannot exist (Danermark et 
al., 1997); in this case, the conditions upon which the social practice of ADHD diagnosis 
and treatment was produced, sustained and modified locally.   
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More specifically, the project used a critical theory-driven ethnographic approach to 
investigate how ‘governmental practices’, understood expansively as the “heterogeneous 
strategic relations and practices that shape who we are and how we are to live” (Bacchi & 
Goodwin, 2016; p. 14), produced ‘problems’, thus legitimating the means for solving these 
problems, and how this process was implicated in the production of ADHD locally as a 
solution.  By problems, I am following Bacchi and Goodwin (2016) in viewing ‘problems’ 
not as a something that exist in a material sense, but as something that has ‘come to be’, 
that has been constructed, through the interaction of multiple knowledges, practices, and 
events.  The approach, thus, investigate how certain problems ‘came to be’ problems in 
order to reveal their ontological politics (Mol, 2002), the various interconnected elements 
that constructed these ‘things’ as problems allowing them to become a target for 
intervention.  
By investigating ‘problems’ and ‘solutions’, the project adopted an approach influenced by 
Bacchi and Goodwin (2016) and Rose (2000).  For Bacchi and Goodwin, a key analytic 
task involves “teasing out the conceptual premises underpinning problem representations, 
tracing their genealogy, reflecting on the practices that sustain them and considering their 
effects” (p. 17).  Similarly, Rose (2000), urges for an analytical focus on ‘answers’ to 
‘arguments’, arguing that their very status as answers is entirely dependent upon the 
questioning of a something that it requires to be answered.  The presence of answers and 
question indicates problematising activity (Rose & Miller, 1992) which, through 
reconstruction, allows for the interrogation of the networks of connections that provide the 
answers with their intelligibility (Rose, 2000).  Through locating a problem and how it is 
represented and solved, the aim is to work backwards, or outwards from the problem, and 
to critically examine the network of connections upon which they are based (Bacchi & 
Goodwin, 2016): the assumptions, familiar notions and unexamined ways of thinking 
(Foucault, 1994) upon which the problem and solution rest.   
This backwards/outwards reading was a key task as this allowed for examination of the 
history of things assumed to be natural, the reasons behind their way of being, the material 
effects, and what they allowed to follow (Johnson, 1981; cited in Bacchi & Goodwin, 2016).  
A further key task made possible by a consideration of problems and solutions was the 
locating of unforeseen effects and their accommodation within the interconnected 
elements of the apparatus.  As outlined earlier, the strategic aim that connects the 
heterogeneous ensemble of elements of the apparatus, due to the multiplicity of 
possibilities that can be elaborated between them, does not predetermine the results, it 
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can only dispose in certain ways, thus allowing for the production of unintended effects.  
The incorporation of these unintended effects creates continual displacement, creating 
changes in the problems represented and solutions proposed, allowing for a critical 
examination of ‘what follows from the effects’; i.e. the historical shifts and changes of the 
interconnected network of elements that constitute the apparatus.  
As mentioned earlier, the starting point for the investigation was observation of the clinical 
appointments and analysis of clinical case notes. Through discussing a discontinuity in 
practice visible in the case notes, I discovered the meeting minutes, which provided 
insights into the various pressures within the CAMHS service and across the connected 
network of institutions, as well as a number of specific policies that placed procedural 
requirements on the service and beyond.  By ‘layering’ these sources of material, from 
individual clinical appointment to policy and political and economic archived material, I was 
able to reconnect the discursive field in which the current ADHD practice emerged, 
allowing for an examination of what was possible to say and do about the problem of 
young people within education and health sites, but also consider discontinuities in how  
problems of young people were constructed across time and place, what was legitimated 
as solutions by these constructions, what effects were created, and what followed from 
these effects.   
Through ‘layering’, I was able to read both horizontally and vertically from the clinical 
appointment and through case notes, meeting minutes, and policies, and use the 
analytical components described earlier to locate, track and document the changing 
discursive background: who was speaking, what was said, what was done, what 
knowledges and technologies were put to work, how this changed across time and place, 
who appeared and disappeared, what appeared and disappeared.  The aim was to 
develop a theoretical redescription (Danermark et al., 1997) of the rise of ADHD diagnosis 
and treatment locally, one that mapped and made visible the multiplicity of heterogeneous 
elements implicated the construction of young people as particular types of problems and 
to provide a genealogical account of the emergence of a local practice of ADHD diagnosis 
and treatment from within this complex network. 
Applying rhizomatic logic/offering a topological account 
In the translator’s foreword of the second volume of A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, the question of whether the book can be ‘played’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1987; p. xiii) is asked and discussed.  The point made is that we should approach the book 
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like the playing of a record, with the book offered as an ‘open system’, where the reader 
could start at any chapter and read in any order, generating different meanings depending 
on the order in which reading occurred (p. iv).  Underpinning A Thousand Plateaus is the 
concept of the rhizome, which has “no beginning or end; it is always in the middle, 
between things, interbeing, intermezzo” (p. 27), allowing for movement from the “middle, 
through the middle, coming and going rather than starting and finishing” (p. 27–28).  I 
found the concept of the rhizome useful for resolving a problem I had in approaching this 
project; the linear logic inherent in writing a PhD did not match the approach to reading 
and thinking that was employed, and when attempting to write, I found myself restricted by 
the linearity in that it created a sense of cause and effect that is not considered to be part 
of the apparatus.   
Thus, by employing a rhizomatic logic, by moving horizontally and vertically through the 
different texts – from case notes to meeting minutes, back to case notes, over to a 
particular policy, over to an interview, back to a policy – like St. Pierre (1997; p. 179), I was 
able to avoid the “ruthlessly linear nature of the narrative of knowledge production”.  The 
‘lateral’ logic of a rhizomatic approach allowed for a dynamic, flexible approach that 
captured the complexity, heterogeneity, and ever-changing ‘becoming’, rather than a fixed 
and finished ‘being’, created through the interaction of the elements of the apparatus 
(MacNaughton, 2005).  The approach also helped guide my approach to writing; rather 
than following a conventional linear approach, I found writing the ‘node’ or ‘element’ of the 
apparatus that emerged as most prominent through the rhizomatic logic beneficial as it 
resulted in a process of movement between and within sections.  By employing this 
approach, like a rhizome itself, each of the sections became detachable, reversible, and 
the focus of constant modification, being written, rewritten, placed and replaced depending 
on the reading of, and connections being made within, the different texts.  I have 
attempted to make the rhizomatic approach and the ‘working backwards’ visible in the 
descriptions of chapters 3 to 6 below: 
In Chapter 3, I provide an overview of the changing politico-economic background of the 
region and the changing requirements of the young person within the new societal order 
that emerged from this process. The chapter documents the decline of industry in the 
region; the removal of traditional forms of employment for young people in the area; and 
the emergence of technologies for disciplining young people towards active citizenship, a 
form of subjectivity in which the young person would self-improve through vocationally 
focused learning in order to ‘fit’ with the emerging post-industrial society.  The discussion 
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in this chapter, particularly part 2, is contextualised by the disciplinary nature of 
unemployment.  This contextualisation is explicitly Foucauldian, and the focus on 
unemployment speaks to Foucault’s explication, in The Birth of the Clinic (Foucault, 1973), 
that to understand the development of certain ways of thinking and acting, several lines of 
enquiry that seem unrelated to the thinking and acting must be followed.  However, it must 
also be noted that other ways of contextualising the analysis are possible, with Illich’s 
(1978) The Right to Useful Unemployment and its Professional Enemies another valuable 
alternative perspective.  I do not believe that this alternative position would undermine the 
preceding analysis, however, but reframe the disciplinary nature of employment as a tool 
of “modernised poverty” (Illich, 1978).  From this perspective, the shifting patterns of 
employment and training described in chapter three would be considered as entrapments 
of a modernity that locks human subjects into a process of production and consumption, 
which undermines autonomy, dulls satisfaction, flattens out experience, and frustrates 
needs (Illich, 1978).  Most significantly, however, according to Illich, the process separates 
human subjects from experiencing “useful unemployment”, a form of human activity that 
permits satisfying and creative personal expression and an avoidance of the pursuit of 
mass production and consumption of commodities.  In this scenario, the construction of 
the new forms of employment and training described in these chapters can be considered 
the work of the ‘professional enemies’ of useful unemployment, the various professionals 
who benefit from developing solutions to ‘problems’, such as employment, education, or 
health, but which function to maintain the status quo of inequality that appears in chapter 
4.   
The analysis in chapter 3 was made possible by the analytical focus that informed chapter 
4: specifically, the emergence of disadvantage and poverty as a strategic aim the 
apparatus of education, which was a prominent topic in my discussions with educational 
professionals.  Its visibility in discussions took the form of accounts of the impact of 
disadvantage locally and ‘on’ the behaviour of children.  These discussions connected to 
the analysis of ‘additional support needs’ and its role in solving the impact the ‘problem’ of 
‘social exclusion’ and ‘disadvantage’ had on learning.  My previous unquestioning 
acceptance of local disadvantage was disrupted through a conversation with an 
educational professional, which was made possible by the critical focus on social exclusion 
in chapter 4.  As such, there was a requirement to extend the critical focus further to 
understand some of the elements that conditioned the possibility of the problems social 
exclusion came to represent.  The chapter is presented in two parts: one part is offered as 
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a genealogical/topological account of the elements considered important in conditioning 
outcomes and effects implicated in the emergence of the local procedures of ADHD and a 
second part where the effects are considered in detail. 
The analysis in Chapter 4 was situated within educational sites and documents the 
conditions that allowed for psychiatric knowledge to play a role within the school.  The 
chapter considers the changing discursive background of ‘learning disability’, the 
emergence of the category of Additional Support Needs from within this discursive space, 
the role this category played in constructing young people as requiring ‘support to learn’, 
and how this opened up a discursive space in which psychiatric knowledge and 
technologies would function.  This chapter was made possible by the analysis in chapter 5: 
one of the pressing issues, and one that offered legitimacy to the procedures that allowed 
for psychiatric knowledge to become dominant in CAMHS was the ‘problem’ of increased 
referrals from schools.  The question in this chapter was to understand what was ‘done’ 
with regards to problems in school and to understand what conditioned the possibility for 
ADHD to become a solution.  As with the previous chapter, this chapter is presented in a 
similar way: a genealogical/topological account of the elements considered important in 
conditioning outcomes and effects and a more detailed consideration of these effects. 
The analysis in Chapter 5 documents the shifting explanation for young people’s behaviour 
within the Child and Adolescent Mental Health Service (CAMHS) through analysis of 
clinical case files.  The analysis documents the conditions that allowed for the emergence 
of the everyday practice of ADHD within CAMHS, connects this to wider shifting health and 
education reforms, and highlights how this was able to connect to the local schools 
through the concept/policy agenda of ‘wellbeing promotion’ and ‘multi-disciplinary working’.  
This was the starting point for the investigation.  The single question that informed the 
entire investigation was how it was possible to do what was done with regards to ADHD in 
the service in the present moment.  I was aware of tensions in the service regarding 
ADHD, yet the procedures for management of the problem appeared to be unquestioningly 
accepted and enacted.  My aim was to attempt to understand what made this possible.  As 
with both chapter above, this chapter is presented in two parts: the first part documents the 
initial steps of the analysis, highlighting the shifting background within the case notes and 
minutes that highlight the emergence and influence of the procedures of ADHD that came 
to form the everyday social practice of diagnosis and treatment.  The second part provides 
an analysis of the discursive background that allowed for the emergence of the procedures 
and which provided the invisible lines of authority upon which they were legitimated. 
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The analysis in Chapter 6 offers a conceptualisation of the medication review through the 
Foucauldian lens of disciplinary power.  The chapter highlights the disciplinary process 
enacted through the ‘elements’ that formed the medication review by using Foucault’s 
account of panopticism to frame the process as a form hierarchical observation in which 
normalisation was enacted through discipline.  This chapter was made possible through 
observing and recording ADHD medication reviews, a required procedural component of 
the diagnostic process.  Through these observations, I was able to locate a tension 
between the ‘ADHD presentation’ represented by formal institutional knowledges and the 
everyday ‘problems’ that came to be represented by ADHD.  Another tension was the 
‘treatment’ of ADHD.  Formal institutional knowledge provides an account of the ‘action’ of 
the medication on the source of the ‘symptoms’, resulting in the behavioural symptoms 
being ‘treated’.  The everyday reality of ADHD treatment in the service was at odds with 
this account, however.  This chapter aimed to provide an account of the means by which 
ADHD continued to be fixed on the young person despite these tensions.  
The apparatus as a topology: A system of ‘correlations’ 
This project is, ultimately, attempting to account for a multiplicity of transformations and 
effects, occurring within and across a nexus of intersecting elements, which allowed for the 
problematisation of young people in certain ways, and the eventual emergence of the local 
social practice of ADHD diagnosis and treatment to be in place.  The ‘final’ description 
should not be considered as fixed and complete, however; but as partial, as incomplete 
and unfixed, as a snapshot of a moving process that commenced before and continues 
after the artificial boundary imposed by this project.  But unlike A Thousand Plateaus, the 
final description cannot be considered an ‘open system’, where chapters can be read in 
any order, as the requirement to frame the project and outline the methods imposes a 
starting point; as such, the problem of linearity remains present within the writing to some 
degree because of this imposition.  To challenge this, the concept of topology is useful, 
particularly the account provided by Collier (2009).  In this account, the conditions of 
possibility for what is thinkable, doable and sayable are not found in stable systems of 
discourse or power/knowledge regimes, but amid the movement and upheaval of 
problematisation, within the ‘patterns of correlation’ through which heterogeneous 
elements are configured and reconfigured.  A topological account aims to describe 
heterogeneous spaces, but also the dynamic process through which the elements of the 
space are taken up and redeployed, and through which new combinations of elements are 
shaped (Collier, 2009).  A topological account is not a ‘before and after’ picture, but an 
 66 
account of how various elements and forms of power have become combined in ‘complex 
edifices’, or ‘systems of correlation’, allowing for certain activities to be thinkable and 
practicable (Gordon, 1991; p. 3). 
In this sense, beyond the account of the methods used for the project, each section is 
offered as a point of intersection, where a multiplicity of connecting knowledges, 
discourses, practices and events exist.  The multiplicity of connections is not the result of a 
linear flow of truth or knowledge development, but the result of the effects created through 
these connections, and the multitude of eventualities that emerged from the conditions 
created.  It was this understanding that allowed me to ‘see’ the apparatus: the apparatus 
emerged through small discoveries of elements and connections, which became 
meaningful through further small discoveries, made possible through the rhizomatic logic 
described earlier.  Through following ‘lines of flight’ from one site to another, I was able to 
consider elements as discursive plateaus, as apparatuses of meaning, as systems of 
correlations that did not stand alone, but which informed each other and which could only 
make sense when considered within and against each other (Honan, 2007; p. 536).  
Through this process, both the elements and the apparatus emerged in tandem: the 
elements only becoming meaningful within the whole system of correlations and whole 
systems of correlations only becoming meaningful through the individual elements; what 
this conveys is that a certain distance must be employed when considering the following 
sections, one that allows for the individual elements and the whole system of correlations 
to exist and inform each other.  The account provided is not a ‘before and after’ picture, 
nor an account of cause and effect; it is an attempt to describe a moving process, one that 
continues to move beyond the boundaries of this account. 
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Chapter 3: Part 1 
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De-industrialisation, post-industrialisation and the changing 
requirements of the ‘young’ citizen 
The following chapter provides an overview of the changing politico-economic background 
of the region and requirements of the young person that emerged from within this process.  
The chapter documents the decline of industry in the region, connecting this with the 
enactment of ‘deindustrialisation’ and its role in conditioning the current levels of poverty 
and disadvantage in the region.  The aim of the chapter was to reconnect wider historical 
political and economic events long silenced by a changing discursive background. What is 
documented are considered elements without which the current reality may not have 
emerged.  The elements described are not offered in a linear cause and effect manner, but 
as correlating events that conditioned the possibility for the effects that followed.  These 
elements are connected to the present in that they are considered part of moving and 
changing apparatus from which the local procedures of ADHD of gained legitimacy. 
The particular focus of this chapter was made possible by the analysis in the following 
chapter; specifically, the emergence of the requirement for schools to contribute to 
‘eliminating’ disadvantage and poverty.  The local disadvantage and poverty was 
prominent throughout my discussions with educational professionals.  Its visibility took the 
form of accounts of its impact locally and ‘on’ the behaviour of children.  I previously 
worked in the region for several years and had only known inequality and disadvantage; I 
had noticed architecture indicating an industrial past, but had not connected this to 
prosperity due to the prominence of disadvantage.  My previous unquestioning acceptance 
of this disadvantage was disrupted by a conversation with an educational professional, 
which illuminated a requirement to question and understand what had happened locally to 
move the region from a position of relative prosperity to high levels of disadvantage and 
poverty. 
The conversation took place in my first meeting with the educational professional.  As a 
starting point in our discussion, they provided a brief social history of the region, 
highlighting that the building we were sat in was once part of a thriving milling community 
that provided employment to school leavers from the area: 
The building we’re in at the moment was a mill and as I said to you one of 
the guidance teachers who works in our Academy at the moment, he 
remembers the managers, the foremen and whatever, of this mill coming in – 
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you know – to the fourth years and saying right, who wants jobs right you, 
you, you – turn up at the office on Monday and sign up. 
Milling was not the only thriving local industrial area, however, with agriculture, mining, 
shipbuilding, wool and textiles, glassmaking, weaving, brewing, malt whiskey distilling and 
barrel cooperage all present in the area until relatively recently.  Historically, the prosperity 
of the local region was recognised as, in proportion to its size, being one of the wealthiest 
counties in Scotland (Findlay, 2005).  In the present, however, whilst including communities 
of outstanding prosperity, the region has neighbourhoods whose health, income and 
employment standards sit with the poorest in Scotland.  In a Scotland-wide context, the 
region has the 5th highest share of population living in the 15% most deprived areas and a 
higher percentage of young people living in the most deprived areas in Scotland compared 
to the Scottish average (Office of National Statistics, 2011; Scottish Public Health 
Observatory, 2008). 
The recollection in the conversation above regarding the ease with which school pupils 
could leave school and take up employment is borne out by economic data from the time; 
at the end of the 1960s, the region in which the investigation was conducted had an 
unemployment rate of approximately 1.5% of the local population throughout the 1950s 
and 1960s, lower than the upper limit of 3% that defined ‘full employment’ within 
Keynesian economics that dominated post-war British social organisation (Stewart, 1991).  
However, by the mid-to-late 1980s, unemployment had increased to 18.4% (Fraser & 
Sinfield, 1988), with 37% of jobs in the manufacturing industry, the industries dominant in 
the region, lost between 1971-1981 (ibid.).  Unemployment in the region (and across 
Scotland) exponentially rose in a relatively short period: by 1979, unemployment had 
doubled, and by 1983 it had doubled again, with continued increases from 1983 onwards, 
reaching 18.4% of the population by 1986, a six-fold increase over a period of 20 years 
(ibid.).  The labour market was particularly problematic for young people, with over a third 
of males aged 18 to 24 experiencing unemployment within the previous 12 months, double 
the figure for older males; by 1985, 16% of males and 24% of females who were out of 
work were under the age of twenty (ibid.).  The impact of the changing labour market on 
youth employment is most clearly documented by considering the destinations of school 
leavers: around 75% of pupils leaving school in 1978 had gained employment by the 
following year, with the proportion in Youth Training Schemes (YTS) less than 8% (ibid.).  
However, by 1985, the percentage of school leavers in employment by the following year 
had dropped below 30%, with the proportion in in YTS rising to nearly 40% (ibid.). 
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Explaining (away) the changing fortunes of the region  
There are various differing accounts for the increasing unemployment rate in Scotland 
over this period.  One such explanation was present in one of the conversations I had with 
a local educational professional – that industry was too expensive and not competitive in 
the newly emerging global economy: 
Along with lots of places in the 1980s, the government policy was that 
because these were big booted industries and they were expensive to run 
and there were cheaper imports coming in from other parts of the world so – 
you know – especially since a lot of them are state funded, these industries 
like the steel industry, the coal industry et cetera, et cetera – I'm guessing the 
government policy was this is not financially viable in the long run. Yes, it 
employs our citizens but actually we can't afford it. And a lot of these things 
were closed down. 
The account above contains statements that can be connected to the historical 
problematisation of industry which continues in present day accounts of the exponential 
rise in unemployment occurring in the 1980s (Collins & McCartney, 2011).  Specifically, 
that the decline of industry was the result of an unproductive and unskilled workforce, 
inflated wages, and the long-term failure of industry to keep up with the technological 
advances of international competitors (Gamble, 1989). This account, however, can be 
seen to silence various effects of the enactment of politico-economic rationalities 
associated with the ‘New Right’ and their role in the conditions of the present.   
These political and economic theories, an amalgam of contradictory strands of liberal and 
conservative political and economic rationalities most widely known as neoliberalism 
(Harvey, 2007), emphasise the efficiency of market competition over other forms of 
societal administration, prioritise the capacity of individuals in determining economic 
outcomes through rational choice making, and problematise all forms regulation as 
reducing the efficiency of the ‘natural’ function of the free market to regulate society.  
Despite only gaining prominence in the 1970s and 80s, these rationalities have become so 
familiar that it is hard to imagine a background structured differently.  And it is this 
familiarity that allows for the inevitability contained in the statement above – ‘if businesses 
are not financially viable, they are closed down, even it employs our citizens’ – allowing for 
the uncomplicated acceptance of the making redundant of large numbers of individuals.  
This is to not say that this was the position of the professional I spoke with, but the 
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continued acceptance and use of the explanation continues to silence a historical period 
when closing down industry and making citizens unemployed was not the norm. And 
through this silencing, the social and political upheaval associated with this shifting 
politico-economic background, and their role at present, also remain hidden.   
This shifting background is particularly important to this project as it plays a fundamental 
role in shaping the understanding we have of ‘young people’, what we expect from them, 
what we do to achieve this, and what we do when this is not achieved.  The shifting 
background is important to this investigation in other ways too, in that a number of 
artefacts from this period of social and political upheaval, particularly youth unemployment 
and reforms to education and health services, played and continue to play, an important 
role in conditioning our present, but they have disappeared from our accounts of the 
present, allowing for uncomplicated acceptance of the here and now.  This investigation 
attempts to bring them back out, ‘unsilence’ them, and place them in the foreground, 
allowing examination of their role in conditioning the possibility for the social practice of 
ADHD.  
Troubling the explanation: Making visible ‘New Right’ rationalities 
The various discursive strands constituting the political and economic rationalities of the 
‘New Right’ are widely accepted to have gained dominance from the 1980s onwards 
(Harvey, 2007).  The discourses had been in circulation prior to the 1980s, however, 
appearing in various political discourses and movements, such as ‘Powellism’ (Nairn, 
1970), the ‘Selsdon’ agenda (Barry, 2005), and the ‘Ridley report’ (Gamble, 1989), but the 
interaction of various political and economic events in the 1970s and 80s allowed the 
statements to coalesce around the problematisation of the prevailing social democratic 
organisation of society (Gamble, 1989).  Prior to this historical juncture, the UK was 
considered a dominant and prosperous industrial nation, attributable to a colonial past of 
forceful extraction of raw materials for the manufacturing process and a system of 
economic relations through enforced free trade (Rose, Vogler, Marshall & Newby, 1984).  
After the second world-war, the international economy was reordered in accordance with 
the Bretton Woods agreement and the Marshall plan, with established economic trading 
links reconfigured to create a system of trade between advanced industrial societies at the 
expense of the previous colonial networks.  This newly constructed network of 
interconnections created interdependence in the production and consumption and import 
and the export of manufactured goods within and across multiple advanced nation states, 
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but also the potential for domestic economic vulnerability through fluctuations and crisis in 
any of the interconnected nations (Mann, 1983).   
The UK was considered to have been particularly vulnerable to these fluctuations through 
attempts to maintain its colonial past.  High levels of government and private investment in 
colonial outposts are considered to have underpinned recurring government balance of 
payment crises and a lack of investment in domestic industry and economy, which were 
disguised by post war economic expansion (Matthews, Feinstein & Odling-Smee, 1982).  
The interconnected economic system created new requirements for growth in production 
and profit across the network, with measures for its calculability and comparability across 
the network, allowing for economic performance, growth and productivity to emerge as 
political arguments in the late 1960s and 70s (Miller & Rose, 2008).  A major economic 
event to impact on the newly constructed network of nations, the oil crisis in 1973, can be 
seen to have created the conditions for the first appearance of these political arguments, 
allowing for the impact of the UKs colonial past on its domestic economy to be 
reconstituted as an inefficiency of the labour force and an underperformance of industry, 
and for ‘deindustrialisation’ to emerge as a solution to the ‘problem’.  The effects from this 
solution are well documented: from a peak in 1966, employment in manufacturing was 8.4 
million, by 1983 this had reduced to 5.5 million, representing a 34.5 percent fall in 17 
years, with half – 1.5 million jobs – lost between 1979 and 1983 (Rose, Vogler, Marshall & 
Newby, 1984).  In Scotland, by 1979, one-third of the population worked in industry, by 
1984 it was less than one-quarter. Scotland's manufacturing was reduced by 
approximately 30% with the three traditional mass employment sectors – shipbuilding, 
steel manufacturing and coal mining – all but disappearing (Smith, 1988; Naysmith, 2013).   
The requirements of ‘new’ citizen of the post-industrial society 
Another often-deployed explanation for deindustrialisation is that the economy required 
‘modernising’ and that deindustrialisation was a necessary first step in this process 
(Fingelton, 1999).  The explanation can be considered to be informed by economic and 
political discourse dominant in the 1950s and 60s which constructed advanced industrial 
societies as destined to move from the production and consumption of goods, to a post-
industrial society underpinned by the “centrality of theoretical knowledge as the source of 
innovation and policy formation” (Bell, 1973; p. 12).  In this new societal order, industry 
would be a relic of the machine age and abandoned to the ‘lesser’ economies of the world 
with the more ‘advanced’ economies underpinned by technology, finance, 
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entertainment/service and the production of knowledge and skills (Fingelton, 1999).  
Employment in this new societal organisation would require flexibility, technical skills and 
professional qualifications.  The requirement for manual labour, physical exertion and the 
production and distribution of physical objects would be reduced and employees would 
gain greater freedoms and control over their conditions of work (Rose, Vogler, Marshall & 
Newby, 1984).  The shift to the post-industrial society would occur ‘naturally’ as the 
country became richer, with the “third sector” (Bell, 1976; p. 574) expanding as industry 
shed labour and eventually overtaking industry as the main employer of the citizen.  The 
requirements of the citizen in this new societal order would be different from the previous 
industrial society, with individual freedom, personal choice, self-fulfilment and initiative 
separating the post-industrial citizen from the passive and state dependent industrial 
society citizen.  The new citizen would display self-interest, individual moral responsibility 
and the exercise of personal choice within a free market place (Jordan, 1989; Harris, 
2002) resulting in self-enhancement and wellbeing and a reduction in the requirement for 
state provided welfare services (Hill, 2003). 
The material effects of ‘modernisation’ through deindustrialisation were quite different, 
however: the discourse of the post-industrial society constructs the shift from industrial to 
post-industrial as ‘naturally’ occurring, one that occurs as society grows richer, and as 
employment moves from industry to the third sector.  In ‘reality’, however, the shift from 
manufacturing to the third sector did not happen; between 1979 and 1983, in the UK, 
manufacturing output was reduced by approximately 28% (Leys, 1985), with the reduction 
in Scotland higher due to a higher concentration of heavy industry and manufacturing 
(Collins & McCartney, 2011).  In 1979, one-third of Scots worked in industry, by 1984 it 
was less than one-quarter, with manufacturing reduced by approximately 30% (Smith, 
1988).  Over the same period, against losses of almost a quarter of a million 
manufacturing jobs in Scotland, employment in the service sector increased by 30,000 
(Smith, 1988).   
Rather than being presented as a problem of the application of New Right politico-
economic rationalities, however, the solution to high unemployment levels was to reform 
the social security apparatus according to the same New Right politico-economic 
rationalities.  The various ‘reforms’ reduced the financial assistance available and created 
a requirement for those in receipt of welfare to have their ‘need’ reviewed on a regular 
basis, conditioning a shift in the welfare apparatus from one based on universality and 
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welfare, to one based on conditionality and workfare.  This new welfare apparatus, rather 
than functioning as a safety net, would function as a technology for disciplining the newly 
redundant industrial workforce through regimes of assessment of job seeking and a 
reduction in the amount of financial assistance available (Dwyer, 2004; Hill, 2003).  Two 
reforms specific to young people and relevant to this investigation include the ending of 
entitlement for school leavers under 18 years old and a reduction of school leaver 
entitlement for 18-year-old school leavers (Blanchflower & Freeman, 1994), both of which 
will be touched upon later in the chapter. 
An unforeseen effect of the New Right rationalities and reforms was increasing 
unemployment, increasing social inequality, rising levels of social unrest and a resulting 
impact on social cohesion (Gamble, 1988).  Through the slow eroding of the social 
democratic politico-economic concepts of social integration, solidarity and collectivism and 
replacement by the New Right concepts of individual responsibility and self-interest, the 
obligations of the state to the citizen and from individual citizen to the state were disrupted 
and displaced (Jordan, 1989).  However, as before, these effects were not constructed as 
problems of New Right politico-economic, but as the result of passivity and dependency of 
the social democratic citizen (Gamble, 1988).  Against this problematisation, the ‘active’ 
citizen, and the ‘enterprising culture’ in which they would flourish, can be considered to 
have emerged as a solution (Rose, 1992).  The ‘active’ citizen can be considered as an 
attempt to counterpose collectivist welfare approaches and the ‘dependency’ of the social 
democratic citizen (Kearns, 1995) whilst reintroducing social obligations. This new form of 
citizenry would be both individually and socially responsible for him/herself, their family, 
and others through forms of voluntarism, with state support constructed as a last resort 
(Beckett, 2006).   
Fabricating the young active citizen: The apparatus of education 
The shifting apparatus of social security can be considered as having the image of the 
active citizen as its aim.  The new regime of reduced financial support, surveillance and 
disciplinary procedures can be seen as a technology for governing those in receipt of 
welfare through inducing poverty, with the aim of encouraging movement towards 
employment in the newly emerging third sector (despite there not being one).  Alongside 
targeting the newly redundant industrial workforce, the specific welfare ‘reforms’ targeting 
the young person can also be considered as technologies of discipline.  However, both 
‘reforms’ – removing entitlement for school leavers under 18 and reducing entitlement for 
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18-year-old school leavers can be seen to connect to a wider approach of governance of 
the young person involving the apparatus of education.  This is visible in the gradual 
emergence, within the apparatus of education, of discourses and technologies aimed at 
shaping the young person as a future adult/worker, which are clearly visible in the 
‘National Curriculum’ introduced by the 1988 Education Reform Act (Demaine & 
Entwhistle, 1996).  The aims of this new centrally directed national curriculum was to 
extend educational reach into new domains of the young person – including spiritual, 
moral, cultural – and for these domains to be utilised in preparing the young person for the 
“opportunities, responsibilities and experiences of adult life” (Her Majesties’ Government, 
1988; p. 3).  These new aims would be achieved through additional reforms codified by the 
act, including instruction in new technological and vocational knowledges and the 
introduction of regimes of multiple testing, allowing for surveillance, measurement and 
comparison over time.   
The discourse of active citizen can be seen to emerge within the educational apparatus in 
1990s, as evident in the intersecting policy agendas of Encouraging Citizenship (Her 
Majesty's Stationery Office, 1990) and Curriculum Guidance 8: Education for Citizenship 
(National Curriculum Council, 1990).  Both policy agendas attempt to construct a 
‘consensus view of citizenship’ (Edwards & Trott, 1995); minimise the contested nature of 
the concept (Edwards & Trott, 1995; Rankin, Fielding & Reeve, 1990); and position the 
pupil, the teacher, the parent, and the newly constructed position of school governor, as a 
partnership that would shape the participative and active young citizens of the future 
(Edwards & Trott, 1995).  The policy agendas can also be seen as the reconstitution of 
educational practice as a technology of governance, one that would develop in the young 
person, the “knowledge, skills and attitudes necessary for exploring, making informed 
decisions about and exercising responsibilities and rights in a democratic society” 
(National Curriculum Council, 1990; p. 2), “establish the importance of positive, 
participative citizenship” and “help pupils to acquire and understand the information on 
which to base the development of their skills, values and attitudes towards citizenship” (p. 
5).  This new form of citizenship placed at the centre of the apparatus of education was 
one based on ‘values’ that exemplified the ‘civilised society’.  The overarching emphasis of 
this new focus, however, was on the responsibilities and obligations of the future citizen to 
the state, rather than rights of the future citizen of the state (Kearns, 1995).  The active 
citizen would be responsible for themselves, responsible for their development and role 
within the new emerging post-industrial society, and responsible for others through 
 76 
voluntarism, with the state functioning as night-watchman, as umpire in post-industrial 
society governed through free market principles. 
A further important shift within the apparatus of education that can be considered a 
solution to the effects of the enactment of the post-industrial society was the emergence of 
the requirement for vocational training, as evident across several intersecting policy 
agendas, including A New Training Initiative: A Programme for Action (Department of 
Education/Department of Education and Science, 1981), A New Training Initiative: A 
Consultative Document (Manpower Services Commission, 1981), Better Schools 
(Department of Education and Science, 1985) and Working Together: Education and 
Training (Department of Education/Department of Education and Science, 1986).  The 
problem constructed across these agendas is a lack of workforce available to meet the 
new demands of the post-industrial society: the emerging new markets of the post-
industrial society are constructed as requiring the adoption of new technologies in new 
areas, such as ‘micro-electronics, bio-technology, advanced chemicals, new materials, 
computer applications, energy and communications systems’, which required a ‘highly 
skilled, better educated, and more mobile workforce’ consisting of a ‘large number of 
professional and technical staff’ who would be supported by a ‘range of highly trained 
workers performing a multitude of tasks rather than repetitive assembly or manufacture of 
a specific product’.   
The target of this problematisation were young people between the ages of 11-18, and the 
aim was to keep them in full-time education beyond the age of 16.  Full-time education 
was constructed as offering ‘a better preparation for working life’ through the availability of 
‘vocationally relevant courses’ (Department of Education/Department of Education and 
Science, 1981).  The means by which this was to be achieved was through inclusion of a 
technical and vocational focus in the school curriculum in line with the emerging markets of 
the post-industrial society, the reconstitution of the role of the ‘teacher’ to fulfil the 
demands of the altered curriculum, reform of the examination system to allow for 
surveillance and measurement of the young person’s ‘achievements’, and a system for 
surveillance and measurement of achievement of the aims of the altered curriculum (Dale, 
1989).   
Differing dimensions of the Scottish apparatus of education 
The particular technologies of this emerging discourse were divergent across English and 
Scottish contexts, reflecting the differing elements of the apparatus in which the discourse 
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emerged.  In a Scottish context, the discourse of vocational training emerged within a 
shifting policy agenda that allowed for the reconstitution of technologies of assessment to 
allow ‘every pupil’ to obtain recognition for his or her achievements (Scottish Education 
Department, 1988).  The particular form the new technologies of assessment took were 
the ‘standard grade’ and the ‘national certificate’.  The ‘standard grade’ emerged against 
the problematisation of the ‘O grade’ as designed for ‘high-achieving pupils’ (Scottish 
Education Department, 1977), allowing for assessment of the new ‘wider curriculum’, one 
which would now have a focus on social and vocational skills, at three levels – foundation, 
general and credit – which aimed to cover the full range of pupils within the expanded 
school system.  The ‘national certificate’ emerged against the problematisation of the 
‘bewildering choice’ of qualifications and examining bodies faced by Scottish pupils 
(Scottish Education Department, 1983).  In this new arrangement of the apparatus, 
learning could continue after leaving the school system, with ‘modules’ available through 
further education colleges, or the workplace, allowing for the national certificate to meet 
the needs of ‘growing numbers of pupils for whom higher education was not an 
appropriate aim’ (Weir, 1988, cited in Arnott, 2011).   
This new arrangement of the apparatus of education can be argued to have the image of 
the active citizen of the post-industrial society as its aim.  The new requirement for self-
motivated self-enhancement in order to continually adapt to changing requirements of free 
market place is visible: the new requirement for ‘life-long learning’ was made possible 
through connecting schools, further education colleges, and the workplace through the 
new modular system of examination (Scottish Education Department, 1986).  Additionally, 
the new forms of vocational training now available involved private enterprise in the 
delivery of the curriculum (Bell, Howieson, King & Raffe, 1989), allowing ‘industry experts’ 
to shape the curriculum in accordance with whatever demands the free market placed 
upon the worker.  The new worker/citizen being fabricated would “understand commercial 
culture… understand the profit motivation… understand about personal aspirations for 
personal success” (Kalms, 1988, cited in Gewirtz, Whitty & Edwards, 1992) and would 
remedy the dependency culture of state welfare provision through doing things for 
themselves, thinking for themselves, and acting responsibly (Hall, 1988, cited in Gewirtz, 
Whitty & Edwards, 1992). 
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Creating a new background for the active young person 
A further element of the attempted enactment of the post-industrial society that offers clues 
to the shifting requirements of the citizen in this new configuration of society are 
‘Enterprise Zones’.  The rationale for including these zones in this discussion is that they 
are considered to provide a glimpse of the background upon which the new active citizen 
would function and, thus, a glimpse of image that can be considered to be at the centre of 
the new requirements shaping the apparatus of education.  The ‘enterprise zone’ first 
appeared within the Local Government Planning and Land Act (1980) and the Finance Act 
(1980).  They can be considered as an ‘experimental’ enactment of New Right politico-
economic rationalities which aimed to ‘liberate enterprise throughout the country’ through 
‘sensible deregulation’ of the ‘bureaucratic nightmare of rules and planning’ that frustrates 
healthy private initiative.   
Geographically, zones were designated areas that had experienced economic and 
physical decay (Department of Education, 1980) through the decline of earlier industrial or 
commercial activity (Department of Education, 1982), but rather than areas of high human 
cost, the zones targeted vacant land to test how far industrial and commercial activity 
could be encouraged by the removal or streamlining of administration of certain statutory 
or administrative controls (Department of Education, 1980).  Enterprise was to be attracted 
to the zones by a number of ‘incentives’, including a simplified planning regime, 100% 
allowance on corporation tax, exemption from development tax, exemption from paying 
rates on property, a reduction in official requests for governance information, exemption 
from contribution towards the costs of training workers, and exemption from the 
requirement to supply information to industrial training boards (Anderson, 1990).   
Considered a ‘New Right flagship’ (Anderson, 1990), the enterprise zone can be 
considered as a microcosmic enactment of the post-industrial society, a glimpse of the 
materiality of the discourse.  The ‘incentives’ were offered to attract business, with the aim 
being a property-led economic regeneration of the deindustrialised regions and the shifting 
of responsibility for their regeneration and the reversal of their economic and social 
problems from the state to the free market (Anderson, 1990; Howe, 1978).  The reduction 
in ‘state controls’ such as taxation and governance, and the proliferation of new ‘arms-
length’ agencies and their involvement in administering the zones (Danson & Lloyd, 1992), 
can be considered to function as free market pockets, free from state involvement, where 
the ‘invisible hand’ of the free market would take over from the state in societal 
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administration.  To be a worker in these free market pockets required the ability to self-
improve in line with the free market demands [there was no requirement to train workers] 
and to be flexible to respond to the changing background; for those unwilling, or unable, 
there was no alternative (Thatcher, 1980); they would either self-improve or remain 
unemployed and governed by the new disciplining welfare apparatus. 
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The material effects of the ‘post-industrial society’: Inequality and 
disadvantage 
The promised shift from manufacturing to the third sector in the post-industrial society did 
not emerge in practice; between 1979 and 1983, in the UK, manufacturing output was 
reduced by approximately 28% (Leys, 1985), with the reduction in Scotland higher due to a 
higher concentration of heavy industry and manufacturing (Collins & McCartney, 2011).  In 
1979, one-third of Scots worked in industry, by 1984 it was less than one-quarter. 
Scotland's manufacturing was reduced by approximately 30% with the three traditional 
mass employment sectors – shipbuilding, steel manufacturing and coal mining – all but 
wiped out (Smith, 1988; Naysmith, 2013).  Over the same period, against losses of almost 
a quarter of a million manufacturing jobs in Scotland, employment in the third sector 
increased by only 30,000 (Smith, 1988).  Additionally, the ‘New Right flagship’ enterprise 
zones, the ‘experiment’ in New Right societal administration, failed to create a free market 
driven economic recovery or produce employment for the ‘active’ citizen.  Over a 10-year 
period, 38 zones were active, creating 126,000 jobs, with only 58,000 of these being 
classed as ‘additional’ jobs (Ward, 2016).   
The differing employment figures illuminate an unintended effect of the zones: the 
relocation of enterprise from non-designated areas to the designated zones; and as the 
majority of the zones were designated in major cities, the result was concentrated job loss 
in smaller rural or semi-rural areas (Anderson, 1990).  An effect of this movement was 
that, whilst some previously industrial areas were reconfigured in line with the post-
industrial discourse, most deindustrialised regions and the individuals who lived there, 
were ‘left to rot’ (Anderson, 1990).  The region in which this project was conducted can be 
considered as falling into this ‘left to rot’ category; it was not a designated enterprise zone, 
it was geographically located near 3 of the 4 designated Scottish zones, and the material 
effects of the deindustrialisation are very clearly documented by the Office of National 
Statistics (2011) and the Scottish Public Health Observatory (2008) reports mentioned at 
the start of the chapter.  As I also outlined, the material effects also figured heavily in the 
conversations I had with the various local educational professionals; for example: 
Excerpt 1: 
Family Support Worker: I kind of... it scares me because... you know... 
having kind of gone out to work... well, left school in the kind of Thatcher 
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years... without kind of going and getting too political about it... and knowing 
what was available then. Which was nothing.  
[…]  
And it kind of feels like it’s another cycle that we’re going through, and when I 
first started working here it was great. There was money flying in... you 
know... because it’s classed as an area of deprivation... you know... there’s 
drug use and... I mean, it’s kind of inner city in a very rural area. 
Excerpt 2: 
Educational Psychologist: I think in [region]... I think it was particularly hit 
because lots of industries would have closed all at once. It's a wee bit 
interesting community... and I call it a wee community on purpose I'm using 
those words fairly advisedly... it's a place where everybody knows everybody 
else and they're mostly related to each other as well. There are three distinct 
communities and they are notoriously suspicious of each other as well.  
[…]   
The [area] cluster… and that's the cluster that I mostly cover... is very 
interesting because they're quite tight as a community. They've got lots of 
problems – massive social deprivation down there, huge social deprivation... 
but they're not the kind of folk... you know... you've got some other places 
where folk will say ‘I haven't got’ and ‘I deserve’ and ‘it's my right’... the folk in 
[area] are not like that.  
[…]   
So I know, for example, in one of the primary schools where they would have 
a very high free school meal school meal entitlement, quite a lot of the 
parents don't claim it. They don't want help from outsiders. They don't want 
that kind of dependence. It's very... it's very odd actually. You would think 
that... you know... there's huge poverty and deprivation... you'd think you'd be 
saying ‘yes please’. But no, they're quite close. 
Excerpt 3: 
Interviewer: What do you think that’s about? 
Teacher 1: I think it’s about parenting. I think it’s about attachment.   I think 
it’s about trauma. I think it’s about... like I say... domestic abuse, substance 
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abuse... you know... I think there’s drugs and alcohol within [region]... you 
know the things that are known to have that… 
Teacher 2: You look at the health profiles it’s poor. It’s really quite 
shocking... you know... what the prospects are for our children, certainly for 
some of them... it’s quite alarming. 
Interviewer: It’s quite a high area of deprivation, isn’t it? 
Teacher 1: We’ve got about 40% on decile one and two [lowest two 
indicators of family income]. 
Within our school, yeah. 
Interviewer: In this school? 
Teacher 1: In this school.  So that’s about two hundred kids to us... that’s a 
big number in a school of five hundred. 
Interviewer: so it’s almost half of your cohort then? 
Teacher 1: Yes, living in that... that level... in poverty and deprivation. 
Interviewer: So what's your sense of what it’s like for the young people in 
this area then? 
Excerpt 4: 
Deputy Head Teacher: It's, umm... I mean, it's pretty grim. I would say their 
perception of it is there’s... I mean traditionally... you know... the industries 
that were here... you know... the brewery and all that have gone. There is a 
high level of unemployment in [area], particularly [area], and the bottom end 
and out in [area]. Also because it’s the smallest authority there is not the 
same... you know... facilities here for young people. But I think there is a 
push... you know... they're trying to develop a skate park now... there's 
different things... there is some kind of regeneration of the communities going 
on. But I do think that... you know... young people here feel that it's dead 
easy just to avoid it. They can... you know... take drugs, get wasted with your 
pals... you know... there's not an awful lot to do here. There’s still quite a high 
level of unemployment... you know... in comparison... but they would 
probably answer that better than I would. But I think young people feel they 
do... they all say... you know... it’s not [city], it's not is not [city], we don't have 
access to the same opportunities as other young people do. 
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Educated and unemployed: Increasing the requirement for education without jobs  
Along with the increasing deprivation outlined above, several effects specific to young 
people were also conditioned by the attempted enactment of the post-industrial society.  
The twin elements of the changing curriculum and welfare entitlement removal for young 
people resulted in increased numbers in the school system who would have previously left 
school at 16, and for whom further education was not a priority (Paterson, 1993; Weir, 
1988, cited in Arnott, 2011).  It was difficult to find official statistics on this issue – I 
contacted the Scottish government requesting sources of data but was informed that 
statistics were not available for this time period – however, one study investigating the 
impact of the education reforms (Sinclair, Ironside, & Seifert, 1996) found that secondary 
school class sizes increased by 7.5%, pupil-teacher ratios reducing by 6.4% and class 
sizes of over 30 increasing by 5.4% nationally.  In a Scottish context, the increase in 
secondary school pupil numbers was considerably larger, with an increase 18% occurring 
between 1983 and 1994 (Paterson, 1997).   
Despite the increasing school pupil numbers and educational focus on vocational training, 
the destination for these young people was not employment in the new technology driven 
free market as intended.  By 1989, approximately half the young people who engaged in 
vocational training were on government administered Youth Training Schemes, 30% were 
unemployed, with 20% in full-time employment outside schemes administered through 
governmental unemployment services (Bell, Howieson, King & Raffe, 1989).  At the same 
time, engagement in vocational training did not impact on employability, with the presence 
of vocational training experience not having a corresponding influence on the practices of 
recruitment and selection of enterprise; statements from employers can be seen to 
indicate that experience of vocational training would not influence selection of new 
employees (Bell, Howieson, King & Raffe, 1989).  The effect of this shift towards 
vocational training, rather than the creation of a highly trained, vocationally able young 
workforce, was the maintenance of young people within the apparatus of education for 
longer (Paterson, 1993) and the creation of a subgroup of skilled young people, without 
employment opportunity, administered through governmental unemployment services, 
such as Youth Training Schemes or unemployment services, alongside the large numbers 
of adults classed as long-term unemployed. 
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Social exclusion and marginalisation of young people 
A further effect from the deindustrialisation was the exponential increase in young people 
socially excluded from society.  The removal of welfare entitlements for young people 
under the age of 18, and restriction of entitlements for young people under the age of 25, 
resulted in the large numbers of young people, unwilling to be governed by the discourses 
of vocational training, being marginalised from society.  In Learning to Labour, Willis 
(1977) explores how the young people of the study “get working class jobs” (p. 1) by 
documenting the discourses and practices that shaped the subjectivities required for taking 
up employment in the manufacturing industries.  A dominant discourse in this process was 
that education was pointless and only for middle class kids.  The effect of the discourse 
was the devaluing of educational effort resulting in academic underachievement and 
leaving school at 16 for employment in manufacturing.  The same discourse was apparent 
in this project, appearing in an account of the impact of deindustrialisation on the region by 
the same educational professional who highlighted the region’s past prosperity.  In the 
account, she recalls her own experience of schooling and educational choices: 
I mean I had people in my family when I said that I wanted to go to university, 
they were kind of looking at me saying why do you want to do that? You 
know what you're going to do as a woman – sorry dad [whispering that to him 
up there] – was well you'll go and you'll do secretarial training and then you'll 
go and get an admin job and – you know – that's what you'll do, because 
then you'll get married and you’ll have babies and you’ll give up your work 
and – you know. So what was the point of – you know – going to university?  
My cousin's friends who did that because that – that’s exactly what they did 
because there was still loads of these industries around that required the 
typing pool and the admin skills and things like that. So the desire for further 
education and higher education wasn’t huge because there were plenty of 
job opportunities for sensible, competent people to do straight after school 
[…].  
So my generation kind of had to think differently about what they were going 
to do at the end of education but maybe people just five years before me, 
they could do a reasonable spread 1st to 4th year, keep your nose clean, 
don't get into too much trouble, and then leave school and get a job. 
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In the midst of the deindustrialisation of the local area, this would have not have resulted in 
employment in working class jobs, or even in unemployment, but in the creation of 
subgroup of young people not in receipt of welfare assistance and not appearing in official 
unemployment statistics (Levitas, 1996; MacDonald, 1996).  As these young people were 
excluded from official statistics, it is impossible to gauge the numbers of young people 
marginalised by this process; however, if one considers the emergence of the category of 
NEET as the construction of this particular group of young people as a social problem, as 
several critics have argued (Bynner & Parsons, 2002; Crisp & Powell, 2017; Furlong, 
2006; Melrose, 2012), then an indication of the ‘scale of the problem of NEET’ suggests 
that, by the early 1990s, approximately 9% (161,000) of 16-17-year-olds per year were 
being socially excluded from society (Social Exclusion Unit, 1999).  Invariably, though, 
dominant contemporary discourses of youth unemployment do not construct NEET as the 
result of punitive welfare reforms aimed at ‘encouraging’ continued education or take-up of 
vocational training (Bynner & Parsons, 2002), but as the result of lacking the personal 
characteristics deemed necessary to fulfil the societal obligation of work (Crisp & Powell, 
2017), reflecting the transmutation of social issues into moral problems by New Right 
politico-economic discourse (Cole, 2008). 
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Governing young people through ‘Additional Support for Learning’ 
In the previous chapter, I provided an overview of the changing politico-economic 
background of the region and the changing requirements of the young person that 
emerged from within this process.  The chapter was made possible by the discussions that 
informed this chapter and, thus, are important for foregrounding this chapter.  As stated at 
the start of the previous chapter, this shifting background is important because of what 
was made possible in the present.  The effects created – particularly poverty and 
disadvantage and the emerging role of the apparatus of education in shaping the future 
citizen – are considered important in conditioning the elements expanded upon in this 
chapter: ‘social inclusion’ as requirement of schools and the emergence of ‘additional 
support needs’ as a category of disability.   
Both of these elements are considered an important focus in this investigation as their 
intersecting genealogical lines can be seen to have created the conditions for the invention 
of a grid of procedures, knowledges and technologies for ‘supporting’ young people ‘to’ 
learn.  My argument is that this grid emerged as a solution to a proliferation of ‘learning 
problems’ conditioned by the emergence of social inclusion as a strategic aim of the 
apparatus of education and a requirement to meet the learning needs of every pupil 
required by the additional support needs.  It is the appearance of this grid, conditioned by 
these intersecting elements, that is considered to have allowed for an increase in use of 
psychiatric knowledge within the school. 
This chapter, like the last, is offered in two parts.  In part one, I chart two genealogical lines 
– one for social inclusion and one for additional support needs – tracking backwards from 
their appearance within the apparatus of education.  In the first genealogical line, I chart 
the appearance of social inclusion as a strategic aim of the apparatus education by 
examining Scottish and UK political discourse.  This is then connected with the emergence 
of ‘Third-Way’ politics.  In the second genealogical line, I chart the expansion of the 
category of disability, illuminating the changing requirements conditioned by its 
reconstitution from a discrete biological condition to about ‘anything’ that has a bearing on 
educational progress.  In part two of the chapter, I provide an analysis of the emergence of 
ADHD as an explanation within the grid of procedures, knowledges and technologies 
conditioned by the intersecting elements charted in part 1 of the chapter.  
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Genealogical line 1: Social exclusion as problematisation of the ‘effects’ of 
deindustrialisation 
The appearance of social exclusion/inclusion as a problem and focus of political discourse 
in the UK can be connected to emergence of ‘Third Way’ politics, with its stated aims of 
combining social solidarity with a dynamic economy (Giddens, 1998, 2000; Peters & 
Besley, 2014).  The problem of social exclusion has a longer history, however, originating 
in French political discourse in the 1960s and 70s (Peters & Besley, 2014; Silver, 2010).  
Within this discursive framework, social exclusion has as its target citizens separated from 
mainstream society by disability, illness and poverty, with social and economic rather than 
individual factors constructed as the cause of exclusion (Peters & Besley, 2014).  
Considered to be informed by French republicanism, the concern for the socially excluded 
connects to the concepts of solidarity, the social bond and equity for all citizens that 
structured French societal organisation (Peters & Besley, 2014; Silver, 1994, 2010).   
In UK political discourse, however, the problem of social exclusion lacks a clear target, 
with concepts such as ‘multiple deprivation’ and ‘complex inequality’ presented as its 
concern (Hills & Stewart, 2005).  This vagueness is visible in various statements 
constructing descriptions of the unit tasked with tackling social exclusion that is considered 
the beginning of its emergence as a problem within UK political discourse.  The Social 
Exclusion Unit (SEU), a ‘flagship’ policy invention attributable to ‘Third-Way’ political 
discourse, constructs social exclusion as occurring because of ‘prospects and networks 
and life chances’; as a ‘modern problem’, as ‘damaging to the self-esteem of the 
individual’, and as ‘what can happen when people or areas suffer from a combination of 
linked problems such as unemployment, poor skills, low incomes, poor housing, high 
crime, poor health and family breakdown’ (Blair, 1997; Social Exclusion Unit, 2004a).  The 
discourse of the SEU also positions social exclusion as resulting from “wider demographic 
and economic changes”, particularly those from the “1980s and 1990s”, and caused by 
“poverty and low income; unemployment; poor school results; poor mental or physical 
health; family breakdown and poor parenting; poor housing and homelessness; 
discrimination; crime; and living in a disadvantaged area” (Social Exclusion Unit, 2004b; p. 
13). 
The characteristics of the SEU social exclusion discourse – particularly the focus on the 
wider demographic and economic factors of the 1980s and 90s as involved in poverty, 
unemployment, poor school results, poor mental or physical health, poor housing, etc. – 
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imply a UK version of a French republican discourse, one that conveys concern for 
solidarity and the social bond and equality for all citizens.  However, the target of UK 
political discourse, despite the connection to wider demographic and economic factors, 
was on social groups and their problems, rather than on the political and economic 
background.  This is clearly emphasised in the constructed solutions: social exclusion 
would be tackled through provision of equal opportunity for all and elimination of barriers to 
these opportunities, which would be achieved through the provision of the individual skills 
and attributes required to reconnect the individual with the labour market (Hills & Stewart, 
2005; Levitas, 1998).  This focus is also visible in various statements presented by the 
SEU: “the best defence against social exclusion is having a job, and the best way to get a 
job is to have a good education, with the right training and experience” (Social Exclusion 
Unit, 1999; p. 6).  In this construction, the individual and their skills, abilities and attributes 
remain the problem and cause of social exclusion and, thus, the focus of intervention.  
However, rather than being because of a moral and behavioural deficiency, as was 
dominant in UK political discourse in the 1980s (Cole, 2008; Pickard, 2014) the lack of 
attributes was positioned as resulting from missing out on opportunity due to social 
exclusion. 
Scottish devolution and the emergence of social ‘inclusion’ 
A variation of social exclusion can be seen in flagship policies of the first devolved Scottish 
government.   In a raft of policies targeting the ‘problems’ of Scottish society, social 
inclusion is positioned as the opposite of social exclusion, as the means of tackling 
exclusion, and as the central aim of post-devolved Scottish political policy.  Social 
exclusion remains a multi-dimensional problem: as caused by a “broad range of social 
problems, centred around low income, lack of opportunity, diminished quality of life and 
degraded environments” and as “what can happen when individuals or areas suffer from a 
combination of linked problems such as unemployment, poor skills, low incomes, poor 
housing, high crime environments, bad health and family breakdown” (p. 8).  To solve the 
problem, a new configuration of institutions and professionals would promote social 
inclusion through participation in the labour market, which would be achieved by tackling 
the specific barriers to participation that individuals faced, including “ill health, low self-
esteem, homelessness and drug misuse” and by promoting “a culture of active citizenship, 
in which self-development, participation in community and civic life and caring for our 
disadvantaged neighbours” (p. 8) were key features. 
 91 
Within UK political discourse, exclusion and inclusion can be considered to have shifted 
from their French republican origins: the problematisation of exclusion as resulting from 
social and economic factors gives way to a problematisation of individual attributes 
(Levitas 2005; Silver, 2010).  In this new focus, individuals are positioned as socially 
excluded because they lack the education, training or skills required for employment.  
There is also a silencing of the wider political and economic background implicated in 
social exclusion: the individual barriers that result in social exclusion are constructed as 
because of social exclusion, with education, training and employment constructed as the 
pathway out of disadvantage and towards social inclusion.  This particular shift can be 
seen as decontextualizing and depoliticising the material effects of political and economic 
approach of 1980s and 90s allowing for a continued targeting of the individual as the 
solution.  However, in this approach, the deployment of disciplining measures, such as 
stripping of welfare rights and creation of mass unemployment, can be seen to give way to 
an approach to governance that requires active engagement from individuals.  In this new 
approach, individual active involvement is encouraged, not through a punishment and 
coercion, but through a pastoral approach, one that positions social exclusion as holding 
the individual back from doing well in life where, if they are able and willing to engage with 
state-provided opportunities to self-improve, the result will be social inclusion and a 
pathway out of disadvantage.  In this new construction, individuals who continued to be 
socially excluded, remain so not because of political and economic structures, but because 
they, as individuals, have not taken advantage of the opportunities made available to them 
to “take part in work, in learning, and in society more generally” (Scottish Office Education 
and Industry Department, 1999). 
Shaping the young person through inclusion: The case of education 
The particular construction of social inclusion outlined above – one that depoliticises 
exclusion, positions it as the cause of disadvantage, and constructs individual engagement 
with state-provided opportunities as the pathway to inclusion – also emerges within the 
apparatus of education, highlighting the positioning of education as a technology of for its 
enactment.  In the document outlined earlier – Social Inclusion: Opening the Door to a 
Better Scotland (Scottish Office Education and Industry Department, 1999) – education is 
positioned as the “best way to achieve a significant, long-term difference to the incidence 
of social exclusion” (p. 6), as this would “develop [the young person’s] skills and their 
employability” (p. 5) with the individual young person positioned as having “responsibility 
for making the most of those opportunities” (p. 5).  These particular aims – the construction 
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of a skilled, employable and responsibilised young person – can be seen as a continuation 
of the activisation of the young citizen through the apparatus of education outlined in the 
previous chapter.  However, the incorporation of the discourse of social inclusion can be 
considered to allow for shift in the functioning of power, from one that excluded ‘problems’ 
to one that would function through technologies of inclusion and normalisation.   
This changing educational background was illuminated in an interview with a deputy head 
teacher.  In the following excerpt, he provides a description of a separate school domain 
where young people were sent once categorised as problematic by mainstream school.  
The role of the domain appears to function solely as a space to banish ‘problems’ from 
mainstream school, possibly acting as an intermediary step to more coercive forms of 
exclusion [residential school].  In this domain, education and learning was not a central 
concern of the exclusion process, with teaching and learning missing from the account of 
the activities.  In the second part of the account, excerpt 2, the deputy head documents the 
shift to inclusion and the proliferation of technologies, and associated professionals, that 
functioned as part of a network for including young people, considered problematic, within 
mainstream schools.  This new focus and approach can be seen to have emerged within 
the shifting requirements of the apparatus of education which now aimed to ‘support’ 
young people in their learning within the mainstream school. 
Excerpt 1: 
Interviewer: I presume that's what you were saying about just coming down 
and there wasn't the education side of things – 
Deputy head teacher: Aye.  I think it's started off – you come down – you 
know – play a couple of songs, play pool, they used to smoke and all that… 
you know… way back in 1970 when it was set up and it was just a resources 
thing for keeping kids out of residential school at that point… because it was 
a different way of thinking. 
Excerpt 2: 
 Deputy head teacher: Within each of the three mainstream schools they 
have a behaviour support department who are primarily staffed by a senior 
member of staff and learning assistants who will…  
Interviewer: So they’re teachers the… the heads of these places? 
 93 
Deputy head teacher: Yeah.  They would be teachers.  But the people who 
run it tend to be… sorry the people who support it, would tend to be kind of 
learning assistants.  They run very differently in each of the three secondary 
schools.  
[…]  
So there are behavioural supports they all have a range of strategies that 
they’ll try and employ within schools through behaviour cards or active 
timetables to support a young person.  But – and then you've also got the 
learning support department or the additional support needs department 
which is more about young people's learning.  So young people come down 
there and they would get a hand with their schoolwork but they're very 
different in each of the three schools.   
Genealogical Line 2: Thinning the mesh and widening the net: The changing category 
of disability 
The current category of disability functioning within the apparatus of education – additional 
support needs – is a relatively new category of school-based disability, with its appearance 
and functioning within the apparatus traceable to the Education (Additional Support for 
Learning) (Scotland) Act (2004) (Scottish Parliament, 2004).  This new category positioned 
additional support needs as anything that acted as a ‘barrier to learning’ and placed the 
requirement for meeting the needs with mainstream schools.  This is considered an 
important shift in the discursive background of apparatus of education, one that can be 
considered to intersect with and be legitimated by the appearance of social inclusion as a 
strategic aim of education.  However, the appearance of disability in this particular form at 
this historical juncture warrants consideration as its gradual transformation across several 
policies can be seen to have conditioned the possibility for the intersection with the social 
inclusion agenda charted above.  The starting point for this account is the Special 
Education Needs: Report of the Committee of Enquiry into the Education of Handicapped 
Children and Young People (Warnock, 1978).  The Warnock report is considered an 
important element in this changing background as its recommendations were codified in 
the Education Scotland Act (1981), which in turn conditioned the possibility for the current 
procedures for managing ‘problems’ in Scottish schools to be codified as additional 
support needs.   
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Prior to enactment of the Warnock report, biological and medical discourse provided the 
procedures for the management of ‘problems’ within the apparatus of education, visible in 
the various subcategories that constituted the Education (Scotland) Act (1945) 
classification of ‘handicapped’.  Each of the 11 subcategories – blind, partially sighted, 
deaf, partially deaf, delicate, diabetic, educationally subnormal, epileptic, maladjusted, 
physically handicapped, and speech defects – constructed problems as an innate 
disability, biological in origin and as requiring certification through ‘medical examination’ by 
a ‘medical officer’ in order to receive either specialist education ‘treatment’ or certification 
as “suffering from a disability of mind or body” (p. 28) and as incapable of receiving 
education.  The category of ‘handicapped’, and the requirement for education authorities to 
provide specialist educational ‘treatment’ for this new category, legitimated a proliferation 
of specialist educational settings, the classification of large numbers of young people as 
‘handicapped’ and for exclusion to function as a means for managing ‘problems’ of 
learning (Warnock, 1978).   
The problematisation of segregated specialist education is apparent in the changing 
category for classification of disability that appears in the Warnock Report (1978).  In the 
report, the category of ‘handicapped’, is reconstituted as ‘special education needs’, 
vaguely defined as an incapacity or disadvantage that hindered learning, as on a 
continuum, and as ranging in form and severity.  The shift from ‘handicapped’ to ‘special 
education needs’ is legitimated through deployment of ‘evidence’ from newly emergent 
child and adolescent epidemiological studies (i.e. the Isle of Wight studies: Rutter, Tizard, 
Yule, Graham, & Whitmore, 1976).  The ‘problem’ considered by these studies is young 
people considered not to be doing well educationally despite not being considered to be 
‘handicapped’ (i.e. those in mainstream school performing badly).  The reality constructed 
was that there was no distinction between ‘handicapped’ and other concepts, such as 
‘disability’, ‘incapacity’ and ‘disadvantage’ and that the relationship between handicap in 
educational terms and the severity of a disability in social terms was more complex than 
initially thought.  In this new reality of disability, the school environment was positioned as 
key to whether disabilities would contribute to poor educational outcomes: if school 
adjusted to the disability, the young person would not be educationally ‘handicapped’ 
(Warnock, 1978; pp. 36–49). 
This new reality of disability can be seen to have legitimated a widening of what could be 
constituted as disability, allowing for a shift from targeting discrete ‘biological defects’ to 
any form of incapacity or disadvantage that could hinder educational outcomes.  This new 
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consideration of what constituted disability expanded the category from its confinement by 
biological discourse to include social, emotional and behavioural dimensions.  A material 
effect of this shift was an increase in what could be constructed as ‘special needs’.  
Special educational needs were now considered to relate to “everything about [the young 
person], his abilities as well as his disabilities – indeed all the factors which have a bearing 
on his educational progress” (Warnock, 1978; p. 37), allowing for a shift from a system of 
discrete and permanent labels to one of fluidity and change: a dynamic system of 
educational surveillance and ‘treatment’.  This ‘thinning of the mesh and widening of the 
net’ (Cohen, 1979) can be consider to have increased the range of who could be targeted 
for intervention; the net was now wide enough to include any young person considered at 
risk of poor educational outcomes, with anything impacting on learning now considered 
legitimate for intervention. 
A new technology of disability: Mainstream school 
This shifting understanding of disability legitimated new procedures for the management of 
what was constructed as special needs.  Previously, the categories of ‘handicapped’, once 
certified as such by medical examination, were fixed upon the young person by a medical 
authority, remaining fixed for the entirety of their time in the educational apparatus and 
beyond.  Specialist education was prescribed as ‘treatment’, which took the form of 
segregation from mainstream schools in separate educational facilities specific to the form 
of disability assigned to the young person.  However, with the emergence of the new fluid 
concept of special needs, the mainstream school was reconstituted as the means of 
management of this new category of disability.  This new approach would require the 
mainstream school to adjust educational provision to meet the specific learning problems 
of young people, and would extend to locational, social, functional and academic domains 
of the school experience.   
The shift from exclusion and specialist schooling to inclusion and mainstream schooling 
was legitimated by this new form of disability.  As discussed above, the Warnock Report 
(1978) problematises the category of ‘handicapped’ as not being wide enough to capture 
the full extent of the problems of learning that were considered to be present in the school 
population.  Through application of the wider concept of special education needs, the 
Warnock Report calls for special education needs to be expanded to one in five of the 
school population (p. 41).  These needs were to be considered as time-limited problems of 
learning, as stemming from a “variety of causes” rather than “handicapped in the traditional 
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sense of the term” and, without time-limited suitable help, the problems would be 
“reinforced by prolonged experience of failure” (p. 41).   
By expanding the category to cover young people not considered to be handicapped but 
not doing well in mainstream school, the new construction problematises mainstream 
school educational provision as not being adequate enough to meet ‘less noticeable forms 
of disability’ experienced by one of five of the pupil population.  The beginnings of a 
preventative discourse can also be detected in this new construction – these needs would 
be ‘time limited’ if provision was made to remedy the variety of causes from which they 
stemmed, which included the contribution of the school environment to the problems.  The 
implicit construction is that these less noticeable disabilities would be avoided if schools 
adapted provision early in order to reduce the ‘prolonged’ failure experienced by this 
previously silent group of young people.      
This new reality of educational disability and its inclusion in mainstream school constructed 
in and legitimated by the Warnock Report became codified by the Education Act (1981) in 
England and Wales and the Education (Scotland) Act (1981), further legitimating by law 
the expanded category of special education needs.  Both acts codified the requirement for 
education authorities to assess the educational needs of young people considered to have 
difficulties with learning and for these to be recorded and monitored as a ‘Statement’ in 
England and Wales and a ‘Record of Needs’ in Scotland.  A key divergence between 
these two acts, however, was that the English and Welsh act codified the requirement for 
inclusion in mainstream schools, whereas the Scottish legislation did not make such a 
commitment (Riddell & Brown, 1994).  Both sets of legislation construct special education 
needs in line with the wider focus legitimised by the Warnock Report and codify the 
requirement for special education provision; however, the English legislation placed a 
requirement for the provision to be made in ordinary school (Education Act, 1981; p. 2), 
whereas the Sottish legislation restricted the requirement to the expedient identification of 
young people with special educational needs, provision of suitable forms of education for 
meeting these needs, and continued surveillance of both needs and provision thereafter 
(Education (Scotland) Act, 1981; pp. 12–15).  As such, within the Scottish educational 
apparatus, exclusion remained a technology for managing problems of learning, with the 
reach of its application expanded to meet the wider category of special education needs; 
however, its continued functioning was time limited, eventually problematised by the 
Standards in Scotland’s Schools etc. Act (2000) as a contributing factor to the social 
exclusion and disadvantage visible in Scottish society (Scottish Government, 2017).   
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The solution proposed by the Standards in Scotland’s Schools etc. Act was the placement 
of a ‘requirement for mainstreaming education’ for every pupil, placing responsibility for 
education of young people considered to have special educational needs on mainstream 
schools, with education to be adapted to meet their specific abilities.  The new requirement 
of mainstream education for all pupils irrespective of disability was legitimated by a 
moralising discourse, one that positioned social exclusion and disadvantage as an 
individual problem that resulted from poor education and urged those providing education 
to be more adaptive in order to contribute to solving the problem.  The requirement for 
mainstream education was connected to social exclusion by reconstituting disability as 
relating to differing ‘personal or social circumstances’ that acted as obstacles to education 
and, thus, to future wellbeing.  Removing these obstacles was now a ‘duty’ as it would 
provide ‘equity’ in education provision and, thus, equity of opportunity for everyone 
regardless of circumstances.  By including everyone regardless of difference, the ‘belief 
they mattered’ would be ‘instilled’ in the young person, encouraging them towards 
achieving the highest possibilities available to them based on individual abilities and 
strengths.   
With this shift in the understanding of disability came a new requirement – to ‘achieve’ – 
which was constructed as beneficial, not only to those considered to have special education 
needs, but to all pupils, the whole school, and society generally.  The rationale offered for this 
new requirement was that ‘educated’ and ‘achieving’ young people would provide a 
“significant contribution to the economic growth of the country, improving wellbeing, family 
life, lifestyles, communities and the nation as a whole” (Scottish Government, 2017; pp. 16–
17).  However, this new reality of the benefits of inclusion contrasts with the reality of 
exclusion authorised by the Education (Scotland) Act (1945), where exclusion of those 
constructed as ‘handicapped’ from the mainstream school was considered beneficial to those 
who remained in the mainstream school.  Arguably, however, inclusion can be considered 
through the lens of ‘disablism’, where technologies such as inclusion, and the category of 
learning disability, function as a “form of social oppression involving the social imposition of 
restrictions of activity on people with impairments and the socially engendered undermining 
of their psycho-emotional wellbeing” (Thomas, 2007; p. 73).  Through this lens, education 
policy can be seen as a technology of assimilation, with the aim to incorporate and normalise 
biological, cognitive, sensory or psychological difference (Goodley & Runswick-Cole, 2011).  
However, rather than being about inclusion and achievement, the practice can be considered 
to be the solution to the problematisation of differences as a risk to the economic progress of 
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the wider community (Runswick-Cole & Goodley, 2015), a problem clearly visible in 
statement above within the Standards in Scotland’s Schools etc. Act (2000).   
Expanding the continuum of need: The inclusion of complex needs 
The category of ‘special education needs’ was reconstituted as ‘additional support’ needs 
by the Education (Additional Support for Learning) (Scotland) Act (2004).  In terms of what 
it could target, the new category was similar in focus to the category it replaced, with both 
constructed as the solution to the problem of obstacles that impacted on learning and 
achievement.  Similar to special education needs, the new category, by providing equity in 
educational provision through recognising “individuals’ challenges and barriers to 
learning”, and by putting in place additional provision, would ensure that young people 
considered to have additional support needs would be “given the best possible chance of 
being a full part of society” (Scottish Parliament Education Committee, 2003; col. 564).  
This new category also allowed for a variety of school-based problems to be constructed 
as additional support needs if, ‘for whatever reason’, the young person is, ‘or is likely to 
be’, unable without the provision of additional support, to benefit from school education 
(Education (Additional Support for Learning) (Scotland) Act 2004; p. 1).   
Where additional support needs differed, however, was the inclusion of ‘complex needs’ 
within its reach.  As outlined above, the category of special education needs was 
legitimated on claims of the existence of problems of learning that were too subtle to be 
‘picked up’ by the previous procedures legitimated by the category of ‘handicapped’.  The 
reality created was that there were less noticeable forms of disability that were not being 
‘treated’ and that mainstream school was not meeting the needs of this hidden population 
and was thus contributing to the poor educational outcomes of this group of young people.  
The new category of additional support needs, however, now required mainstream schools 
to meet needs arising from “one or more complex factors” or “multiple factors” (ibid.; p.2), 
with ‘factors’ vaguely defined as anything “likely to have a significant adverse effect on the 
school education” (ibid.; p.2).   
The inclusion of complexity in this new category legitimated a shift in the means by which 
barriers to learning would be reduced.  The category of special education needs would 
support learning through “adjustments in current mainstream provision”, with the 
adjustments – and thus the problems of learning – considered as ‘time limited’.  However, 
the new category of additional support needs expanded what would be required to be 
provided by mainstream schools, from time limited adjustments for low-level special 
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education needs to “significant additional support”, which would be required to “continue 
for more than a year” (ibid., p.2).  To meet this expanded requirement within its remit, 
mainstream schools would now require involvement of “one or more appropriate 
agencies”, with ‘appropriate agencies’ defined as local authority and health board 
departments.  Inclusion of the wider network in meeting problems of learning would be 
authorised by the school – involvement would be defined as appropriate if it could “help in 
the exercise of any of the education authority’s functions”, with individual schools required 
to specify what was required to meet additional support needs (ibid.; p.18). 
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Chapter 4: Part 2 
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The ‘official’ procedures of inclusion and additional support needs 
The genealogical accounts in the first part of this chapter are important for discursively 
positioning the emergence of the current procedures for managing problems of learning in 
the schools that were described in the interviews with educational professionals.  The 
question that informed the interviews asked about how schools responded to learning 
problems and how ADHD was recognised and processed from within these procedures.  I 
was interested in what was done – i.e. the knowledges, techniques and procedures 
deployed in the management of school-based problems – in order to understand how 
these came to be in place and how they contributed to young people being constructed as 
‘having’ ADHD.   
Through these conversations, an extensive grid of procedures, knowledges and 
technologies for making problems of learning intelligible was made visible, one that 
expanded across nursery education, primary schools, secondary schools, and outwards to 
health and social service agencies.  The ‘official’ representation of the grid was laid out in 
material that was provided to parents and young people, with a similar account offered in 
an interview with an educational professional.  Both are positioned below for comparison: 
Official procedure 
Stage 1:  
Teachers and nursery staff may 
recognise that the child or young 
person may need some short-term 
changes or support to help them get 
the best out of the work in the group 
or class 
The supports will be reviewed and 
the child can be removed from 
Stage 1 or moved to Stage 2 if 
further help is needed 
Parents/carers are informed and 
kept actively involved 
Stage 2:  
A meeting will be held with the 
parents/carers and where possible, 
the child or young person.  Other 
Professional account 
Educational psychologist: “So, 
stage one is a kind of monitoring 
stage where things are starting to 
bubble away, school are just like, 
right, OK, but there’s no external 
agency involved and it’s really 
just right, OK, we need to make 
some tweaks in-house.  
Stage two is a sort of 
assessment stage, where things 
are starting to increase a little bit 
and they’re starting to think about 
we might want to bring in the 
primary school support service 
outreach, we might want to bring 
in inclusion therapists, we might 
want to start having – you know – 
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staff may also be invited, i.e. family 
support workers, support for 
learning staff etc. 
A plan will be put in place to address 
the child or young person’s 
additional support needs.  The plan 
is agreed and reviewed at least 
annually 
Following a Stage 2 review the child 
or young person may continue on 
Stage 2, return to Stage 1 or move 
to Stage 3 if more support is needed 
Stage 3:  
A planned move to Stage 3 will 
happen due to a need to 
individualise aspects of the child or 
young person’s curriculum 
One or more specialists or agencies 
could be involved, i.e. speech & 
language therapist, social workers, 
outreach staff, educational 
psychologists, offering support in a 
more direct role 
An Individualised Educational 
Programme (IEP) will be drawn up 
with short- and long-term targets to 
be achieved by the child or young 
person 
The IEP targets will be reviewed; 
short-term targets are normally 
reviewed every term and long-term 
targets every year 
At the annual Stage 3 review the 
child or young person may remain at 
Stage 3 with new targets developed, 
or they may return to Stage 2, or a 
request can be made to the Staged 
Intervention Scrutiny Group for a 
raising this name with the 
educational psychologist.  
[…]” 
Interviewer: “Who does the 
assessment?”  
Educational psychologist: “It’s 
done within the schools.” 
Interviewer: “So, like a teacher-
led thing?” 
Educational psychologist: 
“Yeah, yeah.  So, when we’ve got 
– at the point where we become 
involved – we usually become 
involved through a team around 
the child meeting.  School might 
say wee Jimmy is having 
difficulty with X, Y, or Z – are you 
available to come along to a 
consultation?  
[…]  
So, now with the consultation 
model, you either open it and 
close it straight away, or you 
open it because you’re going to 
do a specific piece of 
assessment or intervention.  So, 
we tend to go along to the team 
around the child meeting, we 
have a consultation document 
that we complete that has various 
different bits of information on it – 
it’s quite functional: name, 
address, date of birth – and what 
we think the concerns are.  And 
then on the back page we have 
an action plan we share with 
whoever’s been involved in the 
consultation.  So, consultation 
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move to Stage 4 
Stage 4:  
Following agreement by the Staged 
Intervention Scrutiny Group a child 
or young person will be moved to 
Stage 4 where there is need for an 
extensive degree of 
individualisation, adaptation or 
enhancement of the curriculum 
and/or learning environment 
There will also be a number of 
specialists and/or agencies involved 
An IEP will be in place and in some 
cases, a coordinated support plan 
(CSP) 
Parents/carers and the child or 
young person will be involved in 
meetings and decision making 
A Stage 4 review will take place at 
least once a year 
can take place just with the class 
teacher, or the head or the 
depute, or it could be a full team 
around the child meeting.  
[…] 
So at that point we make a 
decision as to whether or not we 
just are involved on a 
consultation basis as a one-off, 
so – you know – you might 
provide some psycho-education 
around whatever – you know – 
you might have resources that 
you hand out – it’s an 
open/closed case. 
[…] 
Within schools – within the 
staged intervention process, we 
have a set of paperwork that 
schools are expected to complete 
to track children.  All children will 
have – they have different names 
– but things like a personal 
learning plan.  And that’s every 
school – that’s the universal level 
– so every child will have 
something that says ‘this is wee 
Jimmy and they’re working on X, 
Y and Z – you know – this is how 
he did on it’.  Children who 
become more involved in the 
staged intervention process will 
have what we call an individual 
education plan, where they have 
specific targets that they’re 
working on. 
[…] 
So that’s at the level of – you 
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know – kids who are getting to 
the sort of stage three in staged 
intervention, they should have a 
child’s plan. 
[…] 
But then you get another layer 
above it which is the coordinated 
support plan.  And coordinated 
support plan is a legal document 
and there’s specific assessment 
periods and paperwork that goes 
with it.  There’s specific criteria 
for children to meet to say that 
they need a coordinated support 
plan, which is generally that it 
requires the coordination of 
agencies external to education.  
So, things like health services, 
social work, voluntary agencies – 
that they need to be coordinated 
in such a way to meet the 
educational needs of the child.  
So, for example, the cases where 
we most often have CSPs would 
be the children who attend things 
like extended ESN – persevere in 
complex provision – so for them 
to be able to meet their 
educational goals, they need 
support from, for example, the 
physiotherapist to provide them 
with equipment to be able to get 
into school and things like that.  
And those needs need to be 
substantial and last for longer 
than a year.” 
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The existence and purpose of the grid was conditioned by the new requirement for 
mainstream schools to support every child and young person to learn irrespective of 
disability codified by the Education (Additional Support for Learning) (Scotland) Act (2004).  
The requirement for a ‘staged/tiered’ approach to management of school-based problems 
was outlined in official policy, but the specifics of the approach were to be developed by 
each region (Scottish Government, 2003; p. 91).  Both ‘official’ and professional accounts 
of the grid enacted locally construct the image of an approach that adapts the school 
environment, including the curriculum, to the young person’s specific needs, with these 
adaptations based on careful assessment of risk to learning.  The inclusion discourse is 
visible in both accounts: depending on assessment, the problem would be placed on the 
grid, with “tweaks in house” at the lowest level to an “extensive degree of individualisation, 
adaptation or enhancement of the curriculum and/or learning environment” at the highest 
level, being made to adjust the school environment to individual need, allowing the grid to 
include and manage the full continuum of need within its reach.   
A preventative discourse is also present in the accounts.  The requirement for adaptations 
to be reviewed on a regular basis, with movement back down (or up if required) the 
continuum of need if the problem had reduced through the support offered, indicates that 
problems are not considered fixed, but could be remedied through the grid of intervention.  
The forms of knowledge for understanding school-based problems that permeated the grid 
are positioned as holistic, with dominant explanations structured by discourses of 
attachment or trauma; in these explanations, developmental history and context are 
considered important for understanding the problem: 
Excerpt 1: 
Teacher: We’re dealing with the child in front of us, so therefore it’s the 
behaviours that we see on a day-to-day – and obviously dependent on the 
relationship with the class teacher – you know – often the dynamics of the 
class – there’s so many different factors that can determine how a child’s 
managing within the school environment. 
Interviewer: So you wouldn’t immediately assume ADHD then – 
Teacher: No.  Not at all.  I would say especially not – 
Teacher 2: …I would say especially not. 
Teacher: No, I think a lot of – we look at attachment – probably… for us, that 
would be one of the things that often comes up – 
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Excerpt 2 
 
Interviewer: So who takes them on depends on the type of assessment that 
occurs?  I suppose that then would influence what happens next. 
Educational psychologist: In some ways, yeah.  I think – you know – we’ve 
been having discussions sort of informally – we haven’t got to the level of 
having a sort of formal team meeting, but the landscape’s changing.  You 
know, there’s going to be less of us going forward because they’re not going 
to turn into an increase in our numbers – I would be very surprised if that was 
the case.  We’re obviously now splitting from [region] and things like that.  
And we’ve had sort of initial discussions just amongst ourselves but to say 
actually do we need to split ourselves and say right, we’ve got a learning 
team, and we’ve got an attachments team, for example – or attachment and 
trauma because a lot of us are trained in more specific attachment – 
Excerpt 3: 
Educational psychologist: So for a while we had [name] heading up the 
intervention project from Western European Social Fund money, so he had 
[name] and then we had three early years workers. 
Interviewer: Right. 
Educational psychologist: And the early years workers part of that 
disappeared, and we just had [name] providing a therapeutic input. 
Interviewer: And that was attachment work – from an attachment 
perspective – or – ? 
Educational psychologist: Attachment and trauma.  So he would use – you 
know – Dan Hughes Dyadic Developmental Psychotherapy – he would use 
that approach, but he would also do a lot of EMDR work with people who’d 
been traumatised, abused, whatever. 
In this holistic, supportive and inclusive system, diagnosis generally, and ADHD 
specifically, was not considered to be required – needs would determine provision, rather 
than specific conditions or diagnoses.  This was made clear by an educational 
psychologist I spoke with: 
Interviewer: Is there any benefit then to having the diagnosis of ADHD or 
ASD for the families? 
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Educational psychologist: From an education point of view, the answer 
should be no.  And currently the answer is no.  And I would hate to think that 
we would get to a point where it becomes a necessity.  And in fact, actually a 
colleague and I were just talking about this before you came in, because 
under the Additional Support for Learning Act, we don’t need a diagnosis.  
So, for example, this morning I was taking a family to visit the [school] ASD 
provision.  Now their daughter is probably highly likely to get a diagnosis of 
ASD at some point, but she doesn’t have one currently.  But the process is 
set up in such a way that as long as the team around the child have a 
consensus, and actually we can see on paper the sort of things that she’s 
having difficulty with, then we don’t need a diagnosis.  […]  And that’s the 
same whether it’s ASD, ADHD or whatever. 
This positioning of need over diagnosis was also presented in the accounts offered at the 
level of the school by teachers and a deputy head teacher (from different schools).  Both 
professional groups were asked questions about how schools responded to learning 
problems and how ADHD was recognised and processed from within these problems.  
Both groups offered a similar response – that they did not see disorder when considering 
problems of learning: 
Excerpt 1: 
Interviewer: I’m interested from a school’s perspective.  So, how would you 
recognise ADHD?  You know, if you’d seen a child, how would you know that 
that was ADHD?  Or what would make you think it was ADHD?  And then 
what would you do about that?  What are the processes that you would 
follow? 
Teacher: I think first and foremost we don’t make the judgment on whether 
we think a child has ADHD or not.  What – I think we always look at children 
who perhaps present as very anxious or have a very poor attention span, or I 
don’t know their ability – they seem very hyper and agitated.  And we start to 
look at a bigger picture for that child, you know?  So, for us the very initial 
steps we’re gathering information around that, especially for a new child to 
the school, because we want to find out their background.  We’d try to find 
out about home circumstances, whether there’s been any involvement from 
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any other agency prior – you now – previous to coming here, or whether they 
are still ongoing. 
Excerpt 2: 
Interviewer: Within the range of pupils you see in the kind of various ways in 
which they present – how would you interpret their behaviour? 
Deputy head: I think we’ve kind of got – I mean I think – you know – we get 
young people with – or who have displayed quite extreme behaviour within a 
mainstream setting.  Extreme behaviour for us in here would be kids picking 
up furniture and kind of launching it.  And we don’t see that often – that's kind 
of extreme.   
[…]   
So we do a lot of work here building up relationships.  A lot of our young 
people do get it wrong but they tend to get it wrong and it manifests itself and 
coming out as ‘rarr rarr’ – frustration, anger, and that's the kind of – that’s 
your bread-and-butter – you know –  
[…]  
Interviewer: So what do you think causes the behaviour – like, that type of 
behaviour? 
Deputy head: I think in here a lot of the time it's frustration, it’s trying to mask 
learning difficulties.  I think some of the kids can just have a bad day before 
they've come to school.  Sometimes it's about establishing themselves in the 
pecking order.  Sometimes it’s just playing up for their peers.  So there's a 
whole range of kind of reasons and I think what we try and do is find out as 
quickly as we can – you know – what the reason is and try to help them solve 
it.  Not necessarily finding out what the reason is – just helping the young 
person solve it and say, well, like you being a listener, they’ll tell it to us – you 
can behave like this – so let's try and get there quickly – you know? 
However, despite what could be considered as resistance to ADHD, and diagnosing more 
generally, and a system that prioritises need over condition, where the environment would 
be adapted to meet the specific needs of a young person, there was recognition that 
ADHD diagnosis was increasing in prominence within the school system: 
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Excerpt 1: 
Teacher: When you’re seeing a child who for all of – you know – all of a 
sudden, it’s presenting perhaps more anxious, more distressed, not coping 
within class, bit of challenge of behaviour, say – you might just think, I’m just 
going to call a meeting, because I just want all of us checking and hearing 
what’s going on – has there been a sudden change – does someone know 
something we don’t know.  And that can be useful just to put like around a 
table. 
Interviewer: So that would be for any kind of issues, then?  Not necessarily 
ADHD – 
Teacher: Mhmm.  It could be. 
Teacher 2: It could be, yeah.  That could be a wider issue.  But again, if we 
were seeing a real decline in ability to attend to any task, for instance, that 
would be something we’d need to say, well, what’s changed – why were they 
able to do that three weeks ago and then  – 
Teacher: Again, my thinking would be that a child with ADHD would have 
always found that challenging – you know – would not suddenly become – so 
therefore on that occasion like you say you’d think something’s changed – 
something else is going on – it’s something else – whereas – you know – a 
child with those definite challenges – you’d expect to be seeing that – 
Teacher 2: I do feel that it’s a diagnosis that’s being made more often. 
Interviewer: Sorry? 
Teacher 2: I think it’s a diagnosis that’s being made more often.  But for us 
it’s maybe come as a surprise, because of – we might have said it would 
have perhaps been much more related to attachment, and – you know – and 
trauma. 
Excerpt 2: 
Interviewer: So something like ADHD then, that type of behaviour that is 
considered that way – what sort of things would you do? 
Educational psychologist: At the assessment stage or the intervention 
stage? 
Interviewer: I suppose both, really.  So the assessment would be get 
feedback from teachers, and then what? 
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EP: Well, the assessment would be information from the school, gathering 
information from parents – you know – developmental – general 
developmental history is something that we – you know – really blindingly 
obvious or is there nothing.  And covering things like divorce and separation.  
Trying to rule out is this an attachment difficulty.  And then if you’re coming 
down on the side of it being ADHD or a neuro-developmental difficulty, in 
terms of intervention, I don’t know that we’ve got a – it’s probably an area 
where we don’t have a huge amount of resource.  Because actually, until 
recently, ADHD wasn’t something that was really on our radar in [region]. 
Interviewer: I remember reading something about [region] being the lowest 
diagnosis rate in Scotland. 
EP: And I think at the moment we seem to have a spike in it, and I don’t 
know – you know – where that’s come from. 
The ‘witches brew’ of actual practice: Division, normalisation and psychiatric 
knowledge 
When discussing ‘the problem of rationalities’ in Questions of Method, Foucault (1991; p. 
81) highlights the roles of ‘witches brew’ in understanding the enactment of governmental 
rationalities.  The term is used to describe the functioning of power at the micro level in 
overcoming resistance to its enactment through the various actions and enactments of the 
subjects in response to the resistance.  The critical point was that power did not function 
according to an ‘ideal’, to official programmes or technologies, but as always unfolding 
within the limitations inherent within the ‘actual’ elements of the apparatus and through 
specific encounters with resistance and blockages to its functioning and flow.  This critical 
point was elaborated and put to work by Brady (2011) in her study of enactment of 
Australian single-parent welfare reforms.  Drawing on the work of Lipsky (2010), Brady’s 
work highlighted the role of those involved in service delivery as not just about 
implementing policy, but as ‘making it up’, as creating discursive spaces within official 
rationalities where alternative discourses and rationalities would assist in the enactment of 
these ‘official’ rationalities.  The work of Brady (2011) and Lipsky (2010) are relevant here: 
both consider the role of individual subjects within agencies functioning at the micro level 
of government in the fabrication of ‘actual’ practices within official governmental 
rationalities.  The relevance of the ‘witches brew’ of actual practices to this project was 
made visible by the descriptions of what was considered to be ‘intervention’, but also in the 
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use of psychiatric knowledge to construct ‘complex’ problems and the function this 
construction played in managing these problems.  
As outlined earlier, both in the genealogical account but also in the official and professional 
account of the procedures of additional support needs, the image constructed is of a 
holistic, supportive and inclusive system that adapts the school environment to meet 
specific needs, with adaptations based on careful assessment of risk to learning.  
Additional needs were not considered fixed, but fluid and ‘fixable’ through application of 
specific adjustments.  The forms of knowledge present within the system allowed for 
structuring of problem explanations as ‘caused’ by attachment issues, trauma and/or 
disadvantage, with history and context considered central for understanding the problem.  
In this system, diagnosis and disorder were not required, support would be based on need, 
and additional provision would be provided to accommodate needs.  However, despite the 
claims of inclusion of difference and adjustment of environment to meet this, descriptions of 
‘interventions’ by educational professionals highlight the young person as the target, rather 
than the environment.  In the following excerpt, a school teacher is describing a ‘nurture 
group’ intervention, explicitly describing young people as the target, with the aim being the 
development of ‘regulation skills’ in order for them to be able to ‘go back to class’.  The 
discourse of attachment and the importance of context are visible within this explanation of 
the ‘problem’, but despite this, young people remain the ‘target’ for intervention, with self-
regulation the desired outcome: 
Teacher: That’s right – yeah.  And obviously, particularly in our area and 
where we are, we’ve got to get that bit right for a lot of our kids before they’re 
in a place to learn and look at – you know – other areas of the curriculum.  
So [name] runs a nurture group.  And originally, we set that up and it 
supported about six children all morning.  And what we found was that was 
really effective in giving them that intense, small group support, trying to 
teach them some of the regulation skills and strategies and – you know – lots 
of emotional work.  And then they would be able to go back to class and they 
were beginning to graduate.  The level of need increased if you like and what 
we had to do was change resource to have the nurture facility running three 
times a day for an hour and fifty minutes. 
Teacher 2: But there was more children who really felt were identifying that 
need – they were needing that wee bit of nurture for all sorts of reasons.  
Some of them were looked after and accommodated.  Others – you know – 
 112 
we know were coming from challenging home backgrounds – there’s some 
who’ve never learned ‘no’ – they’ve never learned.  An adult saying when I 
mean ‘no’… I mean no – there’s a lot of children who haven’t learned that 
self-regulation because when I kick off at home and I shout and scream and 
swear I eventually get what I want.  So I’m going to try that in school, and all 
of a sudden, ‘this isn’t working; why’s it not? – Ahh, I can’t cope with this 
because it’s so different to home.’  So we now run the nurture three times a 
day, and that allows us to target just a few more children, and a bit more age-
specific, too.  So we’ve got like a senior nurture group – 
Another discontinuity between the ‘official’ procedures and the ‘witches brew’ was the role 
of psychiatric knowledge.  As outlined earlier, the accounts of the grid presented an image 
of a system structured by discourse of attachment and trauma.  Accordingly, problems 
would be considered holistically and contextualised by environment and development; 
within this reality, diagnosis was not considered to be required, with the knowledges and 
approaches available considered appropriate for the forms of ‘’problems’ made visible.  
Despite this, psychiatric knowledge and discourse frequently appeared in descriptions of 
problems, appearing to be §deployed to construct certain problems as severe and 
complex.  In the first excerpt below, an educational psychologist is describing whole school 
and individual interventions as being structured by the discourse of attachment, but goes 
on to use psychiatric discourse when describing the specifics of the ‘problem’ presentation, 
which can be considered as opening up space for the deployment of either discourse 
when ‘treating the problem’.  In the second excerpt, a different educational psychologist 
offers an account of disadvantage in a school catchment area, connecting this to the 
complexity of the problems that have required additional support in a particular school; 
however, towards the end of the excerpt they highlight that provision for Autism Spectrum 
Disorder (ASD) had been set up in the school because of the number of young people 
considered ‘not to be managing’.  This ‘not managing’ was attributed to being on the 
‘spectrum’ despite the extensive description of contextual factors: 
Excerpt 1: 
Educational psychologist: In general, as a service we have provided loads 
of training and intervention, either in a whole school or an individual basis 
around about supporting children who look as if they’ve got some kind of 
insecure attachment.  And our schools – that’s the language they speak.  So 
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if you're thinking about a child who was a bit dysregulated, who’s got poor 
attention and concentration and they can’t sit on their bum – are you thinking 
there’s something intrinsically wrong with that child, or are you saying that 
developmentally they’re actually younger than their chronological age. 
Excerpt 2:  
Educational psychologist (2): The Scottish government have provided 
funding to schools or local authorities who have schools within the most 
deprived areas of Scotland.  And [school] doesn’t fall within the most 
deprived area, but the level of need that it mops up is phenomenal.  You 
know, some of the most bizarre and complex cases I’ve had, have come from 
[school].  
[…] 
So [school] has a real – and again, I think looking more widely at the 
community, it’s a community where we seem to be two, three, sometimes 
four generations being involved with families.  You can make links back – oh, 
that’s such-and-such’s grandchild, or that’s so-and-so’s great aunty. 
[…] 
There’s areas in [catchment area of school] that were used as kind of – I 
don’t like to say ‘dumping ground’, but that’s essentially what they were.  You 
know, they moved out the really difficult families from those difficult 
challenged areas in [city], and they wanted to bring them out to the 
countryside.  So they brought them to places like [catchment area of school].  
But – you know – the sensible person in you goes ‘well, actually, they’ve just 
brought the problems with them’.  So we’ve got generational issues with – 
you know – families who’ve never worked, who’ve always been on benefits – 
you know – repeated histories of abuse of various forms, substance misuse, 
all that kind of stuff.  So [school] is our new melting pot of all of that, and has 
some really challenging kids.  But has historically had a really good 
reputation within the authority, as being a school that just manages and gets 
on with – you know – and the course of time that I’ve had that school, we’ve 
set up an ASD-specific provision, because we had a real spike of kids that 
were just not managing because they were on the spectrum. 
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The reality of additional support needs constructed through actual practices at the level of 
the individual professionals within schools highlights the continued functioning of 
psychiatric knowledge in the construction and management of problems considered to be 
complex, despite claims of accommodating individual need through school and curriculum 
adjustment.  The system, rather than being inclusive of need and adjusting to meet these, 
appears to function through division of young people into levels of severity and application 
of ‘interventions’ as a means of shaping them to fit school, rather than the other way 
around.  At the lower levels of the staged approach, problems are constructed by 
attachment or trauma with intervention at the level of the school, with support from 
educational psychology.  However, as the ‘problem’ is moved up the staged system, it 
moves into a discursive space where it can become reconstituted by psychiatric 
knowledge and discourse, allowing for targeting by psychiatric intervention.   
The reconstituting by psychiatric knowledge appears to be legitimated by the concept of 
‘underlying abnormality’ being applied to ‘problems’ that are not resolved through school-
based approaches.  In the following accounts by two different educational psychologists, 
the process of division is visible; in the first account ADHD becomes a potential 
explanation if the problem persists once attachment or contextual factors have been 
considered.  Similarly, in the second account, ADHD appears to exist alongside 
attachment to explain why the young person is unable to ‘keep their bum on the seat’ 
despite attachment ‘work’ having been conducted by the previous case holder.  In both 
accounts, what appears to be made visible is a line across which ‘problems’ cross to 
become assigned to a different form of knowledge for explanation and, thus, for alternative 
forms of intervention.  The reality created appears to be a reconstituted continuum of need 
divided into a normal and abnormal binary.  On one side are problems of less severity, 
manageable within the apparatus of education, and on the other side are complex and 
severe problems underpinned by abnormality and requiring specialist psychiatric 
consideration.  In both cases, ADHD becomes a potential alternative explanation, allowing 
the young person to become a target for ‘treatment’ with psycho-stimulant medication: 
Excerpt 1 
Educational psychologist: Well, the assessment would be information from 
the school, gathering information from parents – you know – developmental – 
general developmental history is something that we – you know – really 
blindingly obvious or is there nothing.  And covering things like divorce and 
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separation.  Trying to rule out is this an attachment difficulty.  And then if 
you’re coming down on the side of it being ADHD or a neuro-developmental 
difficulty, in terms of intervention, I don’t know that we’ve got a – it’s probably 
an area where we don’t have a huge amount of resource. 
Excerpt 2 
Educational psychologist (2): I think historically, as a service, we’ve had 
more of a focus on attachment and trauma.  And that was kind of coming 
from the top down.  You know, [name] and [name] and [name] – so the three 
previous principals that we’ve had – that was very much their focus and their 
area of expertise, their area of interest.  
[…]  
When [name] was off sick earlier on this year, I picked up a case from her 
where she said ‘actually, I think it’s both – I think we’ve got attachment things 
going on but actually they can’t keep their bum on the seat and – you know – 
I think they’ve just been really unlucky – they’ve got a double whammy’. 
Avoiding the inscription of ‘severity’ as ‘real’ difference 
In her examination of the means by which young people were subject to governance 
through educational policy and practice, Watson (2010) highlights how ‘mainstreaming 
difference’ through the discourse of inclusion does not result in the reduction in the use of 
diagnostic labels; rather the use of the technology increases and its use changes.  The 
critical point illuminated by Watson’s analysis was visible across the various conversations 
with educational professionals conducted for this project: that psychiatric diagnosis 
become a resource for the production of forms of subjectivity, allowing governance of the 
subject through associated technologies and expertise.  The continued role for psychiatric 
knowledge was visible in the process of division and normalisation that structured the 
actual practices of additional support needs at the micro level of their application: without 
the continued role of the knowledge, the problems considered severe would remain within 
the mainstream school and would require intervention to reduce the risk to future learning.  
This continued availability of psychiatric knowledge and associated technologies allows for 
division and reconstitution of problems as severe and complex and as requiring psychiatric 
expertise and input, allowing for schools to incorporate new forms of management 
alongside those within the apparatus of education.   
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An additional critical point that will be offered as part of this analysis, however, relates to 
the work of Lipsky (2010) drawn on earlier in the chapter.  In his analysis, the actual 
practices at the micro level of governmental rationalities were shaped by multiple 
competing requirements and influences, including inadequate resources, growing demand 
for services, vague policy requirements and goals, etc.  In the present analysis, all of the 
above competing requirements and influences were visible in the apparatus of education – 
made possible by the intersecting discourses of social inclusion and additional support 
needs – exerting pressure on the individual subjects enacting the practices of governance.  
These are visible in two main themes that were repeated across all conversations with 
educational professionals: the reconstitution of local council educational services 
according to changing budgetary requirements, and the changing role of educational 
psychology from a direct therapeutic service to a ‘consultation model’ due to reduced 
capacity and increased demand.  When considered against this background, the 
application of ‘underlying abnormality’ to ‘problems’ not resolved through school-based 
approaches can be considered to be a fabrication of practice in response to the problem’s 
resistance to intervention.  However, rather than the resistance to ‘treatment’ being 
underpinned by ‘severity’ or ‘complexity’ caused by a biomedical abnormality, this can be 
considered a response to normalisation occurring instead of structural change, placed 
upon the apparatus of education by the increased demands conditioned by the 
requirement for inclusion and for mainstream school to meet the needs of every young 
person. 
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Fixing the ADHD child: The clinical case file 
The following chapter provides a description of the analysis of the clinical case notes of 
several young people who had received a diagnosis of ADHD.  Those who agreed to take 
part in the project were not pre-selected for the project, but were the young people, 
attending appointments during the periods in which I was embedded within the service and 
who consented to take part in the project.  Some of the young people who allowed access 
to their case notes had been involved with the service for several years, others several 
months.  This time period was particularly useful, as it provided access to a changing 
background of arguments and logics in relation to the ‘problem’ of young people within the 
service.  Over the years covered by the case files, it was possible to detect various “truths, 
explanations, categorisations and taxonomies, vocabularies and diagnoses” (Rose, 1996; 
p. 25) at work in the problematisation of young people, allowing for an examination of the 
ways that the ‘truths’ that structured the explanations contained in the case files had come 
to be formed (Foucault, 1975).   
In total, I accessed 10 sets of clinical case files, with all of the files representing males; as 
mentioned, this was not pre-selection, but a representation of the gender of young people 
attending the Child and Adolescent Mental Health Service (CAMHS) for ADHD-related 
clinical appointments.  The dominance of the male gender constituting the overall number 
receiving the diagnosis is a well-documented contradiction in the neurodevelopmental 
explanation of ADHD: according to its own frame of reference, if ADHD is 
neurodevelopmental in origin, the spread of diagnosis should be more equal across both 
genders, but this is not the case, with the ratio of males to females receiving the diagnosis 
ranging from 2:1 to 9:1 (Biederman, Faraone, Monuteaux, Bober & Cadogen, 2004).  In 
relation to this point, it must be made explicit that the use of Biederman et al as a means of 
‘truthing’ this critical point does not imply acceptance of the objectivity of the claim, it is 
offered to illustrate a contradiction within the psychiatric and biomedical discourse which 
claims ADHD as neurodevelopmental condition.  In fact, by returning to the Foucauldian 
critique adopted throughout this thesis, one can question Biederman et al’s claims as a 
‘solution’ to a problematisation of the diagnosis of females, one that can situated within an 
apparatus that contains pharmaceutical funding for research, pharmaceutical profits, and 
the cultural capital gained through engaging with ADHD as ‘real’ (Fisher, 2008; Sarchet, 
2011). 
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In addition to the case files, I was also able to access several years of CAMHS 
management team meeting minutes.  These documents provided access to the various 
policies and political trends impacting on the service, which was particularly useful in 
providing the discursive context for the changing clinical procedures documented in the 
case notes.  The procedure followed for processing the textual material was based upon 
what I have termed ‘layering’: simultaneous reading and analysis within and across case 
notes, meeting minutes and relevant policies discovered through the minutes.  When 
‘layered’ together, the textual material can be considered to have provided the discursive 
background that made possible what was sayable and doable within the service.  Within 
this background, it was possible to locate the ‘truths’ that had come to form the 
problematisation of conduct; the forms of specialist knowledge and skills deployed in 
diagnosing and intervening in problematised conduct; the sites in which the conduct was 
judged, assessed, evaluated, understood, and acted upon (ibid.); and the interacting 
conditions that allowed the “contemporary matrix” and its “diverse and contradictory logics” 
(Rose, 1996; p. 24), to condition what was sayable and doable within the service at this 
moment in time. 
Despite being positioned as chapter 5 in the overall document, the steps outlined was the 
starting point for the entire project, with the process of ‘working backwards’ described in 
the methodological plan commencing from the ‘problems and solutions’ discovered during 
the analysis that underpins this chapter.  The analysis was conducted in two stages: the 
starting point was a detailed analysis of the problems and explanations that constructed 
the initial referral letters for each of the young people represented by the case notes.  This 
was followed by an analysis of the different ways the ‘problem’ in the referral letter was 
constructed within the service and what ‘treatment’ these constructions legitimated.  What I 
discovered through this stage was a changing discursive background, one that shifted 
from coexistence of a multiplicity of explanations and idiosyncratic procedures to a 
dominance of psychiatric discourse and a formulaic ‘approach’ legitimated by the problems 
it solved. The second stage of the analysis aimed to reveal what made it possible for this 
dominance to occur.  Through analysis of the ‘treatments’ outlined in the case notes and 
simultaneous analysis of the meeting minutes, the appearance of a detailed ‘approach’ for 
the management of ADHD referrals was detected.  The appearance of this approach at the 
particular historical juncture at which it appeared was critical in conditioning the possibility 
for the eventual dominance of psychiatric discourse within the service, but also beyond the 
service in the local schools.  The analysis of what made it possible for this dominance to 
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occur consisted of deconstructing the statements at work in the legitimation of the 
approach within the meeting minutes and reconnecting these to the wider policies, 
discourses and events that allowed for the legitimating statements to be in the ‘true’ at the 
point in time at which they were uttered.  The aim of the analysis was to locate the 
statements that constructed the ADHD machine and track their appearance from within the 
service to the discursive formations that provided the invisible lines of authority upon which 
the machine was legitimated. 
A final point to make regarding the ‘working backwards’ approach is that the analysis in 
this chapter allowed me to locate the ‘problem’ of increased referrals from educational 
establishments and its role in conditioning the possibility of the ADHD approach that aided 
the eventual dominance of psychiatric discourse and practice.  This analytical point 
provided the starting point from which to ‘work backwards’ in the previous chapter.  This 
working backwards across the shifting discursive realities of health and educations sites 
highlights how they are undeniably linked in the construction of young people as ‘having’ 
ADHD: the problem of ‘additional support needs’ discussed in the last chapter can be seen 
to have created the conditions for increased referrals from educational establishments to 
CAMHS – the very problem the ADHD ‘approach’ was proposed to solve.  The procedure 
within the ‘approach’ that would solve the problem of increased referrals was to ‘work’ 
directly with schools to provide support to manage ADHD within educational sites.  
However, rather than reduce referrals to CAMHS, the ‘approach’ can be seen to have 
conditioned the possibility for ADHD as an explanation to increase in dominance within 
educational establishments, creating a mutually reinforcing discursive process that 
resulted in the proliferation of ADHD diagnosis and treatment.  
Constructing the problem: Analysis of referral reasons 
ADHD is very much an object of psychiatric knowledge and discourse, appearing in 
various forms since in emergence in its contemporary iteration in the DSM-III (APA, 1980).  
When considering ADHD at the level of the clinical files, however, it became apparent that 
a diagnosis of ADHD was not solely the result of the deployment of psychiatric knowledge 
by psychiatrists.  There were case files that highlighted the fixing of ADHD solely by 
psychiatric knowledge and discourse, but the majority of the case files (7) highlighted 
ADHD as an eventual outcome, as something that gradually emerged from within a 
multitude of competing explanations, with a range of non-psychiatric professionals 
involved in constructing the problem in different ways prior to ADHD being fixed in place.  
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In each of these case files, the ‘problem’ that resulted in the young person being referred 
to the service was constructed by explanations other than ADHD.  For example, one of the 
explanations for the ‘problem’ that led to the young person being referred can be 
considered to be constructed by an ‘attachment’ discourse: 
[Mother] has advised that she has suffered episodes of anxiety throughout 
her life.  Her pregnancy with [young person] was unexpected and 
precipitated her setting up a household with [new partner].  This was a very 
anxious time for her.  She conceived again shortly after [young person]’s 
birth and her daughter [child] was born 11 months after [young person].  
Following this, [mother] suffered from post-natal depression.  She believes 
this impaired her emotional availability for both children. 
The above excerpt, whilst not stating attachment explicitly, includes the statement 
‘impaired emotional availability’, positioning this as something that should have been 
provided by the mother, but which was disrupted by post-natal depression.  When 
constructed by an attachment discourse, problems are positioned as resulting from a lack 
of containing, secure caregiving experience disrupting the quality of the child-parent dyad 
(for an example of the discourse as ‘objective’ theory, see: Cassidy, 1994).  According to 
this explanation, the parent-child relationship is the foundation of secure attachment 
relationships and, it is upon this foundation that personality and future wellbeing is built, 
with those considered to be securely attached more able to ‘self-regulate’ how they react 
to the wider world around them (Brumariu, 2015).  In other files, attachment as explanation 
was more explicit: 
Given the developmental history, I think that many of [young person]’s 
difficulties stem from an insecure anxious attachment and are compounded 
by [mother]’s diffidence in parenting him. 
In both of these accounts, implicitly and explicitly, the difficulties are constructed as the 
result of an impaired caregiving dyad, with the resulting ‘impaired emotion regulation’ or 
‘insecure anxious attachment’ considered to be the cause of the problem requiring 
assessment by mental health services.  By constructing the problem as a problem of 
attachment, the ability to regulate emotion is positioned as an attribute, one that is learned 
within the caregiving experience, and which provides those who have gained the skill with 
an ability to regulate the impact of their emotions on their behaviour and environment.  
The opposite position in this explanation, and the one that can be considered to be implicit 
 122 
in the problem constructions located in the case files, is that emotion ‘dysregulation’ is the 
outcome of the poor early attachment experience, which has resulted in the young person 
being unable to ‘manage’ their behaviours and emotions (Brumariu, 2015). 
A further explanation located in the referral reasons emphasised the impact on the 
development of the young person of a variety of negative social events and 
circumstances.  This appeared in different forms; for example, as the result of domestic 
violence (first excerpt) or as part of a collection of multiple interacting stressors (second 
excerpt): 
Excerpt 1: 
My impression was that the family had experienced a number of difficulties 
that may have made providing consequences difficult.  Paternal alcohol use 
and domestic violence coupled with maternal depression may have 
influenced the development of the current situation. 
Excerpt 2:  
[Father] caused serious injury to his child and received a prison sentence.  
He was released from prison and placed on licence for three years on 
condition he was not to have unsupervised contact.  [Mother and father]’s 
mental health was also an issue and alcohol use and honesty around the 
amount being consumed, affecting their ability to address problems.  There 
was an overdose attempt by [father] when [young person] was in the house, 
leading to concerns about the impact on his wellbeing.  There were also 
concerns around [young person]’s school attendance with [mother] colluding 
with him on this and the chaotic household with a number of adults in and 
out the family home.  It is concluded that [young person] has experienced 
physical and emotional abuse and has impacted on his mental health. 
In both explanations, the problem is positioned as resulting from an interaction between 
environmental factors, such as negative social events and circumstances, impacting on 
the normative development of skills, abilities and attributes.  In this problem construction, 
negative social events and circumstances are positioned as ‘risk factors’ – a ‘thing’ in the 
young person’s context considered to be detrimental to positive developmental outcomes 
(Walker, Wachs, Gardner, Lozoff, Wasserman, Pollitt et al., 2007).  In this account, 
commonly accepted psychological attributes, such as behaviour, cognition, emotion, etc., 
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are considered to be individual outcomes of naturally occurring developmental processes 
that are entwined with multiple, interrelated contexts or systems within which we grow, 
including family, school, peers and communities.  In this account, development is divided 
into a ‘typical’ and ‘atypical’ binary, with each outcome dependent on the presence or not 
of risk factors at various developmental stages.  In both excerpts above, the role of 
‘parenting’ is present, with its absence or diminished capacity constructed as resulting in a 
lack of behavioural consequences for bad behaviour or behaviour problems not being 
addressed at all.  In these explanations, the referral problem is constructed as resulting 
from the interaction of ‘poor parenting’ with the young person’s normative developmental 
processes, with mental health problems constructed as the outcome of this interaction. 
As well as accounts that constructed the problem as something that had developed, there 
were also explanations where a number of ‘symptoms’, or ADHD as disorder, were offered 
as explanations for the problematic behaviours: 
Excerpt 1:  
[Young person] is active and aggressive.  He is biting and spitting.  In the 
clinic-room today he would not sit still and take ‘no’ for an answer.  I 
understand he is on level 3 staged intervention and is likely to require 
additional support in school, however his cognitive abilities appear to be 
normal.  I think [young person] will need further consideration of possible 
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and perhaps other conditions. 
Excerpt 2:  
[Young person] displays hyperactivity, inattention and a degree of 
impulsiveness over all settings.  [Mother] notes that [young person]’s school 
work has appeared disorganised in the past year and he seems to be 
struggling with his attention more than he has previously.  Sleep has been a 
significant concern for some time and it sounds like [young person] can stay 
up until the early hours of the morning and get by on very little sleep the next 
day.  [Young person] is also picky with his food and tends to graze on small 
amounts.  [Young person]’s parents note that he appears isolated socially 
having no close friends and showing very little interest in developing peer 
relationships.  I am going to request information on [young person]’s 
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presentation at school as well as asking for any relevant correspondence, 
reports or assessments. 
In both statements, behavioural expression is positioned as representing the ‘symptoms’ of 
ADHD, with the disorder positioned as the explanation for the symptoms.  These 
explanations can be considered to be constructed by psychiatric discourse; in these 
accounts, problem behaviours are positioned as ‘symptoms’ and as manifested by an 
abnormal endogenous process.  The functioning of diagnosis in this explanation signifies 
that a process of assessment, interpretation and identification of the nature of the illness 
has been conducted by a qualified medical professional.  The ‘illness’ diagnosed is 
positioned as the underlying cause of the symptoms, with the diagnosis arrived at through 
careful comparison of assessment information with medical disorder classification systems 
such as, in the case of ADHD, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(APA, 2013) or the International Classification of Mental and Behavioural Disorders (WHO, 
1992).   
The diverse logics of problematisation 
The various explanations within the clinical files, represented in the excerpts above, can 
be considered to be constructed upon two competing logics: one of development and one 
of abnormality.  Both of these logics permeate the wider positivist research literature, 
underpinning psychological and psychiatric accounts respectively.  A cursory glance at 
examples of the positivist literature regarding ADHD highlights the visibility of these 
competing knowledges and their distinctive logics. For example, Hellmer & Nyström (2017) 
position dysfunction at a neurochemical level, citing specific abnormally functioning 
neurotransmitters as indicative of a genetic level vulnerability which results in the 
expression of ADHD.  The logic of abnormality contained within this example exemplifies 
the wider psychiatric explanation of ADHD: problematic behaviours are positioned as 
symptoms of neurotransmitter dysregulation, genetic anomalies, and defects in brain 
structure and function (Deacon, 2013).  In these accounts, ADHD is constructed as 
ontologically distinct from normative social behaviours, as a deviation from normal human 
biological expression and as a result of disordered biochemical or neurophysiological 
processes.  The biomedical ‘treatment’ with psychotropic medication that is authorised by 
this problematisation is presented as correcting the biomedical or neurophysiological 
imbalances considered to underpin the disorder, with psychostimulant drugs, such as 
methylphenidate, considered to reduce ‘synaptic concentration of norepinephrine and 
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dopamine’ in different brain regions (Solanto, 1998).  The outcomes considered to result 
from the psychotropic medication are improved attention, enhanced task-specific focus 
and reduced distractibility and impulsivity (Volkow, 2001).   
In contrast to psychiatric discourse and the logic of abnormality, Brocki, Forslund, Frick & 
Bohlin (2017) position ‘self-regulation’ as important in the ‘development’ of ADHD.  The 
study cites the individual attributes ‘emotion regulation’ and ‘cognitive regulation’ as 
connected to ADHD, with early developmental experiences positioned as influential in the 
development of these attributes.  In this account, problematic early experience and its 
impact on the development of these key individual attributes are positioned as increasing 
the risk for later development of ADHD.  The logic of development visible in this example, 
constructs problematic behaviour not as abnormality, but as maladaptation, with 
maladaptation represented as an outcome of the adaptation of the developmental 
processes to social context (Cicchetti, 2016).  Within a developmental logic of 
maladaptation, development is constructed as an adaptive, multi-process system, with the 
various processes occurring across multiple levels of context.  In this account, young 
people are constructed as complex living systems that interact effectively and ineffectively 
over time with the various contexts in which they are embedded.  Problematic behaviours 
as maladaptation, such as those constructed as ADHD, are represented as continuous to 
normative behavioural expression, which is in contrast to the differentiation of problematic 
behaviour from normal behavioural expression by biomedical discourse, with problematic 
behaviour considered a symptom of an underlying abnormality (Cicchetti, 2016). 
Discontinuity of practice: Comparing CAMHS practice with official knowledge   
Despite the two logics visible in the referral problems, and in the examples of ‘official’ 
knowledge above, seemingly contradictory to each other, both have become entwined 
within the discourse and practice of developmental psychopathology.  This was a 
particularly important point within this project because a contrasting position was 
discovered within the case notes and more widely within the discourse and practice of the 
service.  Arguably, developmental psychopathology has become an increasingly dominant 
form of official knowledge within the institutions of child and adolescent mental health, with 
its emergence associated with the coalescing of distinct institutional knowledges, including 
behavioural genetics, neuroscience, psychiatry, and developmental psychology (Cicchetti, 
2013), around the problem of ‘at-risk’ children and young people.  Over the last 20-30 
years, the discourse and practice of young people’s mental health can be seen to have 
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become integrative and, rather than competing over explanation, the various disciplinary 
knowledges can be seen to have combined, with problem explanations becoming more 
expansive, incorporating more and more domains of the young person’s experiences and 
environment.  An example of the combined logics within the discourse of developmental 
psychopathology is visible in the following excerpt from an ‘official’ knowledge source – a 
journal article.  In the excerpt, ‘abnormality’ remains, but takes the form of 
‘neurophysiological associates of disorder’.  It is no longer positioned as a cause, however, 
but as a marker, as an underlying abnormality that will only find expression through a 
dynamic interactive developmental process: 
So important is the perspective of development for understanding 
psychopathology that it spawned a new discipline—“developmental 
psychopathology”—which has seen remarkable advances since its 
introduction but has yet to completely fulfil its promise. To do this requires 
maintaining a thoroughgoing developmental perspective. When development 
is taken seriously, there are implications for how to understand 
psychopathology, describe and conceptualize the origins and course of 
disorder, and interpret research findings. From this perspective, disorders are 
complex products of development; for example, neurophysiological 
associates of disorder can be viewed not as causes but as markers, the 
development of which needs to be understood. Research on developmental 
psychopathology requires an examination of the history of problem behavior 
from early in life, and it unites multiple features of adaptation and 
maladaptation (contextual, experiential, physiological, and genetic) (Sroufe, 
2009) 
In this expanded discourse of mental health, problematic behaviours are positioned as the 
result of ‘bidirectional interactions’ occurring within and across genetic, neural, 
behavioural, and environmental levels of human context.  The new combined logic is one 
of development but within a biomedical framework, neatly summarised by the concept of 
probabilistic epigenesis (Gottlieb, 2007) that constructs the description of gene and 
environment interaction at the core of the above statement.  In this new logic, genes are 
positioned as initiating developmental pathways that are receptive to influences from the 
cellular to the social contextual level, with problematic behaviour represented as the result 
of ‘coaction’, ‘transaction’, and ‘interaction’ across the multiple levels of human context.  
The entwinement of these competing logics allows for construction of an infinite number of 
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events as ‘risk factors’ that contribute to an increased likelihood of the development of 
problematic behaviours and the categorisation of both social context and individual 
behavioural expression as the target of intervention.   
Within this new framework of understanding, ADHD is positioned as the result of 
‘coaction’, ‘transaction’, and ‘interaction’ of faulty genes with multiple environmental risk 
factors which, over time, interact bi-directionally, creating individual trajectories towards 
the disordered outcome; the behaviour becomes a target of biomedical treatment, with 
known ‘risk factors’ such as parenting approaches, school systems and dysfunctional 
household also considered valid targets of the ‘heterogeneous ‘psy’ judgements’ (Rose, 
1996) of ancillary clinical and non-clinical professionals that constitute the network of 
professionals that target what is represented as mental health condition.  Despite the 
growing prominence of this new discursive formation of mental health within official 
knowledge and practice, it was not visible in discourse and practice of the CAMHS service.  
This was indicated to me by a discontinuity between what is represented in official 
knowledges and what was represented by the case notes.  Within official knowledges, 
there is a clear shift from coexistence and to the merging of the logics of development and 
abnormality, whereas over the several years covered by the case files, the opposite was 
detected: that there was a shift from coexistence of the logics to a dominance of the 
biomedical logic and psychiatric discourse. 
This eventual dominance of the biomedical logic was visible in the case notes of the young 
people who had been involved with the service over several years.  In the older case 
notes, when compared to the more recent case notes, the diagnosis of ADHD was an 
eventual outcome of multiple assessments, with several different explanations offered prior 
to ADHD emerging as the explanation for the behaviour.  In the more recent case files, 
problems are immediately fixed as an expression of ADHD, with no alternative 
explanations visible in the case notes.  This was also evident in letters from general 
practitioners requesting assessment of the behaviour of young people: in the clinical files 
of young people who had been involved with the service over several years, referral letters 
described difficulties in general terms and requested non-specific assessment, whereas 
more recent referral letters constructed the difficulties as ADHD, requesting specific ADHD 
assessment.  
Excerpt 1:  
 128 
I should welcome your assessment of the above young boy.  He is reported 
to be an extremely destructive and angry young child.  I understand he is in 
primary 2 at [school].  He struggles to make friends, appears very solitary 
and at time insecure.  His mum is becoming increasingly concerned 
regarding his behaviour, and accordingly I should welcome your formal 
assessment. 
Excerpt 2:  
I would be grateful for your assessment of this seven-year-old boy.  His 
mother is single and is struggling to manage the behaviour of the boy who is 
on the go all day and who was unable to sit still for a minute in the clinic 
setting. 
[Young person] appears to have average intelligence.  He has good 
imaginative play, understands language and has age-appropriate pencil 
skills.  However, he is constantly in trouble at school and demonstrated 
oppositional and defiant behaviour to his mother today. 
I think mum needs a great deal of support with behavioural management but 
I also feel that his activity levels and attention span may be consistent with a 
diagnosis of ADHD and I would be interested in your formal assessment of 
such. 
Shifting procedures: From clinical judgement to streamlined assessment 
This shifting logic constructing the problematisation of young people within the service 
reveals a discontinuity with formal institutional knowledges and practice of young people’s 
mental health.  Given the historical coexistence of the logics and recent entwinement in 
the discourse and practice of developmental psychopathology, the dominance of a logic of 
abnormality was unusual and in contrast to official accounts of young people’s mental 
health.  Through layering the case notes and the minutes of the management team 
meetings, I was able to connect the shifting logics and wider discursive background in the 
service with the emergence of an approach to the diagnosis and treatment of ADHD that I 
have termed the ‘ADHD machine’.  I have changed the official title of the approach to keep 
the service anonymous in order to protect the identity of the young people who allowed 
access their case notes and clinical appointments.   
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The role of machine in shaping the discursive background within the service was made 
visible through an increasing frequency of statements regarding the machine in the 
minutes and a corresponding increase in frequency of statements connected to the 
discourse of psychiatry in the case files.  Statements regarding the ADHD machine 
emerge in the management team meetings from late 2003 and continued until 2008.  
Correspondingly, over the same period in the clinical files, there was an increase in 
statements connected to the logic of abnormality and the biomedical understanding of 
ADHD.  There was also an increased ‘formalisation’ of approach, with differing individual 
clinical approaches and judgement gradually being replaced by a formulaic approach 
comprised of questionnaires, child observations, and clinical interviews of parents and 
teachers.   
The questionnaires were an important element in this new procedure and in the eventual 
dominance of the biomedical logic – prior to the machine, individual clinical judgement 
allowed for multiple explanations, but replacement with psychometrics, such as the 
‘revised Tanner-Whitehouse questionnaire’ (Tanner & Buckler, 1997) and the ‘Conners’ 
rating scales (Connors, 2001), replaced individual clinical judgement with the objects of 
psychiatric knowledge constructed by the questionnaires.  These constructs – 
hyperactivity, inattention, concentration – can be considered to have gained their 
legitimacy over clinical judgement through a rhetorical warranting by the concepts of 
validity, reliability and objectivity associated with psychometrics.  Procedurally, however, 
the psychometric assessment performed a function in ‘solving’ the problem being 
‘assessed’ through the quantification, comparison and differentiation from an imaginary 
‘norm’.  The use of these psychometrics can be considered to create the image of the 
procedures of diagnosis outlined above.  However, rather than locating a ‘real’ illness, their 
constructs are fixed on the young person through application of a normal/abnormal cut-off, 
allowing for deployment of ‘underlying disorder’ as explanation for the abnormality they 
have constructed.   
The proliferation of statements authorised by psychometric assessments makes visible the 
authority of scientism in the shifting logics within the everyday practice of the service.  
From their own standpoint, the validity and reliability, the cornerstones of the ‘objectivity’ of 
these ‘tools’, are so low as to be considered worthless (Stein, 2012); however, despite this, 
their use, and the statements they authorised, can be considered to be instrumental in the 
shifting discursive background of the service.  For me, the reliance upon these ‘tools’, 
despite the common knowledge of their low levels of validity and reliability (Stein, 2012), 
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speaks to key tenets of the critique of scientism in ADHD (and psychiatry more generally) 
(Timmi, 2018; p. 262): that approaches to ADHD are ‘scientific’ because they look like 
‘science’.  What this makes visible is that the discourse of science is so dominant within 
our historical moment that ‘solutions’ to ‘problems’ only require the enactment of, or 
connections to, an apparent objectivity to be considered worthwhile and successful.  In this 
sense, the apparent objectivity bestowed upon the ADHD procedure by the use of these 
questionnaires authorises the statements that can be uttered from the administration as 
well as warrants their continued use.  However, more insidiously, the ‘solution’ that is 
constructed by their use allows for the emergence of a biomedical logic that allows for the 
problematisation of young people as abnormal and disordered. 
A final shift in procedure was detected beyond 2008, with the ADHD machine gradually 
replaced by what was described as a ‘streamlined assessment’ process.  This new 
approach was what I observed in the clinical appointments.  During the sessions, the 
procedure consisted of the administering of a ‘service-developed’, biomedically informed, 
‘ADHD care package clinic documentation’ pro forma.  The new streamlined approach 
replaced the application of various psychometric assessment with one ‘proforma’ 
containing several questions regarding ‘clinical presentation’, ‘side effects and medication 
issues’, and ‘comorbid disorders’.  The output from the new approach was quantified an 
‘inattention total score’ and a ‘hyperactivity/impulsivity total score’.  Again, as with the 
above point on scientism, the shift to an ‘in-house’ assessment questionnaire makes 
visible the reliance on the enactment of what looks like science as the authority behind the 
new ADHD questionnaire.  However, with this ‘in-house’ assessment questionnaire, the 
statements produced rely entirely on the scientism of psychiatry for their authority.  There 
are no ‘psychometric properties’ (however weak the concept) to add additional objective 
weight to the claims that can be made from their administration, it is purely the enactment 
of something that looks like ‘science’ that provides authority upon which the ‘inattention 
total score’ and ‘hyperactivity/impulsivity total score’ rely. 
 
 131 
 
 
 
Chapter 5: Part 2 
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The problems it solved: Deconstructing the legitimacy of the machine 
The description of the machine within the minutes constructed it as a ‘nurse-led’, ‘multi-
disciplinary approach’, consisting of ‘nursing’, ‘psychology’ and a ‘teacher’. The procedure 
was positioned as unique in its approach to solving the problem of ADHD as responsibility 
for diagnosis and prescription would move from psychiatrists to an ‘advanced nurse-
practitioner’ with specialist skills in ‘nurse prescribing’.  By moving responsibility for ADHD 
to an advanced nurse-practitioner with specialist skills in prescribing, the machine would 
allow for a fast-tracked ADHD referral process that would allow for increased efficiency in 
diagnosis and prescription of psychostimulant medication.  The involvement of a teacher 
legitimated integration with schools, warranting ‘support’ and school-based intervention to 
be offered to schools alongside psychostimulant medication.   
The first appearance of statements regarding the machine were in a draft ‘CAMHS service 
specification’, which was developed to communicate the ‘aims and philosophy’ of the ‘new’ 
service after its ‘launch’ as the Child and Adolescent Mental Health Service.  However, the 
service had a longer history than was revealed in the minutes, a history that was made 
available to me in the conversations I had during my time embedded in the service: prior to 
its launch as CAMHS, two separate services – a Child Psychology service and Child 
Psychiatry service – inhabiting the same building.  It was the merging of these two distinct 
services that underpinned the launch, with reconstitution of the two services as CAMHS a 
requirement of an emerging policy requirement for ‘integrated services’ and ‘partnership 
working’ across children’s services (Scottish Government, 2003).  The appearance of the 
ADHD machine at this juncture appeared to correspond to several problems impacting on 
the newly integrated service.  At various locations across the minutes, the machine is 
positioned as an answer to ‘increased demands on caseloads’, ‘increased wait times for 
initial assessment appointment’, ‘increased school referrals’ and ‘ to improve assessment, 
management and liaison with schools for children with ADHD’.   
The procedures of the ADHD machine described above played an important role in 
conditioning the eventual dominance of the biomedical logic.  Through moving problems to 
single clinician contact within the service and fast-tracking through a biomedically 
structured assessment process, the procedure can be considered as simultaneously 
closing down non-biomedical ways of constructing problems referred to the service at the 
same time as allowing for a proliferation of biomedical and psychiatric statements.  The 
movement of responsibility for assessment to a single clinician was made possible through 
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the ‘problem of demand’ being constructed as ‘caseloads being filled with assessments for 
problem behaviours often represented as ADHD’.  By moving to a single point of contact, 
the machine was positioned as able to increase the capacity of the remaining clinicians 
and, thus, as reducing the ‘risk to young people with other mental health problems, such 
as depression, anorexia or suicidality’ waiting too long for assessment and intervention.   
The association of ‘risk’ with increased time waiting for intervention can be considered to 
connect to a biomedical account of early intervention, where intervening early in the 
problem cycle is considered to prevent lasting consequences through treatment reducing 
the problem before it becomes intractable (Early Intervention Foundation, 2015).  The 
early intervention discourse can also be considered to offer legitimacy to the proposal of 
fast-tracked assessment, diagnosis and treatment and liaison with schools.  Both 
procedural elements, considered through an early intervention discourse, suggest 
increased efficiency in the detection, diagnosis and treatment of ADHD within CAMHS and 
across schools, with the efficiency allowing detection and treatment before it increases in 
severity.   
Rather than solving the problem of demand, however, reducing the number of clinicians 
authorised to offer clinical judgement can be considered to have closed down the 
possibility of statements outside of the psychiatric explanation of ADHD informing the 
assessment process of young people referred to the service.  Prior to the emergence of 
the machine, statements outside of the ADHD explanation are present within the case 
files, whereas beyond the emergence of the machine, alternative explanations gradually 
disappear, replaced by biomedical and psychiatric statements.  An important element in 
this eventuality was the reduction of CAMHS contact points to one single clinician, but also 
the replacing of their ‘clinical judgement’ with a formulaic assessment process comprised 
of ‘objective measures of ADHD’.  The questionnaires that were deployed required parents 
and teachers to rate the frequency of hyperactive, inattentive and/or impulsive behaviours 
occurring in the young person as well as document challenging behaviours and school-
based problems.  These questionnaires displayed an increasing visibility in the case notes 
over time, but importantly the constructs of the questionnaires displayed an increasing 
visibility in the handwritten case notes and various letters sent to referring professionals, 
thus extending the explanation beyond the service into the wider network of children’s 
services.   
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The underlying subscales of the dominant questionnaire within this process is considered 
to measure the presence of oppositional behaviour, cognitive problems/inattention, 
hyperactivity and global ADHD, with the parent or teacher rating the presence of the 
problem behaviours presented by the questions as either ‘not true at all’, ‘just a little true’, 
‘pretty much true’, or ‘very much true’.  The questions asked include (taken from the 
Connors’ rating scale): 
1. Inattentive, easily distracted? 
2. Defiant? 
3. Restless in the “squirmy” sense? 
4. Forgets things he/she has already learned? 
5. Disturbs other children? 
6. Actively defies or refuses to comply with adults’ requests? 
7. Is always “on the go” or acts as if driven by a motor? 
8. Poor in spelling? 
9. Cannot remain still? 
10. Spiteful or vindictive?  
However, rather than indicating the presence of a natural occurring phenomena, such as 
oppositionality, cognitive problems, inattention, hyperactivity, or ADHD, the questionnaires 
can be considered to construct the ADHD child by problematising young people through 
biomedical logic: the questionnaires assume that the symptoms indicate the presence of 
the underlying abnormality considered to cause the symptoms.  As such, the behaviours 
being considered can only be framed through the lens that informs the questions – 
‘inattentive’, ‘spiteful’, ‘vindictive’, ‘easily distracted’, ‘defiant’, ‘can’t sit still’, etc. – and the 
view of the subject answering the questions is equally shaped by the questions asked.  
Despite the quantification process (not true at all, just a little true, pretty much true, very 
much true), and the behavioural characteristics quantified, being vague and difficult to 
define, the rhetorical objectivity bestowed by positive scientific concepts such as 
‘psychometric properties’, ‘validity’, and ‘reliability’ transform the subjective nature of the 
responses into objective factual ‘hard data’ about the young person.   
The expanding authority of nursing: Advanced nurse practitioner  
An important element through which the ADHD machine gained dominance can be 
connected to the positions of ‘advanced nurse practitioner’ and ‘nurse prescriber’.  
Historically, in the service, ADHD assessment, diagnosis and prescription of 
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psychostimulant medication had been the remit of consultant child psychiatrists; however, 
moving responsibility away from psychiatry to nursing was legitimated upon the clinician 
being an ‘advanced nurse practitioner’ who was able to ‘prescribe’ psychostimulant 
medication as intervention.  The emergence of these new roles of nursing is important to 
contextualise as they functioned as key elements in legitimating movement of 
responsibility for ADHD within the service, but also as key procedural components of the 
everyday enactment of the procedures of the machine.   
A consideration of nursing literature highlights the emergence of ‘advanced nurse 
practitioner’ and ‘nurse prescriber’ in nursing discourse and practice from mid-1990 
onwards.  The training programmes that converted nursing staff to advanced nurse 
practitioners appeared in the early 1990s, with the role appearing in Primary Care settings 
around the same time (Carnwell & Daly, 2003; Royal College of Nursing, 2008).  
Completing training bestowed the title of advanced nurse practitioner, allowing individual 
nurses to ‘receive patients with undifferentiated and undiagnosed problems and make an 
assessment of their health care needs, based on highly-developed nursing knowledge and 
skills’ and ‘make differential diagnoses using decision-making and problem-solving skills’ 
(Royal College of Nursing, 2008).  Similarly, the emergence of the position of nurse 
prescriber appears in nursing discourse and practice around the same time as the 
advanced nurse practitioner.  Like the advanced nurse practitioner, for individual nurses to 
have authority to prescribe, the were required to undertake training before receiving the 
title (Royal College of Nursing, 2012).  Initially, those who held the title had limited 
prescribing authority, but more recently the role has been bestowed with ‘virtually the 
same independent prescribing powers as doctors’ (Royal College of Nursing, 2012).   
Both of these new nursing roles, and the training programmes that were considered to 
provide their skills and attributes, were conditioned by the requirements of a variety of 
health policies and reforms appearing in mid-to-late 1990s (Department of Health, 1997; 
1999; 2000).  A new requirement of this shifting policy background was the provision of 
locally informed, quick and reliable health care (Department of Health, 1997; p. 5) by local 
health care professionals.  This new approach was to be achieved through 
decentralisation of health care provision to new partnerships between local councils and 
local health boards.  In this local approach to health care provision, local professionals 
were positioned as being in the best position to shape local service delivery through an 
awareness of local need.  However, the new requirement for quick and reliable health care 
at a regional level, driven by local professionals, legitimated claims that health care 
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professionals would be required to increase efficiency and improve performance through a 
process of continual self-development and expansion of professional remit into areas 
normally performed by other professional groups.   
To encourage this new requirement of continued self-directed improvement, new individual 
forms of governance were placed upon health care professionals in order to achieve pay 
enhancement.  The new individual governance framework replaced collective bargaining 
by labour unions with a series of ‘national pay spines’ and a competency-based career 
framework (KSF) (Buchan & Evans, 2007).  This new salary framework removed salary 
enhancement from a process of collective bargaining, repositioning this as a requirement 
of individual professionals and only achievable through completing additional training, 
acquiring new skills, or expanding professional remit to cover new areas of practice.  
Legitimated as the ‘modernisation of NHS pay to reward career progressions’ (Department 
of Health, 1999b), the new pay structure can be considered to function as a technology of 
governmental power, one that directed individual professionals towards self-enhancement 
and increased professional responsibility in order to meet the new requirements of locally 
driven health care service needs. 
The intersecting lines of the wellbeing agenda and neoliberalism as governance 
The new requirements of health care that authorised the extension of the role of nursing 
discussed above can be seen to have emerged from within a shifting health policy context 
that marked the change of UK government in 1997.  With the election of Labour in 1997, 
the NHS was subjected to a plethora of policies and reforms – most notably: The New 
NHS, Modern and Dependable (Department of Health, 1997), Making a Difference 
(Department of Health, 1999a), and The NHS Plan (Department of Health, 2000).  
However, reform of the NHS in the period of the prior Conservative government from 1979 
to 1997 was equally as legion (Moon & Brown, 2000), with several policies, and the shifts 
in practice they authorised, conditioning the possibility for the ‘modernising’ agenda 
constructed across the three policies referred to above.  The strategies and technologies 
adopted by each administration differed, but each can be considered to be structured by 
the same politico-economic rationality – neoliberalism. 
Typically, the concept of neoliberalism is considered to represent a drive for devolution 
and dispersal of state-provided roles to arms-length quasi-governmental agencies, an 
extension of market relationships into these and other aspects of society, and an 
overarching aim of rolling back the state’s involvement in the provision of these roles and 
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services (Larner, 2000; Pownall, 2013).  In earlier policies, the enactment of neoliberalism 
within the NHS takes the form of defunding services alongside the introduction of 
technologies of marketization, including the creation and measurement of performance 
indicators, a requirement for discipline and economy in resource allocation, and a shift to 
the promotion of competition in the provision of public services.  Whereas, in post-1997 
policies, the technologies of its enactment shift, taking the form of the codification of inter-
agency working, increasing efficiency though governing staff towards self-improvement, 
and the targeting of the population through a ‘public health’ strategy aimed at encouraging 
‘wellbeing improvement strategies’ (Craig, 2003).  The emergence of wellbeing in the post-
1997 policies mark an important shift in the functioning of neoliberalism, one that can be 
considered to have played an important role in conditioning the emergence of the ADHD 
machine through its legitimation as an approach able to promote wellbeing by intervening 
within health services and schools.  
As outlined in chapter 2, this project has been inspired by Foucauldian governmentality 
studies, which conceptualise neoliberalism as the means by which populations are 
governed as individuals at the micro-level through individual subjectivity and behaviour 
(Rose, 1999).  From this perspective, critical consideration needs to move from political-
economic accounts, as in the account above, towards a consideration of diffuse strategies 
(often legitimated by these policies) for knowing and shaping the actions and thoughts of 
the populace at the level of the individual subject (Prince, Kearns & Craig, 2006).  As 
Larner (2000) discusses, these ways of thinking are found in diverse realms, such as the 
workplace, educational institutions and health and welfare agencies, but also beyond 
formal institutions, with ADHD increasing visible in a broader context of medicalisation to 
be found in blogs, popular magazines, and assorted media.  This increased visibility, as 
highlighted by Larner, surrounds us, encouraging the human subject to see the self as an 
individualised and active subject and as responsible for the enhancement of wellbeing 
through ‘working on the self’.  It is this encouragement of self-improvement in the image of 
accepted norms of behaviour and action – the ‘politics of the self’ – that constitutes the 
‘active citizen’ of neoliberal society, rendering them governable through the very forms of 
knowledge and practice that constitute our accepted norms.  In this sense, a Foucauldian 
conceptualisation considers neoliberalism as government of the populace at the level of 
the individual body, as exercised through self-regulatory capacities of individuals and 
asymmetrical power relations spread throughout the social body, and as immanent in the 
apparatuses of knowledge, discourse and practice that provide the very norms that guide 
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our ways of thinking and acting (Foucault, 1982; Rose, 1999).  Thus, by targeting 
individual health through health surveillance and encouraging population wellbeing through 
individualised wellbeing practices, the post-1997 NHS reforms can be considered to 
legitimate the emergence of technologies in the image of this characterisation of 
neoliberalism.   
The construction of ‘wellbeing’ that has been incorporated as a technology of neoliberal 
governance in the post-1997 policies positions the requirement for improvement on the 
individual, with forms of self-care considered to improve individual health and, thus, 
population health.  However, its positioning as an outcome of engagement in forms of self-
care is a relatively recently representation, one that has replaced wellbeing as collective 
measure of national stability and economic prosperity with an individualised, psychological 
and therapeutic understanding (McLeod & Wright, 2014).  As summarised by Sointu 
(2005), this can be seen to mark a shift from the ‘body politic’ – the wellbeing of the 
citizenry of nation states as constituted by national stability and economic prosperity – to 
the ‘body personal’ – wellbeing as relating to individual health, and as ‘actively produced’ 
by the individual through a variety of personal wellbeing enhancing practices.  In this 
‘actively produced’ individual wellbeing, the citizen is still the focus, but the outcome is a 
form of government that encourages ‘care of the self’, allowing for state rollback of 
provision of health care for the citizenry.   
Two policies that can considered to have aided this shifting understanding of wellbeing as 
well as conditioned their emergence within post-1997 apparatus of health are The Black 
Report (Department of Health and Social Security, 1980) and The Health Divide 
(Whitehead, 1987).  Originally constructed and deployed as a means of problematising 
rising unemployment conditioned by the enactment of deindustrialisation, the 
recommendations legitimated by the report were enacted through the ‘modernising 
agenda’ of the New Labour government.  The position constructed across the reports is 
that poor outcomes in health and wellbeing are related to structural and material 
inequalities across multiple domains, that these inequalities cause long-term trends in poor 
health mortality, and by intervening to reduce these structural and material inequalities, 
health and wellbeing outcomes of the populace would improve.  However, the reports also 
construct the importance of increased health surveillance, promotion and prevention 
activities, and movement from individual institutional approaches to an integrated ‘total’ 
approach as key to solving the problem, as this would allow for the encouragement of 
“good health among a larger proportion of the population” (Black, Morris, Smith, Townsend 
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& Davidson, 1988; p. 202).   
The function of wellbeing and neoliberalism in the Scottish apparatus of health 
The discourses and technologies of wellbeing are prominent in Scottish government 
policies post-devolution from Westminster in 1999.  Placed as a central aim of the newly 
devolved Scottish administration by the National Programme for Improving Mental Health 
and Wellbeing (Scottish Executive, 2003), the achievement of mental health and mental 
wellbeing was positioned as the solution to these societal ills.  The stated aim of this 
national programme of health improvement was to improve understandings of positive 
mental health to enable the Scottish public to take care of their own mental health, to help 
others, to prevent mental ill-health and to promote awareness of where and how to access 
support and help when required.  Children and young people were positioned as “priority 
areas” for action (ibid.; p. 2) by this national programme and, by not acting to promote their 
wellbeing, they were considered at risk of ‘poor developmental outcomes’ and increased 
‘mental health problems’.     
Despite the lofty aim of population wellbeing improvement, the National Programme for 
Improving Mental Health and Wellbeing did not specify the approaches that would achieve 
its stated aims, only that they should met through collaboration between institutions such 
as the Education Department, schools, the NHS and ‘others’.  Through collaboration, 
wellbeing would be achieved by the “development of effective front-line responses in 
schools for children and young people who experience emotional difficulties, mental health 
problems and mental illness” (ibid.; p. 8).  The lack of specificity can be considered to have 
allowed for a multitude of technologies to be invented through discourses of wellbeing, as 
was the case with the ADHD machine, allowing myriad problematisations to be targeted 
through deploying wellbeing promotion or enhancement as the aim.  The breadth of 
domains that were to be governed through wellbeing is illuminated by the Scottish 
government ‘indicators of wellbeing’ (Safe, Healthy, Achieving, Nurtured, Active, 
Respected, Responsible, Included: SHANARRI) (Scottish Government, 2013) – allowing 
for the targeting of diverse ‘risks’, such as abuse; harm at home, school or in the 
community; poor learning; poor development of skills, confidence and self-esteem; 
neglectful family life and/or place to live; physical activity levels; and activities of 
responsibilisation, such as school or local community group involvement.  These seven 
indicators are deployed in the construction of wellbeing across multiple policies and, more 
recently, have been codified in the Children and Young People (Scotland) Act (2014), 
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allowing for wellbeing to be used to organise and make sense of every aspect of children 
and young people’s lives and to govern these areas under the pretence of protecting their 
welfare (McLeod & Wright, 2016).      
As has been discussed by other authors (Brady, 2014; McLeod & Wright, 2016), and has 
been illuminated here, there is not a coherent apparatus or single approach at work, but a 
particular governmental rationality that takes on different discourses and practices across 
time, space and problem; with government of young people, the discourse of wellbeing 
provides a space in which technologies of government can emerge.  As is evident with the 
ADHD machine, the possibility of emergence is connected to multiple elements, 
conditioning its possibility, allowing it to be considered ‘in the true’ when it was first 
constructed as a ‘proposal’.  Through discourses of wellbeing, psychiatric knowledge was 
able to be reconstituted as wellbeing promoting: by intervening early, the ADHD machine 
would promote wellbeing through reducing the impact of ‘the risk’ of time without a 
diagnosis and treatment, thus improving the life chances of children and young people.  
Additionally, the characterisation of ADHD as something that could be solved through 
school-based interventions alongside psychostimulant medication can be considered to 
reduce the ‘seriousness’ of a brain-based neurodevelopmental disorder to an educational 
disability that can be solved through school-based interventions, thus contributing to the 
promotion of wellbeing through increasing the potential for academic and educational 
attainment (Loe & Feldman, 2007).  The promotion or enhancement of wellbeing does not 
appear to be occurring, however – an irony here is the association of the diagnosis of 
ADHD with poor academic and educational outcomes (Loe & Feldman, 2007); poor 
occupational, economic and social outcomes (Harpin, 2005); and poor health-related 
outcomes (Molina & Pelham, 2014).   
These poor outcomes betray a silence within the current discourse of wellbeing and its 
deployment within the apparatuses that target young people – that wellbeing is a 
requirement of all young people and something that they must actively achieve.  This 
requirement is made visible by the policies and guidelines regarding wellbeing: each one 
defines what wellbeing should look like and what the interconnected network of institutions 
must do if it is not being achieved.  In this sense, wellbeing has become the expectation – 
all young people are expected to be well, to engage in activities that achieve this aim.  
Institutions act when there is at risk of it not being achieved: the strategic focus of 
apparatuses that target young people is to monitor all young people and step in whenever 
a risk exists to wellbeing, be that academic achievement, confidence, social skills, 
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unemployment, lack of engagement with school and community.  In effect, the range of 
areas of life that are targetable are infinite given the interconnection of the institutions that 
function as part of the apparatus, requiring only the vague notion of risk to wellbeing to 
enact procedures for its ‘promotion’. 
Extending the machine: creating an everyday practice of ADHD 
The ADHD machine was run as a pilot project in one of the geographical localities that 
formed the wider region, before being ‘rolled out’ across the whole region in mid-2005; 
however, the approach was dissolved into the main referral system of the service in 2008, 
lasting three years as a speciality sub-service within the service.  There was no indication 
of difficulties in the meeting minutes regarding the machine until an account of an 
‘extraordinary meeting’ that was convened to discuss the ‘problem of ADHD’; the problem 
in the account of the meeting was one of capacity, in that the ADHD machine was no 
longer able to manage the numbers of ADHD cases currently in the system or manage the 
number of referrals being received.  The problem of capacity created by the machine 
related to the requirement for continued monitoring, by a professional with medical 
authority, for signs of the impact of the medication on physical growth, with all young 
people receiving medication required to attend 6–8 week ‘medication reviews’.  
Procedurally, the reviews required measurement of height, weight and blood pressure of 
children and young people receiving medication in addition to the continued monitoring of 
the ‘symptoms of ADHD’; as such, an outcome of the ‘fast-tracked’ approach of machine 
was an exponential rise in children and young people requiring monitoring of medication 
by the service.  
Additionally, rather than reduce referrals, the ADHD machine conditioned the opposite 
through the creation of a system of relays for surveillance of young people by psychiatric 
knowledge and the expansion of psychiatric knowledge of ADHD into the school.  The 
machine moved beyond its institutional boundaries, entering schools via a requirement for 
inter-agency collaborative working.  This move into the school can be considered to 
connect educational professionals as relays in a system of psychiatric surveillance and 
judgement, thus increasing the purview of psychiatry and the availability of its knowledge 
within the school.  However, the minutes of the extraordinary meeting do not attribute the 
increasing numbers of ADHD cases and referrals to an increase in psychiatric knowledge 
entering schools, or to the extension of the purview of psychiatry through the construction 
of relays of surveillance, or to the invention of a system for fast-tracked constructing of the 
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ADHD child, but instead attributes this to a discovery of increased need.  The explanation 
that appears to account for these effects is that the machine increased the skills and 
awareness of teachers and other educational professionals in recognising ADHD and that 
the need was much greater than was previously assumed.  The logic deployed was that 
epidemiological studies indicate that ADHD is present in 5% of the under-18 population, 
whereas in this CAMHS region, prior to the ADHD machine emerging, prevalence of 
ADHD was only 0.4%, meaning that 4.6% of the region’s under-18 population were 
‘undiagnosed ADHD’. 
The solution to the problem created by the machine was to distribute the ‘service ADHD 
caseload’ across all professional groups that formed the multidisciplinary CAMHS team 
and to require each of these professional groups to perform a new streamlined approach 
as an individual clinical approach to ADHD assessment and diagnosis.  In effect, the 
solution to the problem created by the ADHD machine was to ‘mainstream’ ADHD through 
the subjectivation, by psychiatric knowledge and practice, of multiple professional groups 
and approaches, thus creating an everyday practice of ADHD, an everyday psychiatric 
practice performed by all professional groups that would extend the process created by the 
ADHD machine. 
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Chapter 6 
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The medication review as disciplinary technology 
As outlined in the last chapter, the initial step in this investigation was observation of 
ADHD clinical appointments.  All the appointments I observed during my time in the 
service were ‘medication reviews’, which were presented as an integral part of the ADHD 
diagnostic process.  Procedurally, the medication review consisted of a recurring 6- to 8-
week appointment and was framed as monitoring the impact of treatment on ‘symptoms’ 
and potential side of effects of the treatment.  Each of the sessions I observed followed the 
same format: a clinician from the ‘ADHD team’ conducted a clinical interview guided by an 
ADHD assessment ‘proforma’, where the presence of the symptoms of ADHD were 
located and quantified.  Towards the end of the review, after completion of the clinical 
interview, the clinician took the young person to another room containing various medical 
‘tools’ to measure their height, weight and blood pressure. 
The rationale for positioning the first step in the investigation as the last chapter before 
concluding the document was because, after ‘working backwards’ from the starting point, I 
was unable to see the medication review according to how it was presented to me.  
Decontextualised from the wider apparatus conveyed across the previous chapters, the 
medication review can be considered as just that – a review of the impact of medication – 
but positioned within the wider apparatus, I was only able to see the medication review as 
a disciplinary technology, one that supported a wider strategic aim of producing a self-
governing, self-improving young person.   
The argument offered here draws on the work of Besley (2010) on the government of 
young people as ‘risky subjects’.  The argument put forward by Besley is that 
governmentality is, fundamentally, about the management of risk to the current and future 
functioning of the state through deployment of discourses and their technologies to 
manage social groups considered ‘risky’.  In this understanding, young people that cannot 
or will not control their conduct, cease to be ‘docile bodies’ and, thus, are positioned as 
problematic for the state.  The outcome is that the state steps in to conduct their conduct 
through technologies of power, including interventions of the psy- sciences, most often 
framed as being about personal wellbeing, to promote forms of self-regulation and 
responsibilisation.  These discourses and technologies are bound up, with and 
administered through, apparatuses such as, in the context of Besley’s work, the youth 
justice system.  In this investigation, it was not through a youth justice apparatus that the 
technology was deployed, but through apparatuses of health and education arranging 
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around the strategic aim of promoting the wellbeing of every young person in Scotland.  
However, rather than being about the risk to the wellbeing of young people, the ‘risk’ being 
managed, as with Besley (2010), is considered to relate to the self-regulating capacity of 
the future adult citizen.   
Framed from this perspective, the ‘medication review’ is considered a disciplinary 
technology within this wider apparatus.  The observation that brought me to this conclusion 
was the requirement for monitoring the impact of medication on the ‘symptoms’ of the 
disorder.  According to psychiatric knowledge, the symptoms of ADHD are the result of 
faults in ‘dopaminergic transmission’ and ‘serotonin transporter genes’ (Manor, Eisenberg, 
Tyano, Sever, Cohen, Ebstein & Kotler, 2001).  The ‘treatment’ – by psychostimulants 
such as Amphetamine, Dextroamphetamine and Methylphenidate – according to formal 
psychiatric knowledge, is considered to alleviate the symptoms by affecting the function 
and structure of the brain in relation to the specific abnormalities (Visser & Jehan, 2009).  
The resulting ‘therapeutic effect’ is considered to be the reduction of inattention, 
impulsivity, and hyperactivity, and resulting improvements in behaviour and social 
functioning (Greenhill, Pliszka, Dulcan, Bernet, Arnold, Beitchman et al., 2001).  This 
improvement in symptoms did not appear to be a reality, however, emphasised by the 
continued visibility of ‘symptoms’ in each of the reviews I observed – these young people 
were receiving medication, had been for several years, yet were still displaying what were 
considered to be symptoms, which, for me, undermines the apparent effects and 
outcomes of treatment. 
As such, the position taken in this chapter is that the ADHD machine, rather than 
assessing and diagnosing ‘real’ illness, produces ADHD by constructing a multiplicity of 
‘problems’ through psychiatric power and knowledge, transforming them into ADHD, and 
allowing management through psychostimulant medication.  The medication review can be 
considered part of this process.  Through the ADHD machine, the young person receives a 
diagnosis of ADHD – a formal branding by psychiatric knowledge – and the medication 
review can be considered to hold this in place by continually subjectifying the young 
person through psychiatric knowledge.  An additional function of the review is made visible 
when considered from this perspective – that the elements that structure it and its 
recurring frequency places the young person in a modern-day space of surveillance and 
discipline in order to encourage self-regulation.  It must be noted, however, that, whilst 
there is an apparent compliance to the medication review, and the diagnosis, on the part of 
the young person in the transcripts, this is no way should be assumed to imply congruency 
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with the diagnosis.  Although beyond the scope of the following analysis, the questioning 
of apparent congruency through an analysis of subtle forms of resistance to the psychiatric 
panopticon would be a valuable addition step, one which would be informed by the present 
analysis. 
The medical examination as ‘ritual of ‘truth’ 
In the remainder of the chapter, I will elaborate the elements and functioning of the 
medication review according to Foucault’s descriptions of disciplinary power.  The aim of 
the chapter are to present the medication review as a ‘ritual of truth’ that produces the 
objects of knowledge used to fix ADHD on the young person, opening them up to constant 
surveillance and discipline through the medication review.  My argument is that treatment 
by psychostimulant medication does not alleviate symptoms, but allows various ‘problems’ 
to be transformed into problems of inattention, impulsivity and hyperactivity, and managed, 
not through ‘fixing’ the faults in ‘dopaminergic transmission’ and ‘serotonin transporter 
genes’, but through a combination of medically induced docility and attempts at 
responsibilisation through psychiatric authority and knowledge.  The role of medically 
induced docility was made clear in an interview with a psychiatrist. In the following excerpt, 
the discussion point was the connection of ‘bad behaviour’ with ADHD, despite this not 
being considered a ‘symptom’ of the disorder.  The psychiatrist highlights that they would 
‘know’ if the medication was working at a ‘low dose’, and how this ‘low level’ is often 
moved beyond as a means of medicating ‘bad behaviour’.  The origins of the ‘problems’ 
that are being medicated are then connected to the school: 
Psychiatrist: That’s the kind of what I do – the word pragmatic says it 
all. Whereas I think it’s scary – you know – when you move 
environments because people kind of – but I wouldn’t keep the children 
on medicine if it didn’t work. I wouldn’t ramp up to 150 and see if they 
blew up, or anything like that, you know? Because you can tell very 
quickly – very low levels – whether or not it’s going to work. Because it’s 
graduated. So at a low level it’s going to work a wee bit, at the right 
level it’s going to work better, you know? 
Interviewer: The thing that I’ve often been confused about with ADHD 
is – the bad behaviour thing. The reason for being here is often about 
bad behaviour. And the kind of increasing medication is because the 
bad behaviour is still around. 
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Psychiatrist: I say to parents that this will – you know – that if this 
works it will improve your child’s ability to attend, to bring the good 
behaviour to the table and the bad behaviour – and the bad behaviour 
is once we’ve improved their attention, their ability to learn new ways, 
and bring better skills to the table, is something that we need to look at 
using parenting approaches. A number of kids that I wouldn’t dream of 
– it’s a problem of the bad behaviour thing – it’s bad behaviour, is it 
really not to do with your attention… Its executive function. And if you 
increase dopamine it makes them rigid and it actually contributes to 
their ability to argue. So you have to be very careful. It’s actually – 
there’s quite a low dose – there’s always like a sweet spot. And if you 
go beyond it – and this is where I think zombie comes from –  
Interviewer: Right. 
Psychiatrist: – where people just keep going cos they’re trying to 
reduce their – medicate out the bad behaviour. And you’re not going to 
medicate your way out of that. 
Interviewer: But this seems to be a thing that’s become attached to 
ADHD – the main characteristic if you want, that’s associated with 
young people considered to have ADHD. 
Psychiatrist: And if they don’t have the behaviour, then they have 
really poor attention, they struggle to get the diagnosis. You know, 
you’re right, a lot of people come here and people aren’t coming and 
saying ‘I think they’re a wee bit inattentive’ – they come and say – you 
know – ‘behaviour is happening at school’. 
Before considering the elements of the medication review through this lens, I will offer an 
outline of the functioning of disciplinary power.  This will then be connected to psychiatric 
knowledge and practice through Foucault’s work on Psychiatric Power (2008), before 
being applied to what is considered to be a contemporary functioning of psychiatric power 
through the medication review. 
Elaborating the functioning of disciplinary power 
Foucault’s accounts of disciplinary power convey a configuration of power that functions 
through individualisation, surveillance and gathering information on the functioning of the 
human subject.  The knowledge gathered is then deployable to induce certain forms of 
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conduct and behaviour.  The two main mechanisms by which it is enacted – hierarchical 
observation and normalisation – are considered to be fused in the ‘examination’.  Foucault 
outlines these mechanisms most clearly in Discipline and Punish (Foucault, 1979; pp. 
170–194).  Through hierarchical observation, individuals are made visible and knowable, 
allowing for their constant surveillance: the constant visibility is considered to function as a 
coercive force, allowing for transformation into docile and knowable subjects through an 
objectifying gaze (ibid.; p. 172).   
The coercive force of being made visible and knowable is considered to function through 
linkage with a normalising judgement.  Being constantly visible allows for characteristics to 
be gathered and constructed into ‘norms’, ideals which subjects can be continually judged 
against.  The particulars of the expert ‘gaze’ form the particulars of the ‘norm’ – 
psychological gaze forms psychological norms, psychiatric gaze forms psychiatric norms, 
etc., – with each ‘norm’ providing a benchmark by which human subjects can be judged, 
and coerced towards, if outside of the parameters considered to form the normalcy 
constructed by the ‘norm’.  In this sense, ‘norms’ allows disciplinary power to ‘correct’: 
individuals can be compared to, and differentiated from, the wider population in 
accordance with set rules, which function to provide a ‘minimal threshold’ that they must 
achieve.  This minimal threshold can be policed through application of means of 
surveillance and measurement, which act to constrain individuals, allowing for those falling 
outside the ‘rules’ to be positioned as outside the ‘norm’.  In short, normalising judgement 
allows disciplinary mechanisms to “compare, differentiate, hierachise, homogenise, and 
exclude” (ibid., pp. 182–183).   
The final mechanism of disciplinary power, the examination, fuses observation and 
normalisation through looking and judging against constructed norms.  Foucault describes 
the examination as a “highly ritualised ceremony of power” (ibid.; p. 184) which allows for 
the deployment of force, establishment of truth and the objectification and subjectification 
of the individual in accordance with the knowledge functioning as part of the mechanisms.  
The examination achieves this through visibility, documentation and the fixing of the 
individual as a “case” (ibid., pp. 187–192).  Through visibility, transgressions or 
movements from the norm are seen by the examining gaze, compared with the norm, 
classified as abnormal and the individual constructed as requiring intervention.  The 
continual documentation of comparisons with the network of others that form the norm 
both contributes to the norm and fixes the individual as a case; they are objectified and 
subjectified by power functioning through knowledge, with each examination providing a 
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snapshot, a moment in time, of the fabrication of the individual within a history of 
themselves, but a history determined for them by knowledge, power and the examining 
gaze. 
In Discipline and Punish (1979), Foucault contrasts the ‘plague town’ with the ‘leper 
colony’ as a means of highlighting the process of division, documentation and registration 
of population.  For Foucault, the ‘leper town’ highlighted a process of exclusion through 
confinement, of exiling those marked as ill, making them unseen and forgotten, whereas, 
the ‘plague town’ highlighted a process of inclusion, surveillance and treatment by 
authorities.  These two different, but not incompatible processes, are considered to have 
slowly come together, allowing for ‘exclusion’ within the wider population through analytical 
distribution and procedures of individualisation.  This “technique of power proper to 
disciplinary partitioning” was applied in spaces of internment, such as the “psychiatric 
asylum” and the “approved school”, allowing control over individuals through division and 
branding, and coercive assignment and distribution (ibid.; p. 199).   
The panopticon is considered the exemplar of this configuration of power (Fox, 1994) as it 
enabled, through its architectural components, both the exclusion and surveillance of 
inmates.  Through a circular design, with cells facing inwards towards a central tower, 
inmates could be viewed at any point by both guards and inmates, with guards also in full 
view of the prison governor.  The particular architectural arrangement of the prison allowed 
for constant surveillance without inmates knowing when they were under surveillance.  
The organisation of the components allowed for inmates to be differentiated into different 
classifications with application of means of training or correction enacted to encourage 
behavioural change towards a particular end (Foucault, 1979; p. 203).  The “major effect of 
this composition of disciplinary power is the inducement of a state of consciousness and 
visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power” (ibid.; p. 201) with the individual 
becoming the means by which subjection occurs, accomplished through the internalisation 
of the gaze of authority being transformed into an internal gaze for policing and regulating 
the self. 
The ‘actual’ functioning of psychiatric panopticism  
According to Foucault, the perfect disciplinary institution functions as a “microscope of 
conduct”, “an apparatus of observation, recording and training”, which makes possible a 
“single gaze to see everything constantly” (Ibid.; p. 173).  This is visible in the architectural 
feature of the ‘ideal’ of disciplinary power, the panopticon, with its circular design allowing 
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for a constant gaze to make visible every aspect of the inmates’ functioning.  But, as 
mentioned in chapter 5, the actual everyday functioning of power does not adhere to an 
ideal, but in accordance with the limitations, blockages and resistances inherent within its 
actual application and functioning.   
The panopticon was never built, but the elements that formed its disciplinary mechanisms 
were transposed onto various institutions, including the asylum.  The outline of the 
functioning of disciplinary mechanisms within the asylum is offered in Psychiatric Power 
(2008).  In this account, there is no ‘central tower’ for continual observation, but a system 
of relays of ‘specialised’ personnel that allowed for hierarchical continuous observation of 
disciplinary power.  Foucault outlines the use of relays in the operation of the psychiatric 
disciplinary gaze within the asylum; the position of doctor is central to the operation of 
power within the asylum, but power operates because there are “relays, networks, and 
reciprocal supports”; it is in this system of connections that power functions: 
…the figure himself [the psychiatrist] must function at first sight. But, in this 
first sight, which is the basis on which the psychiatric relationship is built, the 
doctor is essentially a body, and more exactly he is a quite particular 
physique, a characterization, a morphology, in which there are the full 
muscles, the broad chest, the color of the hair, and so on. And this physical 
presence, with these qualities, which functions as the clause of absolute 
dissymmetry in the regular order of the asylum, is what determines that the 
asylum is not, as the psycho-sociologists would say, a rule governed 
institution; in reality it is a field polarized in terms of an essential dissymmetry 
of power, which thus assumes its form, its figure, and its physical inscription 
in the doctor's body itself. 
But, of course, the doctor's power is not the only power exercised, for in the 
asylum, as everywhere else, power is never something that someone 
possesses, any more than it is something that emanates from someone. 
Power does not belong to anyone or even to a group; there is only power 
because there is dispersion, relays, networks, reciprocal supports, 
differences of potential, discrepancies, etcetera. It is in this system of 
differences, which have to be analyzed, that power can start to function. 
There is, then, a whole series of relays around the doctor, the main ones 
being the following. First of all there are the supervisors, to whom Fodere 
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reserves the task of informing on the patients, of being the unarmed, inexpert 
gaze, the kind of optical canal through which the learned gaze, that is to say 
the objective gaze of the psychiatrist himself, will be exercised. This relayed 
gaze, ensured by the supervisors, must also take in the servants, that is to 
say those who hold the last link in the chain of authority. The supervisor, 
therefore, is both the master of the last masters and the one whose 
discourse, gaze, observations and reports must make possible the 
constitution of medical knowledge (Foucault, 2008; pp. 4-5). 
The functioning of contemporary psychiatric power: The review as hierarchical 
observation 
Some to the ‘elements’ in the above account that allowed for psychiatric power to function 
through the asylum, arguably, are still at work in the modern functioning of the psychiatric 
disciplining gaze.  This system of relays was very much visible in the medication reviews; 
from the 10 reviews that I observed, none were conducted by ‘the doctor’, instead being 
conducted by mental health nurses and mental health practitioners functioning as part of a 
network that included the doctor.  The authority of the doctor was present in the 
conversations, however; being referred to by the clinicians conducting the reviews for 
various reasons.  In the following excerpt of an interaction between a clinician, young 
person and parental authority figure, the clinician highlights the movement of knowledge of 
the young person between the clinician and the doctor, resulting in the ‘intervention’ being 
directed by the doctor: 
Clinician: So how’s the symptoms been? How’s things been in the morning? 
Do you know you need to take your medication in the morning when you get 
up – do you feel restless or anything? 
Young person: No. 
Clinician: No? How about in the afternoons? How’s the afternoons? Cos I 
see that Dr. M increased your medications in the afternoons.  Has that been 
helpful? 
Young person: I usually get tired in the afternoons. 
Clinician: Right, OK.  Take your medication OK? 
Young person: Yeah. 
Grandmother: I think Dr. M increased it because you were getting very 
violent, weren’t you? And mum was really worried. 
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At the end of the session, when discussing the next appointment, the clinician again 
highlighted the role of the doctor, not only in disciplining the young person, but also in 
disciplining the ‘practice’ of the clinician conducting the medical review: 
Clinician: Right.  So, will I just take my lead then from Dr. M.  Just looking – 
if you’ve seen him and then you feel that you need to come back to clinic, we 
can get you back in? 
Similarly, in the following excerpt, the authority of the doctor, this time the young person’s 
GP, is invoked in a discussion regarding attendance at appointments for the medical 
review to take place, where the authority is deployed to urge engagement.  The young 
person was to be transferred to an adult mental health service and the clinician was 
highlighting that the new ‘adult services’ clinician would not engage with the young person 
in the same way the child mental health service did [in a relaxed manner]; in effect, if they 
did not attend their appointments, these would cease to be offered, resulting in the 
medication being stopped.  The ending of medication is particularly pertinent to any 
benefits the young person is in receipt of in relation to the diagnosis. 
Clinician: […] you’ve GOT to make sure you attend appointments, and the 
appointments will probably be sent to you. 
Young person: Right. 
Clinician: Right? 
Mum: That doesn’t mean bin them. 
Clinician: No.  Because if you miss an appointment, they don’t give you the 
kind of chances you get here.  They will just say – you know – they’ve had a 
couple of offers of appointments, they haven’t turned up, then that’s like a 
discharge, and then you might have to wait longer next time.  And then your 
family doctor might say ‘oh, you’ve not been attending appointments, so you 
can’t continue’ [on medication]. 
The family as a ‘hinge’ in the functioning of psychiatric power 
The excerpt above highlights another dimension to the functioning of contemporary 
psychiatric power: the family as a ‘hinge’ in the functioning of hierarchical observation.  In 
the functioning of the asylum, the ‘family’ was an indispensable interlocking point, where 
the individual, rejected from various disciplinary systems, such as the school, as 
‘abnormal’ and ‘uneducable’, was sent to be ‘rehabilitated’ in order to return to the school.  
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The role of the family was to consign the individual to ‘pathology’ or ‘delinquency’, allowing 
for the asylum to take over and discipline through the knowledges and practices of 
psychiatry.  
The medical reviews that I observed took place in the community, where the everyday 
practice of ADHD takes place.  Young people are still admitted to the modern-day asylum 
– ‘inpatient units’ – but a diagnosis of ADHD [on its own] tends not result in admission 
(Kaltiala-Heino, 2010).  This requires the modern psychiatric gaze to function without the 
physical authority of confinement within the walls of asylum.   Arguably, the ‘family’ can still 
be seen to perform this ‘interlocking point’ in the functioning of contemporary psychiatric 
power allowing for the management of young people without confinement and the walls of 
the asylum.  The functioning of family in the asylum was described by Foucault as a “cell 
within power” (Foucault, 2008; p. 79) functioning through the sovereign figurehead of the 
family (Foucault stated this as the father, but in the medical reviews, this was performed 
both by mother and father) monitoring the young person, relaying this information in the 
review, and enforcing the ‘treatments’ imposed.   
This contemporary function of the family was visible in a number of the medication 
reviews, but also interviews with education professionals.  In the following excerpt, two 
teachers are discussing what supports would be put in place if a young person was having 
difficulties in the school.  In the context of what supports would then be offered, one of the 
teachers highlights that parents often go straight to the GP for a diagnosis in order to 
determine the support that is offered: 
Teacher: We’d try to find out about home circumstances, whether there’s 
been any involvement from any other agency prior – you know – previous to 
coming here, or whether they are still ongoing. And initially it’s an awful lot of 
extra information, because we’re not equipped to make any judgments – we 
want to gather that bigger picture. And then we trial strategies and put things 
in place that we think might try and support that child. And it’s only when – 
you know – you’ve exhausted strategies and they’re not working do we then 
start to think we’re going to need a wee bit of extra help, perhaps from 
[educational psychologist], to come and observe –  
Teacher 2: Often I think some of the parents have already gone to the GP 
and been to see some kind of support and perhaps already referred to 
CAMHS.  You know – so sometimes …it comes in the other way. 
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This was also recognised by an educational psychologist independent of the conversation 
with the teachers.  In the following excerpt, the professional highlights the role of the family 
in bypassing the tiered-approach within schools and going straight to the GP seeking 
referral to CAMHS.  The role of resourcing also figures in this excerpt, the professional 
highlights that what was once able to be offered as support within schools is no longer 
able to be offered due to cut-backs.  In this context, families seek support in other ways: 
Educational psychologist: I think just now we also seem to have a lot more 
parents going direct to their GP and asking for referrals directly. And again I 
think some of that is coming from there being just a lack of resource out there 
generally – you know – like the third tier, the voluntary sector – is pretty much 
gone. So there’s a lot less supports out there that again previously might 
have taken us down different routes, that just aren’t there. So parents are 
thinking ‘where can I go’, and they go to the GP and they get a referral 
straight in. 
The role of the family was not confined to fixing in place the forms of knowledge that would 
define and, thus, rehabilitate the problem, there was visibility in maintaining the diagnostic 
function once it was in place.  In the following two excerpts, the family figurehead [mum] 
did not accompany the young person to the review, but the information was relayed to the 
clinician through a phone call prior to the review taking place.  The young person in this 
interview was above 16-years old [hence attending unaccompanied by an adult], but the 
authority and functioning of the family figurehead and the information they add to the 
process is invoked with reference to the ‘phone call’ during the review: 
Excerpt 1: 
Clinician: So – when did I see you? A while ago? 
Young person: Quite a while ago. 
Clinician: March.  OK.  So there’s been a bit happening.  Your mum phoned 
up last month.  When I saw you previously things were going OK.  So firstly I 
just need to check – so we’ll catch up on what, you know, your mum – about 
her phone call.  What your concerns are.  But just first off: still taking the 
medication? 
Excerpt 2 [later in the same review]: 
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Clinician: How are you finding it, focusing on the work and stuff like that at 
school? 
Young person: In the subjects that I enjoy it’s easy, but… even, like, 
subjects that I don’t enjoy, I feel the teachers know – they could ask like – I’m 
always there but I find it harder just sitting, ploughing through all the work. 
Clinician: OK.  So, sounds normal. 
Young person: Yeah. 
Clinician: Most of us would be like that.  OK.  And in terms of when your 
mum phoned, have things settled down since then? Because it sounded like 
things were quite heated then.  Do you want to say a wee bit about what 
happened? 
Extending beyond the confines of the ‘review’ 
To fully consider the functioning of power, we are urged to approach it as a ‘multiplicity of 
force relations’ (Foucault, 2007), with force considered as “anything that influences the 
actions of individuals in a relation, that has an effect on their actions” (p. xxii).  This force 
can be ‘immanent in a physical environment’, in a ‘social configuration’, in a ‘pattern of 
behaviour’, in a ‘bodily gesture’, in a ‘certain attitude’, or in a ‘way of life’.  Thus, to fully 
consider the functioning of the medical review as disciplinary technology, the analysis 
needs to be extended beyond the review, to the wider elements of its apparatus, the 
various factors that work alongside the doctor, the network of relays and the family in the 
functioning of psychiatric power.   
One such factor prominent in the review was the ‘questionnaire’: the medical review was a 
combination of ‘clinical interview’ and ‘physical examination’, with the interview being 
directed by an ADHD ‘proforma’.  Across all reviews, the same questions were asked, as 
each clinician followed the procedure laid out in the questionnaire.  The questions related 
to the presence of ‘symptoms’ of ADHD, allowing for comparison against themselves, as a 
‘case’, at different points in time.  As outlined in the elaboration of disciplinary power, 
quantification of ‘symptoms’ also allows for comparison against a wider ‘norm’ and for 
judgement against normative parameters for ‘correct’ behaviours, forming the basis for 
corrective intervention.  For this procedure to take place, however, there must be a ‘norm’ 
constructed from a wider network of individuals, from which comparison is made.   
This was not the case with the medication review process.  The questionnaire that guided 
the review was an internally constructed ‘tool’ and based on the characteristics of ADHD 
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outlined by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (APA, 2013), with 
quantification based on whether symptoms occurred ‘never, sometimes, often, or very 
often’.  My rationale for highlighting this is not to question the validity and reliability of the 
questionnaire; to do so would be to consider the questionnaire as an objective tool offering 
access to measurable traits, rather than as constructing the traits it claims to measure.  
Instead, the point being made is that I found the lack of reliance on normative information 
interesting as it highlighted the disciplinary function with the review as having moved 
beyond a requirement of normative information – ADHD was not quantified against a 
network of individuals, but solely against a quantification of the young person’s behaviour 
across a history of medical reviews.  The quantified ‘symptomology’ in this functioning can 
be considered to be a ‘tool’ within the disciplining process, with fluctuation used to urge 
self-governance, or as a basis for increasing dose to assist self-management through 
inducing docility: 
Clinician: What about waiting your turn? Do you wait your turn for things? 
Young person: Sometimes. 
Clinician: Sometimes? What about forgetting day-to-day activities? Your 
day-to-day routine.  Do you forget things that you’re meant to be doing in 
your day-to-day routines? 
Young person: Not really.  Apart from my medication. 
Clinician: So sometimes your medication!? Again, most people forget that.  
What about interrupting others when they’re having a conversation – if your 
mum’s on the phone or anything like that, you know? Somebody’s talking. 
Young person: Only with my mum – all of us do that in our house, though. 
Clinician: Right.  So sometimes with your mum.  I’m just comparing it to the 
last time.  So – I’m not sure if your mum was chipping in last time, or if it was 
mostly you.  You seem a bit more – a bit more inattentive than the last time 
but not as hyper! 
Closing down alternative discourse through systematisation of psychiatric statements 
The ‘questionnaire’ also appeared to serve another purpose – that of disciplining the 
clinician and governing what can be said about each young person.  The same questions 
were asked by all clinicians across all medical reviews; questions inquired about sleeping 
and forgetfulness, but also in relation to concentration, fidgeting, keeping ‘on-task’, 
listening, running about/climbing on things excessively, etc.  Each clinician moved through 
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the questions in the same order, creating a uniformity of approach and response in each 
review; where deviation occurred, this was when examples were offered of behaviours that 
would indicate the presence of the symptoms being considered, but answers would always 
be quantified using the same scale outlined above.  In the following excerpt, the procedure 
of two different clinicians is presented side by side to highlight the systematisation of 
procedure.  The response have been removed as it is the process and structure of the 
question that warrant consideration: 
Clinician 1: 
 
“So, there’s failure to give close 
attention to details or making 
careless mistakes in schoolwork – 
you’ve not been at school much. 
But in that kind of thing, if you were 
having to concentrate or 
something, and you were having to 
pay close attention to, how’s that 
been over the last week? 
[…] 
OK. What about fidgeting? You 
know, with your hands or with your 
feet? 
[…] 
What about when you’re – when 
you’re doing something you’re 
enjoying, or any task. Are you able 
to focus on that? Are you able to 
keep your attention on that – on 
that task? Or is it an issue? 
[…] 
Right. OK. If you were in class, or 
doing anything in the last week or 
two where you were meant to 
remain seated, would you be able 
to just sit on the seat – or would 
you be getting up when you’re not 
meant to? 
Clinician 2: 
 
“Failure to give close attention to 
details or make careless mistakes 
in schoolwork? And feel free to 
chip in. What do you guys think 
about that? Is that never, 
sometimes, often? 
[…] 
Very often? Right. What about 
fidgeting – hands, feet – or 
squirming in the seat? 
[…] 
Very often. I’m observing about 
that. What about difficulties to 
staying attention on tasks or 
activities? 
[…] 
In terms of in school and class – I 
don’t know if you’ve heard – but is 
[young person] sitting down? Or is 
he up and down out of his seat 
when he’s not meant to? 
[…] 
What about – does he not seem to 
answer when spoken to directly? 
[…] 
OK. So, certainly – it’s often. But 
clearly, you’re listening just now – 
So there is that – you know – that 
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[…] 
OK. Do you listen to when you’re 
spoken to directly? Do you always 
listen when you’re spoken to 
directly like I’m doing just now? 
[…] 
Yeah? OK. Do you run about, 
climb on things excessively or 
when it’s inappropriate?” 
social communication about eye 
contact sometimes isn’t there – but 
listening and picking it up. OK. 
[…] 
What about running about, 
climbing things when it’s not 
appropriate to do so? You know.” 
 
The questionnaires functioned to frame each young person’s behaviour through ADHD 
discourse, limiting different ways of talking about the behaviours, and reducing the 
behaviour to a comparable number.  Whilst each clinician and each young person talked 
about the object of each question in different ways (fidgeting, restlessness, etc.), the 
framing and quantification resulted in the same outcome, allowing for comparison of each 
young person with themselves over time, the fabrication of the ADHD subject through the 
categorisation according to the DSM symptomatology, and the continued use of 
psychostimulant medication and the medical review as disciplinary procedure. 
Invoking biomedical authority: the clinic room and the clinic ‘tools’ 
Another factor in the extended apparatus was the clinic room and the clinic ‘tools’: in each 
medical review, the young person was taken from the interview room to a medical 
examination room equipped with medical ‘tools’ for measuring weight, height and blood 
pressure.  The room also contained a bed, wash basin, cleaning materials such as hand 
soap and paper towels, and was decorated in neutral colours.  As mentioned earlier, the 
examination is considered a “highly ritualised ceremony of power” (Foucault, 1979; p. 
184); in the case of the medical review, an ‘interview’ is combined with a ‘physical 
examination’ in a highly ritualised ceremony: the examination took place at the same point 
in the medical review – at the end of the interview and before arranging the next 
appointment – and followed the same format – the young person was asked to follow the 
clinician to another room, was asked to sit on the bed and remove footwear, before height, 
weight and blood pressure were measured.   
The measurement of these biological features was a procedure of each medical review, 
but in each of the reviews I observed, I did not hear an explanation offered as to why the 
measurements were taken.  I later found out in general conversation that the 
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measurements were taken to gauge whether physical growth was in line with predicted 
age-related norms, and whether blood pressure and pulse were elevated, in order to 
monitor for side effects of the medication.  This was not how the physical examination was 
presented: the interactions between the clinician and young person were jovial and 
friendly, with conversation almost paternalistic (see excerpt below), which created a sense 
of interest in the wellbeing of the young person.  The actual purpose for gathering the 
information, however, was to protect against the occurrence of known adverse effects of 
medication, thus protecting the functioning of the diagnostic process.   
Clinician: OK.  Well, I’ll get your observations just and we can have a think 
about what next.  So, bring the tape with us.  We can see if you’re still alive, 
yes?   
Young person: Ha, yes. 
Clinician: Pop your trainers off.  If you can step on the scales – so, what 
have we got – 54 kilograms.  Right, if you’d just put your head here. 
Young person: I don’t think I’ve got anymore growing to do. 
Clinician: You might be.  Still might be growing – so it’s just about 170 
centimetres, so that’s just over five foot eight.  This is indicating that you’ve 
taken quite a stretch. 
Young person: Finally!  For about eight years now it’s been the same. 
Clinician: You’ve grown an inch! 
Young person: Yes! 
Clinician: That’s pretty incredible!  And your weight’s just up a wee bit – a 
kilo or so.  Do you have sun tan lotion or something when you’re outside?  
You’re quite brown!  106 over 86 – that’s fine.  I’ll just get your pulse.  Super.  
Right, everything seems to be in order.  So let’s go back. 
Additionally, it could also be argued that an unintended effect of the physical examination 
is a rhetorical warranting of the procedure by biomedical discourse.  ADHD is constructed 
as a neurodevelopmental condition by biomedical and psychological discourse; the 
condition exists in the neural circuitry of the young person’s brain, with modernist scientific 
investigations giving this statement authority.  Whereas, in the actual functioning of the 
medical review, there was no visible connection that bestow this authority; the presence of 
the condition is considered solely through the quantification of ‘symptoms’ by 
questionnaires.  The addition of the physical examination, arguably, can be considered to 
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function as a form of medical authority warranted through the use of ‘tools’ for measuring 
biological features, such as height, weight and blood pressure. 
The medical authority bestowed on the review by the physical examination can also be 
considered to have been aided by the location and physical layout of the clinic in which the 
review took place.  The clinic was located within a local community hospital, alongside 
medical services such as a minor injuries unit, an AAA (Abdominal Aortic Aneurysm) 
screening service, diabetes service, and an out-of-hours GP service.  The child and 
adolescent mental health service (CAMHS) in which the medical review took place was 
originally housed in a Georgian townhouse that looked like, and was located amongst, 
local residential properties, but was relocated to the community hospital under the 
government procedures for identification and sale of NHS property (Scottish Government, 
2011).   
The new ‘medicalised’ location could be considered to further rhetorically warrant the 
review through invoking biomedical discourse: highly visible in the location were medical 
personnel in uniform, wheelchairs at the doorways, medical advice on walls, physically 
unwell patients with visiting relatives, clinical white décor, etc.  The procedure for attending 
appointments added to this: young people had to walk through the location to a reception 
area for CAMHS visitors, the clinician was alerted to their arrival by a receptionist, who sat 
behind an enclosed space, conversing through a hatch only to take the particulars of the 
visitor.  The young person was required to wait for the clinician in an open-plan, neutrally 
decorated, clinical waiting area.  Once the clinician arrived in the waiting area, the young 
person was taken through a secured doorway into a corridor containing several doors 
indistinguishable from each other, then through one of these into the ‘interview room’.   
The procedure and space was similar to many other medical-related experiences, despite 
being formed around a ‘questionnaire’ that could have been completed anywhere. 
Arguably, the familiarity of biomedical discourse invoked through the procedures just 
outlined bestowed a medical authority on the review – an authority imbued before the 
review even commenced through the space in which the medical review took place.  In 
Foucault’s account above of the functioning of the asylum, the figure of the doctor must 
function at first sight; “the particular physique, characterisation, morphology, in which full 
muscles, broad chest, colour of hair, and so on” (Foucault, 2008; p. 4), impressing upon 
the patient the dissymmetry of the power relation.  In the contemporary functioning of 
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psychiatric power, the location of the ‘medical review’ can be argued to have taken the 
place of the functioning of the first sight of the doctor.  
The (paradoxical) functioning of ADHD knowledge and treatment 
The argument offered in this chapter is that the use of the ADHD diagnosis and 
psychostimulant medication is not about illness and alleviation of symptoms, but the 
management of young people through normalising judgement and deployment of discipline 
as a means of encouraging self-responsibilisation.  Several of the young people I met in 
medical reviews had been ‘patients’ in the Child and Adolescent Mental Health Service for 
over 10 years.  The ‘problem’ that resulted in referral changed over the years they had 
been attending the service: for example, ADHD replaced ‘the impact of domestic violence’, 
‘depression’, ‘bedwetting and single mother struggling to cope’, ‘speech and language 
difficulties’, amongst other ‘problems’.  This also appeared to be continuing in the present 
moment: the ‘problems’ being discussed in the medical review included ‘refusing to attend 
school’, ‘struggling to focus at work’ [in a biscuit factory], ‘difficulty adjusting to family 
reorganisation’, ‘not trying at school’ [due to believing it was not worthwhile for future 
employment choice], and ‘difficulty adjusting to addition of half-sibling to the family’.   
Having been constructed as ‘having’ ADHD, all of these ‘problems’ were now being 
understood against the background of a ‘biologically driven, brain-based neuro-
developmental disorder’ background, with all behaviours framed through the questionnaire 
considered to indicate the ‘symptoms’ of the ‘disorder’.  Through the process of 
construction, quantification and comparison, the young people in each of these reviews 
continued to be fixed according to this form of knowledge, allowing for ongoing 
construction of difficulties through the discourse of ADHD and, thus, legitimation as a 
target for ‘treatment’ with psychostimulant medication.  But as mentioned earlier, the 
‘treatment’ did not appear to alleviate the ‘symptoms’ – what was being constructed as 
‘symptoms’ remained visible – its function appeared to be the legitimation of governance 
warranted upon medical authority exerted through a ‘highly ritualised ceremony of power’.   
Throughout the medical reviews, there were multiple examples of ADHD framing the 
‘problem’ and its solution; the problem was placed at the centre of the review and 
questions were asked about fidgetiness, inattention, impulsivity, hyperactivity, behavioural 
difficulties, etc. and, through surrounding the ‘problem’ with these questions, the ‘problem’ 
was then reconstituted in these terms.  Thus, common everyday issues, various irritations 
that occur daily, in being known through the medical review, came to be both produced by 
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and reproducing of ADHD, thus excluding all other possible ways of knowing the 
difficulties.  The questionnaire both functioned to govern the way the difficulties were 
known by limiting the way each clinician could question the difficulties and the way each 
young person could describe the difficulties, but also by constructing and quantifying the 
difficulties simultaneously as ‘symptoms’ of ADHD and, thus, as the ‘result’ of ADHD.  
The parameters of normalcy governed in the medical review were difficult to pin down.  
There was no discernible norm or ideal against which governing took place, only the young 
person’s own history as constructed by the clinical interview process.  What was 
abundantly clear, however, was that the young person was to ‘self-regulate’ all forms of 
problematic behaviour.  Arguably, the lack of any discernible limit of normalcy allowed for 
all forms of behaviour exhibited by the young person to be considered as ADHD and, thus, 
a problem of ‘self-regulation’.  This application of logic appeared to extend into all forms of 
living: in one of the medical reviews, the main focus was the young person’s desire to be 
outside playing with friends and their lack of interest in returning home for lunch.  The 
seriousness given to this as a problem of ADHD was confusing; it was not immediately 
clear why the parents were troubled by the young person’s desire to be outside playing 
with friends.  The main issue was not, however, about being outside, but the lack of 
interest in eating lunch.  A side effect of psychostimulant medication is lack of weight gain 
or height growth (Ritalin Patient Information Leaflet, 2017; p. 8) and it was this concern 
that was framing the behaviour and the seriousness of this as problem of ADHD:  
Clinician: So what had you experiencing some kind of anger or frustration? 
Mum: It’s like – even just at eating times – meal times – when he HAS to do 
something that he doesn’t want – I mean, whether it’s just for eating or kind 
of going out, he’s just ‘Naah’. 
Young person: And my appetite’s not been that good.  Like I’ll feel hungry – 
then I aint hungry. 
Clinician: Right, OK.  Because that was always something that was very 
good for you – your appetite. 
Young person: Mhmm. 
Mum: Aye.  His appetite – I don’t know whether it’s he’s not hungry or it’s just 
that he’s wanting to go out because it’s nice.  And the aggression’s here 
because he’s not getting to go out.  He’s having to stay in and eat and he 
doesn’t want to do that. 
Clinician: Right.  So that’s a change, because you always liked your meals. 
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Young person: Mhmm. 
Clinician: You would eat all your meals and you usually had to eat your 
dinner, then you were going out.  So how’s that changed?  Because you just 
don’t want to eat anymore, or not as hungry? 
Young person: It’s just I don’t feel that hungry any more. 
Clinician: Right.  Is that early on in the day?  After you take your medication 
and do you start to feel hungry as the day goes on?  So by tea time? 
Young person: Yeah.  I feel hungry but just then I’m not hungry. 
Clinician: Right.  Because sometimes you find that people struggle with their 
appetite during the day, but as the medication wears off, later on in the 
afternoon their appetite comes back, and you can eat normally. 
Young person: At night I can maybe eat good. 
Clinician: Right.  So appetite at night – is that better than during the day? 
Young person: A tiny bit. 
Mum: No.  If he can get to his friends he refuses to eat.  It’s more like – I 
don’t know whether it’s the appetite or whether it’s just that he’s got more 
people he can play with now, and he just wants to do that. 
Clinician: Right. 
Mum: He wants to keep going all the time instead of taking time out to eat. 
Clinician: Right.  OK. 
Mum: He’d rather take crisps and sweeties and run out the door or go to his 
pals and get a bag of chips when he’s there.  Because that way he can stay 
and he can do his own thing.  I think the appetite’s there – he’s just not 
wanting to. 
The outcome here, and throughout the reviews, was that everyday common behaviours 
exhibited by young people, such as wanting to play with friends, come to be constituted as 
being about ADHD, allowing for governance of the young person by the continued 
application of ADHD diagnosis and treatment.  In the above interaction, being outside with 
friends and not returning for lunch was reconstituted from an everyday childhood 
occurrence, to a ‘risk factor’ for weight loss and, thus, as a target for regulation.  However, 
somewhat ironically, the regulation of this particular problem was to occur through self-
regulation, with responsibilisation of the young person taking place through the 
deployment of strategies and techniques to shape the behaviour for a particular purpose 
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(Rose, 1999); in this excerpt, it was to reduce the risk of weight loss through behavioural 
self-regulation: 
Clinician: Right.  It might be helpful then to try and make a daytime routine 
during the holidays, like you would have for school. 
Young person: Mhmm. 
Clinician: That might be helpful.  And then you know this is breakfast time, 
this is lunchtime, this is teatime – this is when I’m supposed to be in.  Do you 
think that would be helpful? 
Young person: Mhmm. 
Clinician: And then you know – and then if your friends know they can come 
to the door at a certain time, because then you’ll have finished your lunch, or 
you’ll have finished your dinner. 
Young person: Mhmm. 
Clinician: That would be better.  And then there’s not so much pressure on 
you and you’re not going to be missing meals. 
Young person: Yeah. 
Clinician: Does that sound a bit reasonable? 
Young person: Yeah. 
Mum: As long as you keep to that when you go home. 
Clinician: Well you would need to keep to that.  I don’t think that’s 
unreasonable.  I think that you as a young person, you have a good appetite, 
and we all know – 
Mum: A great appetite. 
Clinician: – he has.  You’ve got a great appetite.  You’ve got one of the best 
appetites of anybody I see here.  You’re my poster boy for eating your 
dinner.  And I think it’s a shame if that slips.  And I get so much that you want 
to go out and be with your friends, and do all lots of different things, but if you 
say to them ‘look, do you know what – I have to be in at – I don’t know – 
what time’s teatime at night? – 
Mum: When [his brother] comes in from his working shift at half past eight. 
Clinician: Right – so that’s when you would have your evening meal, at half 
past eight? 
Mum: Mhmm. 
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Clinician: Right.  So that’s not – you need to be able to say ‘I have to be in 
because that’s when I get my dinner’.  When would you have lunch? 
Young person: At lunch. 
Clinician: Lunchtime?  About one o’clock-ish?  Yeah?  So you say to your 
friends ‘I need to be in from one o’clock to half past one to eat my lunch’. 
Young person: Mhmm. 
Clinician: ‘And I’ll come out when I’m finished’.  Then go out after your 
breakfast in the morning.  That’s not unreasonable.  Yeah? 
Young person: Mhmm. 
Clinician: And then you’re not getting frustrated, you’re not feeling pressure 
from them to get out.  But then you’re not getting into arguments with mum 
either, because you’re doing what you’re supposed to be doing. 
Young person: Mhmm. 
This responsibilisation of the young person – the shaping of a self-regulating subject 
through mechanisms of power functioning through ADHD discourse and knowledge – was 
not isolated to this medical review: it occurred for a variety of ‘problems’ across all medical 
reviews.  For me, what is neatly highlighted in the above excerpt, is the main argument put 
forward in this chapter: that psychostimulant medication does not ‘fix’ the ‘problem’, 
instead allowing for continued surveillance and discipline of the young person through a 
psychiatric knowledge and practice.  The irony referred to earlier in the chapter, and 
inherent in the discontinuity with official knowledges and the everyday functioning of ADHD 
‘treatment’, is that, according to the psychiatric explanation, the disorder signifies the 
presence of problems of self-regulation: the ‘dysfunctional neural circuitry’ that ‘causes’ the 
‘symptoms’ of disorder implies that it is not possible to self-regulate.  Yet here, and in 
every medication review I observed, were young people, apparently suffering a disorder of 
self-regulation, being urged to solve the ‘symptoms’ through forms of self-regulation.   
This paradox can be considered, rather than to highlight failure as ‘medical treatment’, to 
highlight the everyday practice of ADHD’s success as a disciplinary technology.  Receiving 
a diagnosis is the formal branding of the young person by psychiatric knowledge.  The 
medication review can be considered to hold this in place by excluding other possible 
ways of conceptualising ‘problems’.  In this way, the medication review specifically, and 
the wider ADHD diagnostic process more generally, can be considered to a function as 
disciplinary “super-power” (Foucault, 1979; p. 271).  Within the medication review, its 
procedures allow information to be gathered on the young person which then allows for 
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their continued disciplining – the construction and quantification of ‘inattentiveness’, 
‘impulsivity’ and ‘hyperactivity’ are used on a review-to-review basis as a means of 
legitimating continued application of the ‘disorder’ and ‘treatment’.  This reality, rather than 
being a failure, can be considered to indicate “inverted efficiency” (ibid.; p. 271) where, 
rather than ‘curing’ ADHD, the procedures continually produce and reproduce ADHD 
young people, allowing for continued application of the knowledge and procedures as a 
means and mode of discipline. 
The final element that provides for the success of the procedure relates to what Foucault 
termed “utopian duplication” (ibid.; p. 271).  The everyday practice of ADHD, through its 
connection to public health/preventative discourses, allows for the continues practice of 
disciplining through the utopian ideal of promoting the wellbeing of every child and young 
person.  However, the ‘wellbeing’ that is promoted is determined not by positive outcomes 
for the individual, defined by the individual, but by how well they fit with the wider aims and 
direction required of the populace.  The everyday functioning of ADHD, and its continued 
practice, in this sense, functions as a governmental technology for achieving these aims.  
It continually ‘fixes’ ‘risky’ young people through notions of wellbeing and future social 
inclusion.  The ‘fixing’ is presented as in their best interests: without the ‘disorder’ being 
fixed, they run the risk of being socially excluded through not having the skills and abilities 
for the future. 
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Chapter 7 
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Problematising ADHD through micro-level examination 
This investigation sought to problematise the rising rates of ADHD diagnosis and resulting 
treatment with psychostimulant medication.  Rather than engage with this problem by 
entering the ‘battle over truth’ that characterises much of the debate, this project adopted a 
critical sociological approach informed by Foucauldian and post-Foucauldian scholarship 
and contemporary transdisciplinary ethnographic research relating to subjectivity.  This 
desire to avoid the battle over truth connects to my time as a practising clinical 
psychologist.  I was often involved in ‘battles over truth’ at the level of the everyday, 
deploying arguments that highlighted the lack of validity and reliability of the ‘evidence’; 
however, despite ‘cancelling out’ the evidence through critiquing its scientific rigour, the 
arguments did not appear to have any impact on the continued requirement for 
‘assessment of ADHD’ within the child mental health services.   
The battle I engaged in at the micro-level of the everyday can be considered to be an 
enactment of the battle occurring at the level of official institutional knowledges. If one 
considers the knowledges that construct the ‘literature’ of ADHD, the battle is fought over 
the rules and procedures of ‘objectivity’ and ‘methodological rigour’, whereby studies that 
do not attend to these procedural requirements are deemed ‘methodologically flawed’.  
The outcome appears to be the ‘cancelling out’ of each position, most clearly articulated in 
the standoff between the ‘International Consensus Statement on ADHD’ (Barkley et al., 
2002) and the ‘Critique of the International Consensus Statement on ADHD’ (Timimi et al., 
2004).  Despite this, diagnosis and treatment with stimulant medication continues apace: 
in Scotland, between 2002 and 2011, the increase in prescriptions was 105% (GROS, 
2013) with Australia seeing an increase of 73% between 2000 and 2011 (Stephenson, 
Karanges & McGregor, 2013). 
There is a silence betrayed in this battle over truth, both at the level of the everyday and at 
the level of institutional knowledges; one that, for me, makes the adoption of this approach 
as critique a pointless exercise.  Despite highlighting that knowledge of ADHD does not 
conform to the rules and procedures that are considered to provide its scientific 
credentials, it continues to be dominant; so much so that it has become increasingly 
difficult to conceptualise young people, considered problematic within certain contexts, 
outside of this explanation.  In short, the objects, concepts and procedural requirements of 
‘objective science’ that legitimise ADHD as an object of psychiatric knowledge do not 
make any difference when deployed as a critique.  The master’s tools, it seems, do not 
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dismantle the master’s house (Lorde, 2018): the sheer force of the scientific truth value 
bestowed by the construction of ADHD by biomedical discourse appears to silence debate 
from within this discursive domain.  
This point highlights the requirement for a different approach to the problem of ADHD; one 
that offers a critique, but from outside the frame of reference that provides its legitimacy.  
Such was my aim with this investigation.  I wanted to understand how it was possible to 
say and do ADHD, for it to be enacted, in our present moment.  My aim with this line of 
questioning was to simultaneously acknowledge its material existence and to reject the 
reality-version created by the knowledge and discourse that construct ADHD as a 
‘neurodevelopmental disorder’.  For me, there was as much value in engaging in a critique 
that argues that it is ‘not real’ as there was in engaging in a battle over truth from within its 
frame of reference.  It is very much ‘real’, but only in so much as it is enacted daily through 
the actions of multiple subjects located within an apparatus that is reinforced by, and 
reinforcing of, ADHD as a psychiatric disorder experienced by children and young people. 
By considering ADHD in the way described above, I am following Rose (1999; p. x): it is 
commonplace for objects of scientific knowledges to be described as ‘not objective’ and as 
‘socially constructed’, especially in ‘psy- sciences’.  However, as he states, this is not 
particularly enlightening or useful – “objects of thought are constructed in thought: what 
else could they be?”.  So, as he suggests, a more useful approach would interest itself in 
questioning the ways in which objects are socially constructed; i.e., where they emerge; 
the authorities that are able to pronounce upon them; the concepts and explanatory 
regimes that construct them; the problems they solve, etc.  The aim here is to understand 
how they came to be in place in the present moment – why these objects and knowledges, 
and not others, structure our reality – and to reveal the disreputable origins and 
unpalatable functions that have contributed to their emergence in the present moment 
(Rose, 1984; cited in Kendall & Wickham, 1999). 
This investigation is by no means the first to engage with ADHD in this way – e.g., Bailey 
(2013), Graham (2010) and Rafalovich (2004) – but where this investigation differs from 
what has gone before are the sites in which the investigation was conducted.  Previous 
work, such as those above, has either adopted an archival approach, tracking the 
emergence of ADHD as an object of psychiatric knowledge (Rafalovich, 2004) or 
highlighted the construction and functioning of ADHD within schools or in education policy 
(Bailey, 2013; Graham, 2010).  These investigations are valuable, and much of what was 
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carried out by this investigation was informed by them, but I wanted to take this 
investigation further by considering the connection between schools and mental health 
service in the construction of ADHD.  As such, this investigation is unique – not only was it 
able to connect schools and mental health services, but it was able to provide an account 
of the functioning of procedures for managing young people considered problematic, at the 
level of their application, and to situate these within the changing discursive background 
from which they emerged.   
In doing so, the investigation allows consideration of the application of ‘actual’ practice at 
the level of the young person.  ADHD as an object appears ‘monolithic’ – or, certainly that 
it is how I experienced it in clinical practice and at the start of this investigation – possibly 
because of its rhetorical scientific-ness, continued exponential rise in application, and the 
‘global’ reach of the knowledge that provides its visibility.  These elements combine to 
provide ADHD with a ‘realness’ that is difficult to argue with, making it hard to know how to 
engage in critique: where does one begin with what feels like such an impenetrable 
reality?  In this investigation, it was the micro-level: the ‘extremities of power’ – the ultimate 
destinations, the regional and local forms and institutions, where it “invests itself in 
institutions, becomes embodied in techniques, and equips itself with instruments” 
(Foucault, 1980; p. 96).   
Approaching the investigation from the extremities of power allowed for penetration of the 
reality of official knowledges and access to the material effects they create in the 
everyday.  What was revealed at this level was that the impenetrable reality of ‘official’ 
ADHD was nothing more than the production and reproduction of knowledge and 
discourse by various actors at various intersections of societal structure.  At this level, the 
‘truth’ of ADHD is not because ‘objectivity’ or ‘accuracy of representation’, but because of 
its usefulness in solving ‘problems’ within the apparatus in which it is produced and 
reproduced in the present moment.   
Combining ethnography and Foucault to investigate ADHD  
The approach to this investigation aimed to reconnect the wider social, political and 
institutional factors that conditioned the possibility for the emergence of a particular form of 
ADHD-informed health care to be in place within an NHS region in Scotland in the present 
moment.  An overarching aim was to consider ADHD from outside its dominant biomedical 
explanation as a means of critically questioning this explanation.  By engaging with an 
apparatus (health and education) at a micro-level, the aim was to reveal the 
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interconnected nexus of elements in which ADHD functioned in the everyday, the 
‘problems’ it solved, and the effects conditioned by these solutions.  From here, the aim 
was to ‘work backwards’, to provide a genealogical account of the pluralisation of events 
implicated in the eventual emergence of ADHD as the solution to the problems it solved.  
Procedurally, the aim was to question how, why and where ‘young people’ became a 
problem, how they were shaped as the problem they became, what possibilities were 
conditioned by constructing them as these types of problems, and to question how this 
changing background conditioned the current social practice of ADHD locally. 
The approach described above was developed from Foucauldian and post-Foucauldian 
scholarship and contemporary transdisciplinary ethnographic research relating to 
subjectivity.  In drawing on transdisciplinary ethnographic research, this investigation 
engages with subjectivity as both an empirical reality and an analytic category (Biehl, 
Good & Kleinman, 2007; p. 5).  By drawing on this form of scholarship, the understanding 
that informs this investigation is that subjects are ‘epiphenomena’ (Keller, 2007): they are 
“made up”, constituted in and by technologies of knowledge and power (Hacking, 1990; p. 
3).  From this position, subjectivity is considered to be multiple, mobile and externally 
constituted rather than a singular, fixed, internal ‘natural essence’ and, thus, requires 
analytical consideration of the external ‘concrete constellations’ in which it is continually 
shaped and reshaped (Biehl, Good & Kleinman, 2007).   
Much of the ethnographic scholarship regarding subjectivity engages with the concrete 
constellations that shape subjectivity through examination of the ways in which people’s 
inner states reflect the changing background of their everyday worlds (Biehl, Good & 
Kleinman, 2007).  This particular focus marks a difference in this investigation, which was, 
for the most part, positioned outside of ‘inner worlds’ in the ‘external concrete 
constellations’.  As such, this investigation was influenced more by Biehl (2005) who, 
whilst working with the ethnographic consideration of the subject outlined above, focused 
more on the plasticity and malleability of reality; that is, “the synthetic frameworks that 
mediate social control and recast concepts of a common humanity” (p. 16).  In his 
investigation, the focus was ‘subjectivity’, but it was positioned as a ‘material of politics’ – 
the site upon which governance was enacted – with ‘subjective reassemblage’ continually 
occurring against a changing background of rational-technical politics and regional and 
local institutional responses (ibid.; p. 16).  The investigation, like this one, sought to make 
visible the apparatus of interconnections, and the broader social terrain from which they 
emerged, through which governance was enacted.  
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It was the particular understanding of the subject at the centre of the above application of 
the ethnographic approach that, for me, spoke to Foucauldian and post-Foucauldian 
scholarship – particularly those concerned with the study of governmentality.  From a 
Foucauldian standpoint, governmentality refers to the complex of calculations, 
programmes, policies, strategies and tactics that shape the conduct of individuals: that 
which conducts conduct in order to achieve certain ends (Foucault, 1991).  However, 
government is more than just about controlling actions; it is also about constituting ways of 
thinking and acting, encouraging these through a wide range of political technologies and 
government-supported practices and institutions (e.g. laws, policies, interventions, 
initiatives, statistics and techniques), with the ultimate aim being the security and wellbeing 
of society (Belsey, 2010). 
In combining these approaches, this investigation positioned itself in the ‘concrete 
constellations’ that informed health and education practices and aimed to understand what 
made it possible for young people to be made into the ADHD subject; to be ‘made up’ as a 
young person ‘with’ ADHD (Foucault, 1982; Hacking, 1999) and, thus, ‘treatable’ by 
psychiatric knowledge and medication.  The investigation sought to understand this in the 
present – i.e. against what was ADHD being deployed as a solution? – but also historically 
– i.e. what made it possible for ADHD to emerge as a deployable solution?  The aim here 
was not to provide a ‘sociological description’ of forms of governance, but an account of 
the pluralisation of events that made this way of governing thinkable and actionable in the 
present (Dean, 2015) – the focus was the ways in which ‘young people’ were divided, 
problematised and targeted across different periods and domains of life, the effects 
conditioned by these divisions and problematisations, and how these effects are implicated 
in the production of the reality-versions that sustain their visibility.  The investigation has 
attempted to make visible the conditions under which different ways of thinking about 
‘young people’ were formed, the means of governance these ways of thinking legitimated, 
the effects these ways of thinking about and governing young people created, and the 
ways these effects have contributed to the shifting background upon which new ways of 
thinking and acting emerged (Dean, 2015).  
Revealing disreputable origins and unpalatable functions 
The starting point for investigation was observation of ADHD clinical appointments 
occurring in the present moment and then ‘working backwards’ from this point through 
various archival material, including clinical case notes, meeting minutes and current and 
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historical policy.  The ‘inner worlds’ of several health and educational professionals also 
formed part of the investigation, although this centered on the procedural elements of their 
day-to-day practice rather than affect or beliefs.  The narrative ‘stepping-off’ point of de-
industrialisation and post-industrialisation was the end-point of working backwards from 
the present; but, as mentioned in Chapter 2, this is not where ADHD ‘started’ – it is where I 
chose to start the account, on the basis that ‘social exclusion’ had become a problem for 
schools to solve.  The aim of starting at this point was to contextualise the ‘things’ that 
were problematised as ‘social exclusion’ – i.e. to make visible the conditions from which 
the ‘things’ (poverty, inequality, unemployment, health problems, social marginalisation, 
etc.) emerged and, thus, made them describable as ‘social exclusion’.  From here, I have 
attempted to provide an account of the multiple contingencies upon which the local 
practice of ADHD rests.   
What was revealed was that, contrary to official institutional knowledges, the increasing 
visibility of ADHD was not conditioned by ‘improvements in training’, ‘improved screening 
tools’, ‘better treatment regimens’ or the ‘accumulation of knowledge of aetiology’ 
(Anastopoulos, Barkley & Shelton, 1994; Mandell, Thompson, Weintraub et al., 2005; 
Lange, Reichl, Lange et al., 2010) but by a pluralisation of interconnected events 
conditioned by the enactment of deindustrialisation.  Included amongst this pluralisation 
were wider ‘elements’, such as the shifting requirements of the young citizen and the 
emergence of technologies for achieving these, the changing discourses of social 
exclusion and wellbeing, the widening parameters of the category of disability within 
educational discourse, and neoliberal reforms of health and education.  More ‘local’ 
elements included the invention of technologies to ‘support learning’, widening health 
professional remits, and institutional responses to new requirements within the wider 
apparatuses of health and education.  These are not offered as a singular ontological 
domain of practice, however, but as a multiplicity of elements, all with their own history, 
that have become connected in the production of the reality that allowed the ADHD 
machine to be acceptable as a solution at the point in time that it was proposed.  In short, 
these elements can be considered to have created both the conditions for the ADHD 
machine to be thinkable and practicable (Gordon, 1991) and the intelligible background 
upon which its continued existence is legitimated. 
An important feature of the investigation was locating what was considered to be 
unforeseen effects emerging from within interconnected elements and apparatuses.  
These unforeseen effects were what was considered to drive the continual displacement of 
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apparatuses: I focused on these effects as ‘problems’ that were to be ‘solved’, with their 
construction as particular problems determining what was deployable as the solution.  
These effects can be considered to be multiple, interconnected and as shifting the 
strategic aims of the apparatus through the new requirements their construction as 
problems created.  What was made visible in this investigation was a multitude of effects, 
including the production of inequality, poverty and unemployment, requirement to continue 
in education, increased numbers of young people considered to require support to learn, 
and increased referrals to child mental health services for assessment and treatment.  The 
particular ways in which these effects were problematised determined what could be said 
about the problem that was constructed, what could be said and done about it, and who 
was able to say and do those things.  But the particular way in which ‘effects’ were able to 
be problematised was only possible because of the external relations of intelligibility 
offered by the wider elements of the apparatus described above.  It is the interaction of 
effects created, the form their problematisation took, what this legitimated, how this was 
made a reality in the words and actions of individuals, and the effects these words and 
actions created that is considered to drive the shifting background upon which thought and 
action takes place. 
Using this theoretical frame, the investigation revealed increasing ADHD diagnosis as an 
effect of a ‘solution’ to local problems, within both the health and education apparatuses, 
with the solution made possible by the wider elements of the apparatus in which the 
problem emerged.  Within health, increasing referrals, a requirement to promote 
‘wellbeing’ and a requirement for integrated working with education (and other institutions) 
created the conditions in which the ADHD machine would function as a solution.  Within 
education, social exclusion and the increased parameters of what could be constituted as 
a learning problem can be seen to have conditioned the possibility for the staged 
intervention approach and its ‘space’ in which ‘support’ from external agencies would 
function.  This ‘space’, in which ADHD knowledge was able to function, can be seen to be 
conditioned not by the ‘need’ of the young person, but by the need of education to solve 
the problem of additional support needs within a context of increased ‘demand’ created by 
the requirement of ‘inclusive’ education to meet the needs of every pupil.   
Rather than embodying ‘equality for all’, however, ‘inclusive’ education can be seen as a 
means and mode of governance of the young person.  Education was revealed as a way 
of educating and shaping young people according to the requirements of a ‘globalised’ free 
market: they were positioned as the future adult and worker and, as such, required the 
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necessary skills and abilities for the role.  The school, supported by mental health and 
social services, was the means by which this governance was enacted, with the 
technologies of its enactment constructed as ‘inclusive’, as promoting ‘wellbeing’, and as 
reducing the likelihood of social exclusion and disadvantage through providing the skills to 
gain employment.  Within these interconnected apparatuses, anything considered a ‘risk’ 
to future educational outcomes becomes a ‘problem of learning’ and, thus, targetable, first 
through education and then through CAMHS.  The problems of learning witnessed by this 
investigation that were constructed as ADHD were multiple, but every single one of them 
could be placed outside the young person within the structures in which they existed: 
poorly resourced schools, communities affected by poverty, lingering discourses that 
construct education as pointless, experience of abuse and trauma – these were all visible 
in the appointments I observed, but all were individualised as ‘symptoms’ of ADHD.  The 
outcome, contrary to official knowledges and policy, was not reduced symptoms, improved 
educational outcomes and increased wellbeing, but the annulling of the voice of the young 
person through the continued fixing of their experiences as symptoms of ADHD by the 
medication review.  The requirement: continued use of medication and the 
responsibilisation of the young person to improve their problem, rather than consideration 
of the context in which they are constructed as a problem. 
How to keep the account moving and unfinished?  
At the end of the introduction to Vita, Biehl (2005) highlights that an aim of the 
investigation was to bring forth the reality that was hidden behind Vita becoming the “final 
line” for Catarina, and to produce a form of knowledge that opened up a sense of 
anticipation in this most desolate environment (p. 24).  He finishes with the question: how 
can the anthropological artifact keep the story moving and unfinished?  This investigation 
shared similar aims: to bring forth the reality that was hidden behind the construction of 
young people as ‘having’ ADHD and to open up a sense of anticipation within the 
monolithic reality of ADHD.  I also shared the desire to keep the investigation moving and 
unfinished.  But how I might achieve this aim troubled me from the start of the investigation 
– how would I not bring the investigation to a conclusion?  What would be the purpose of 
not bringing the investigation to a conclusion?  The requirement speaks to Mukherjee’s 
precaution to avoid “fatal unclutteredness” (1994; p. 6) when engaging in post-structural 
research.  By doing so, one does not provide conclusions, but endings that recognise the 
temporariness and partiality of knowledge produced by post-structuralist investigations.   
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The temporariness of the knowledge produced through this investigation was starkly 
revealed very early in the project.  As mentioned, I previously worked in one of the sites of 
this investigation.  My recollection of the problem of ADHD from my time in the service was 
that it was a ‘hot topic’; a debate that was engaged with vigorously by various clinicians in 
the service.  One could say the battle over truth was fought daily.  I fully expected the 
battle still to be raging, but it was not; in fact, ADHD did not seem to be a problem at all.  
What appeared to have taken over from ADHD was Autism Spectrum Disorder.  This was 
visible in the clinical appointments I observed and in the conversations with the clinicians 
after appointments.  The various behaviours of the young person being problematised in 
the clinical appointments were first constructed by ADHD, but subtler behaviours that did 
not ‘fit’ with the symptoms of ADHD were causally referred to as ‘autistic traits’.  This was 
also visible in the language of the educational psychologists, who would move between 
ADHD and ASD without qualification.  Throughout the conversations with professionals 
from both sites, there was a sense of ADHD and autism being approached as the same 
‘problem’, which was eventually confirmed in an interview with a consultant child 
psychiatrist.  What appeared to have conditioned this shift was a ‘treatment approach’ 
within the service that was informed by the new category of Neurodevelopmental 
Disorders legitimated by the current DSM (V: APA, 2013).   
In this new category, the previous DSM (IV: APA, 2000) categories of Autism, Asperger’s, 
Childhood Disintegrative Disorder, and Pervasive Developmental Disorder Not Otherwise 
Specified were ‘consolidated’ into Autism Spectrum Disorder (Moran, 2013).  ADHD was 
also added to this new category, whereas previously, it was situated within the category of 
Disruptive Behaviour Disorders (APA, 2000).  The combination of both disorder categories 
under the new term of Neurodevelopmental Disorders can be considered to position both 
as resulting from similar neurological dysfunction, which is what appeared to underpin the 
newly developed treatment approach within the service.  In the approach, targeting 
parents and their parenting now functioned alongside administering ‘small doses’ of 
psychostimulants as the main treatment approach.  The rationale offered for targeting 
parents of young people considered to have ADHD and ASD was that they needed to be 
“super-duper parent[s]”.  These parents needed to do the same things as other parents, 
but with greater resilience and consistency.  The requirement of parents to be ‘super-
duper’ parents was what appeared to legitimate the merging of both ASD and ADHD 
together under one approach:   
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SMARTS is a parenting programme. And – you know – even with ASD and 
ADHD, I suppose, the parenting – you need to be a super-duper parent, in 
that you need to do similar types of things but with almost a greater level of 
awareness of when in timing, and a greater resilience, and a greater 
consistency. I just think splitting everything into bits has actually reduced our 
ability to help kids move forward, rather than increased and improved them. 
(Consultant child psychiatrist)    
Within this new approach, medication would be used in small doses to improve attention 
as it would “improve dopamine” in the attention area of the brain.  Small doses were 
considered to have the desired action and impact, while large doses, highlighted in the 
previous chapter by the same psychiatrist as causing the ‘zombie effect’, were considered 
not to work:  
So in actual fact when you’re putting kids on methylphenidate, you’re putting 
them on the smallest amount of methylphenidate to improve dopamine in the 
attention area of the brain. You’re just really – you’re really dealing with the 
residual attention difficulty after you’ve resolved all the other issues. And I 
think we’ve got a bit confused about that. We tend to go straight in with 
methylphenidate and just ramp it up, and then wonder why it’s not working. 
(Consultant child psychiatrist)   
The implication here is that psychostimulant usage would be reduced; however, this did not 
appear to be the effect created by the new approach.  I was not aware of any young 
people’s medication dosages being lowered.  This was not present in the clinical 
appointments or the case notes.  What was conveyed to me by teachers, however, was 
that there was an increasing visibility of young people being placed on small doses of 
psychostimulant medication without diagnosis and medication being used as a ‘tool’ for 
assessment.  The explanation that legitimated this appeared to connect the treatment 
approach outlined above: that the small dose would help reduce inattention and allow other 
‘symptoms’ to be recognisable and treatable.  In this new approach, the diagnosis of 
ADHD, whilst still fixed on the young people, was no longer required; medication was the 
starting point, which would assist in reducing neurodevelopmental disorder ‘symptoms’ and 
allow consideration of ‘other’ issues.  In all of the conversations I had throughout the 
investigation, this new reality did not appear to be considered problematic, despite the 
awareness that the medication was not solving the ‘problem’: 
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Excerpt 1: 
Interviewer: So that would be for the children who are already diagnosed? 
Teacher: Yeah, on ADHD diagnosis. 
Teacher 2: Or some other assessment – some children are being medicated 
but by no means are they kind of finished assessment, if you like. 
Interviewer: So they were medicated before diagnosis? 
Teacher: That’s always happening now. 
Interviewer: Is that the case? 
Teacher 2: Absolutely. 
Excerpt 2: 
Teacher 1: They’ve been given medication and for some days we actually 
need the medication to be in place to be able to assess the level of trauma 
that’s around for some of these children.  But we wouldn’t have necessarily 
said ADHD in the way they’re presenting within school. I think that’s fair to 
say for a couple of children recently.  We would have felt actually their 
trauma, their past and what they’ve been through, explains an awful lot of 
where they’re at.  But that seems to be coming back as a diagnosis and 
medication’s been offered for these children.  And it’s varying degrees of 
success with it, I would say. 
Teacher 2: Yeah, well, there’s one I’m thinking of at the moment who was 
diagnosed with ADHD with ongoing assessment with other – you know – 
queries – definitely other queries around possibly ASD – you know – and 
obviously that’s ongoing.  But [health professional] was saying, there’s an 
idea of ‘let’s try and treat the ADHD part and let’s see what happens’.  That 
was what we were led to believe was the thing.  So he’s been, if you like, on 
medication since about June time, but actually what we see in class is still 
those hugely explosive outbursts – that anxiety, that – you know – and 
actually it doesn’t – you’re thinking ‘has he had his medication’ – is the 
medication working –  
Does this delegitimise this investigation?  I would argue that it does not and that the move 
from ADHD to ASD highlights the ‘movement’ that is central to the concept of the 
apparatus: that the changing background upon which thought and action takes place 
conditions what is possible, but also creates unforeseen effects that drive displacement 
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and change in the apparatus.  In this case, the new approach was conditioned by wider 
changes in formalised institutional psychiatric knowledge, but it was only acceptable locally 
because of the established reality of the ADHD constructed by the ADHD machine.  Within 
the service, ADHD had come back under the purview of psychiatry due to the ‘effects’ 
created by the ADHD machine: the service ‘case load’ of ADHD was spread amongst all 
clinicians, but only for ‘assessment’.  Responsibility for diagnosis had returned to 
psychiatry, with medication reviews being conducted by nurses and mental health 
practitioners.  The new system placed psychiatry central to the process, but with multiple 
connecting relays through which the new treatment approach would function.   
This ‘movement’ also speaks to the second point above: the partiality of knowledge.  By 
virtue of the displacement and movement, knowledge claims must be considered partial, 
never complete or fixed.  In this sense, knowledge cannot be considered as being globally 
and trans-historically applicable; rather it is constituted by various actors at the various 
intersections of societal structures, and is continually dynamic.  Through ‘movement’, but 
also through engaging with and producing knowledge, new frames are opened, give way, 
and in turn open in new frames for engaging, theorising and acting (Olesen & Clarke, 
1999).  What is offered here, thus, is not considered trans-historically applicable, but as 
constructed through engaging with the apparatuses at the point in time at which I engaged.  
It is offered as a glimpse of a moving and changing reality, but also as means for engaging 
with the reality that has opened up through engagement and movement.   
With the partiality of knowledge, we must also assume a second meaning: that knowledge 
can only ever be partial because of our embodied biases inherent in the ‘way of seeing’ 
that underpins our production of knowledge.  The theoretical position adopted for the 
investigation positions the researcher as within discourse and knowledge. We must 
consider ourselves as both objects and agents of knowledge, which requires us to 
consider the connections in which we are situated, what we see and do not see, what we 
produce and reproduce, and how these things might function as part of the wider network 
of connections involved in the production of meaning.  In this sense, much of what is 
produced by this investigation must be considered in light of my previous role in the 
service: how has this way of seeing influenced what I have produced here and what has 
remained silent?  But I would also argue that this positioning is not necessarily a problem 
for knowledge production and that we should recognise, even celebrate, the role of our 
situated knowledges in the construction of knowledge.  In this way, maybe what has been 
produced by this investigation could not have been produced if it were not for my previous 
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position in the service.  This certainly applies when considering the relatively unrestricted 
access that was available to this project.  
So, what are we to do?   
The points above can create an experience of ‘paralysis’; or, certainly, that is something I 
experienced at points in the investigation: if what we produce can only ever be partial 
because of inherent bias and the background upon which it was produced, forever being 
displaced, what grounds are left to stand on when making knowledge claims?  I found the 
concept of situated knowledge particularly useful for moving beyond this paralysis 
(Haraway, 1988).  The problem posed by Haraway is whether we can have simultaneously 
“an account of radical historical contingency for all knowledge claims and knowing 
subjects, a critical practice for recognising our own semiotic technologies for making 
meanings, and a no-nonsense commitment to faithful accounts of a ‘real world’, one that is 
partially shared and that is friendly to earth-wide projects of finite freedom” (p. 579). The 
premise informing the problem is that ‘real’ science is rhetorical, achieved through the 
enactment of illusionary objectivity-creating procedures, and that the knowledge claims are 
historically and culturally contingent.  However, through this problem, and through a desire 
for a ‘strong tool’ for deconstructing the truth claims of science, critics have been left with 
no ground on which to stand when making knowledge claims of their own.  
Within this context, Haraway offers an account of partial, ‘situated’ knowledges as forms of 
what she terms “embodied objectivity” (p. 588).  Using ‘vision’ metaphorically to describe 
embodied bias, she argues that only partial perspectives can offer an objective vision, 
which can only be produced through engaging with ‘how we see’.  What is urged here is 
engagement with partiality and situatedness: by engaging with both, we will ‘see’ what 
contributes to our unpacking of reality, but also allow for accountability of our knowledge 
claims through opening them up to critical examination.  And by acknowledging our 
partiality and situatedness, we will avoid falling for the ‘god trick’: the idea that there is a 
disembodied, transcendent, conquering gaze from nowhere that allows access to an 
objective truth of our world.  This form of seeing ‘fixes’ in place knowledge, closing down 
alternative reality-versions.   
According to Haraway, faithful accounts of the ‘real’ world that are friendly to projects of 
freedom, modest meaning in suffering and limited happiness (p. 579) do not depend on a 
logic of discovery or an objective truth, but are ‘partially shared’ and depend on a critically 
informed, ‘power-charged’ conversation (Haraway, 1988; p. 593).  For me, acknowledging 
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the partiality of the knowledge claims I have made allows for the critically informed, ‘power-
charged’ conversation to continue; and it is this continued conversation that will keep the 
investigation open and unfinished.  The investigation is not finished, as the ‘movement’ 
above highlights; what is offered here is a partial account, one that urges for a continued 
examination of newly emerging reality of governance conditioned by the elements of the 
apparatus revealed by this investigation.  Governance of young people (and other social 
groups) in accordance with certain aims continues; thus, critically informed investigations 
of its means and mode of functioning within the sites it meets its target must also continue. 
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